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ABSTRACT 
  
There are currently very few discussions of moral psychology in the animal 
ethics literature. This dissertation aims to fill this void. My main contention is that many 
theories in animal ethics hold mistaken views about the moral psychology of human 
beings. These mistaken moral psychological views, I argue, limit these theories’ ability 
to act as a guide in people’s treatment of animals. 
 To develop my argument, I propose five criteria by which to assess the 
psychological plausibility of ethical theories, drawing from numerous recent 
developments in empirical moral psychology. I also draw a comparison between cases of 
physical impossibility in the “ought implies can” literature and cases of psychological 
difficulty, primarily as they arise in the literature on moral ideals. In both cases, I argue, 
limitations in individual resources constrain what ethical theories can ask of individuals.   
I then investigate three different topics relevant to human moral psychology and 
normative evaluation of animals: attributing mental states to animals, the status of 
animals as disgust elicitors, and our empathic responses to animals. With respect to 
mental state attribution, I argue that the best research to date indicates that phenomenal 
mental states, like pain, determine our judgments of the moral considerability of animals. 
I also argue that the behavioral triggers we possess for attributing phenomenal states to 
animals are quite narrow—primarily animals that look and act like human beings. With 
respect to disgust, I examine research suggesting animals elicit disgust-based avoidance. 
I draw from research on dehumanization to argue that one way we cope with animals, 
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despite their disgust-evoking powers, is by attributing them mental states that evaluate 
them positively but simultaneously cement their status as inferior beings. In the case of 
empathy, I argue against the idea that empathy is psychologically central to expressing 
moral concern for animals. I examine six empirical claims made about empathy in the 
animal ethics literature and argue that all six are problematic to varying degrees. 
I conclude by making suggestions for overcoming specific psychological 
obstacles identified throughout the dissertation. I also outline a research plan for 
constructing psychologically plausible theories in animal ethics.   
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1. INTRODUCTION: MORAL PSYCHOLOGY IN ANIMAL ETHICS 
Here is a simplified snapshot of the current state of moral psychology in 
philosophy: First, some philosophers focus primarily on empirical studies within 
psychology, neuroscience, and other sciences. They attempt to achieve clarity on the 
theoretical issues at stake, adjudicate competing claims, advance hypotheses, and 
synthesize and interpret empirical research for philosophical audiences. These are all 
typical tasks for philosophers, firmly established in the history of the discipline, but they 
are also generally recognized as tasks for psychologists—or descriptive moral 
psychology. Secondly, other philosophers, in the process of developing theories of the 
right or the good, advance particular theories of moral judgment, intentionality, 
motivation, the relationship between beliefs and desires, and other aspects of moral 
psychology that are not as easily studied in the lab. Thirdly, an increasingly popular 
approach is to use the first category to inform or critique the second. There is no 
particular name for this third type of approach, as it straddles both empirical and 
theoretical aspects of moral psychology.  
  This dissertation adopts the third approach. However, it also focuses on animal 
ethics, which tends to emphasize traditional normative and meta-ethics without regard 
for moral psychology. Recent advances in empirical moral psychology are mostly absent 
from prominent discussions of, for example, the moral status of nonhumans, intensive 
animal agriculture, species rights, and a variety of other issues. I aim to change this 
trend. My explicit aim in this dissertation is to use studies from the cognitive sciences, 
primarily psychology, to improve and inform the development of theories in animal 
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ethics. I seek to identify and construct ethical theories about animals that are morally 
defensible and psychologically plausible.  
My main contention in this dissertation is that many theories in animal ethics 
hold mistaken views about the moral psychology of human beings. These mistaken 
moral psychological views, I argue, limit these theories’ ability to act as a guide in 
people’s treatment of animals. To develop my argument, I propose five criteria by which 
to assess the psychological plausibility of ethical theories, drawing from numerous 
recent developments in empirical moral psychology. I then investigate three different 
topics relevant to moral psychology and normative evaluation of animals: attributing 
mental states to animals, the status of animals as disgust elicitors, and our empathic 
responses to animals. In the concluding section, I make suggestions for overcoming 
psychological obstacles pertaining specifically to the perception of animal bodies. I also 
outline a research plan for ethicists and moral psychologists interested in our treatment 
of nonhumans.  
This section will provide a basic summary of the role of moral psychology in 
ethical theory generally and animal ethics specifically. Each of the following sections 
will take on this task in their own way, but here I will try to capture general moral 
psychological themes so as to help frame the rest of the dissertation. This is intended to 
orient my dissertation within the moral psychology and animal ethics literature. I will 
discuss three general issues: how psychology can be argued to impact ethical theory, 
how to think about the goals of ethical inquiry, and how animal ethicists have 
approached moral psychology. 
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1.1 Using Psychology to Inform Ethics 
Many ethicists seem to think of moral psychology as ancillary to moral theory. 
The claims I advance can be understood as reversing this relationship. Consider two 
potential projects someone might adopt in using psychology to inform ethics. 
 The first I’ll refer to as descriptive accuracy. Suppose that most normative 
projects in contemporary ethics are working with an inaccurate picture of human beings, 
whatever that might mean. Ethicists could see this as bad in its own right, regardless of 
how it might impact their normative projects. By analogy, denying what human beings 
are really like could be considered similar to denying the facts of history, mathematics, 
or any number of other disciplines. Even if getting clarity on facts about human beings 
wouldn’t affect our normative projects at all, we could still see descriptive accuracy 
across disciplines as a worthwhile goal. 
A second possible project I’ll call deception avoidance. Someone could argue 
that ethicists are frequently too biased towards their own projects, and construe human 
psychology however they wish for normative ends. Kantians say we are rule-following 
creatures, Humeans say we are fundamentally driven by emotions and desires, virtue 
theorists emphasize character traits, and so on. Here, empirical moral psychology 
constitutes the loyal opposition to ethical theory. Moral psychology keeps ethicists in 
check by making sure they are staying within their descriptive bounds when making 
normative (or meta-ethical) claims. This doesn’t inform ethical projects so much as it 
keeps our biases in check. 
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 My project is not to merely “fact-check” normative theories nor help keep their 
biases under control. Rather, the psychological limitations I identify are also aimed at 
altering the content of ethical prescriptions. My aim is to show why mistaken descriptive 
views about human moral psychology are undesirable, and why uncovering them should 
lead us to amend our ethical theories. To be clear, I do not wish to dismiss moral 
philosophy, or replace moral philosophy with social science, but rather to explain how 
moral philosophy can operate within the bounds of human psychology.  
Most ethicists seem to think that being mistaken on descriptive issues is only 
trivially bad. If I have the right moral theory, then what relevance is moral psychology? 
If I have correctly identified a moral duty, why does it matter what I say about human 
beings’ capacity to realize that duty? For instance, suppose I claim that our highest moral 
duty is to increase the amount of pleasure and decrease the amount of pain in the world. 
And suppose I derive from this that our current treatment of nonhuman animals must 
change dramatically. Assuming these claims are right, and the reasoning sound, what 
relevance is whatever moral psychology that follows? For instance, why should it matter 
if people are unmoved by the pain felt by animals? 
The main problem, which I address in detail in section 2, is that human agents are 
not always capable of responding in the right way to moral theories—however correct 
they might seem to philosophers and professional ethicists. This inability to properly 
respond is varied: some will be confused by what ethical theories are proposing, some 
will reject the proposals as illegitimate (for whatever reason), and some won’t be 
motivated by ethical theories. I do not wish to take any specific stance here on what 
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causes the improper response (though I will in later sections). What is clear is that when 
ethical prescriptions fail to have an impact, they also fail to serve as guides. The 
prescriptions offered by ethical theories are not “live options” for many people. They 
might offer paths to action—and so are at least nominally what ethicists would describe 
as “action guiding”—but these paths might not be available to large segments of society.  
Perhaps many ethicists are willing to accept this consequence. If the goal of 
ethics is to identify moral truths, for instance, then the only people whose responses 
count are those capable of perceiving moral truths. That ethical prescriptions are not 
“live options” for many people might be considered irrelevant to the project of ethics. 
This can be understood by analogy to science. We might say the project of science is to 
identify truths about the world, regardless of what people believe. In science, we would 
never suggest that the truth of things is affected by how people, in general, respond to 
scientific proposals. Why think ethics is any different? 
 
1.2 The Goals of Ethics 
I think the projects of ethics and science are similar in many ways. One way in 
which they are not the same, however, is in addressing human psychology. Whereas 
reasons for accepting scientific claims need not act as a guide for normal human beings, 
reasons for accepting ethical claims should.  
The idea that ethical theories should be guiding in some way has been endorsed 
by a wide variety of different philosophers. Some prominent moral and political 
philosophers, for instance, have criticized ethical theories for ignoring the action options 
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human agents actually face, and instead focusing on the action options agents would 
have in ideal conditions (e.g., Gheaus, 2013; Velleman, 2013). That ethical theories 
should be guiding in some way is a particularly widespread view among applied 
ethicists. For instance, among environmental ethicists, Ronald Sandler (2003, 2004, 
2007) argues that action guidance is a necessary component of any adequate 
environmental ethic. On Sandler’s view, an adequate environmental ethic “must 
recommend a course of action…in concrete situations regarding individual or communal 
interactions or relationships with the natural environment” (2004, p. 479). An adequate 
environmental ethic, he elaborates, “must be efficacious in promoting solutions to real 
world environmental problems. It must help bring about, not merely justify, 
environmentally sustainable practices, policies, and lifestyles” (2007, pp. 107-108). 
Though I am not arguing for action guidance specifically, this sort of view illustrates the 
interest many ethicists have in producing theories that will have concrete effects on 
ordinary human beings. 
It is furthermore a common view among ethicists that ethical inquiry is distinctly 
unlike scientific inquiry in that it should act as a guide for normal human beings. 
However, I disagree with the arguments often offered for this. A classic expression of 
this idea can be found in Korsgaard (1996, lecture 1). Korsgaard argues that normative 
ethics is, by its nature, first-person oriented: What ought I do? On the first-person 
perspective, normative ethics, unlike science, aims to provide individuals with reasons 
for action. This is like science in one respect, however, in that ethicists’ answers to this 
first-person question are taken to be independent of general human psychology.  
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I think normative ethics should ask a slightly different, third-person, question: 
What ought people do, in general? The main consideration in support of this is that 
answers at the first-person level might not provide guidance for anyone else. This is a 
basic lesson ethicists could learn from cognitive science. Cognitive scientists generally 
seek out statistical regularities among groups of individuals. Rather than ask what 
individuals should do, ethicists should ask what various psychologically similar groups 
of human beings should do. This is the best way to ensure that ethical prescriptions 
generalize beyond one’s own perspective. If normative ethics is first-person oriented, 
then what use are ethicists, whose ethical views might apply only to their particular 
perspective?  
Third-person ethics focuses instead on providing recommendations that take into 
account what people are capable of, and what actions their psychological profiles1 are 
best suited for, while still providing substantive normative content. Third-person ethics 
is unlike scientific projects in that it takes people’s beliefs to influence the content of the 
questions at hand (i.e., ethical prescriptions). However, it is broadly scientific in that the 
object of study—human psychology—is understood in terms of statistical regularities. 
Given sufficient empirical data, ethical prescriptions can be tailored according to 
prominent psychological features of the general population. This may ultimately 
culminate in an individual (or individuals) asking the first-person question “What ought 
I do?” but the general framework for ethical decision-making, as promoted by ethicists, 
is determined in accordance with broader patterns existing among groups of human 
                                                
1 I use “psychological profile” as shorthand for all of a person’s psychological dispositions. 
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beings. This is not to say that these broader psychological patterns settle any ethical 
issues, but that ethicists must understand these patterns in order for their theories to have 
“psychological grip” on a variety of psychological profiles.  
To illustrate the point I am trying to make about third-person ethics, consider two 
different types of potential normative projects. Suppose that the correct metaphysical 
account of responsibility holds that none of us are responsible for our actions. On one 
sort of normative project, ethicists would recommend that those in charge of enacting 
laws regulating punishment and blame should take this into account. On another sort of 
normative project, ethicists would assume that people are likely to reject the idea that we 
ultimately are not responsible for our actions, however strong the metaphysical case for 
this view. Here, those in charge of enacting relevant laws concerning punishment and 
blame would need to take into account both the metaphysics and the psychology of 
responsibility.  
While first-person ethics might be adequate for the first normative project, it 
seems hopeless for the second. Ethicists would not be able to assume that answers from 
first-person theorizing would provide guidance. What any particular ethicist, politician, 
or lawmaker would do in dictating punishment and blame—from the first-person 
perspective—would potentially be irrelevant to anyone else. In this case, and arguably in 
many others, first-person ethics appears to serve as a guide only by assuming significant 
uniformity in psychological profiles.  
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1.3 Moral Psychology in Animal Ethics 
For the most part, animal ethicists have not engaged with any of the central 
debates in contemporary moral psychology. However, one relevant debate within the 
field is over the role of reason in changing our attitudes to and treatment of animals. Like 
normative ethicists generally, animal ethicists too have adopted a broadly first-person 
approach. Perhaps the most prominent moral psychological claim found in the animal 
ethics literature, commonly attributed to Peter Singer and Tom Regan, is that human 
agents need only use reason to recognize their moral duties to animals. From the first-
person perspective, that is, individuals should be able to reason their way through any 
psychological obstacles to see what is required of them.  
Consider Tom Regan’s (1991) argument against care ethics. A key feature of 
care ethics is that our moral duties arise out of our close relationships with others. We 
owe more to our offspring, for example, than we do to strangers. Regan (1991, pp. 96-
98) claims that this is not only morally objectionable but also psychologically 
implausible. He argues that human beings, as rational agents, are psychologically 
constrained by morally arbitrary principles—we recognize and want to avoid them. And 
showing partiality towards others, he argues, is one of these morally arbitrary principles. 
For example, in the case of pain, Regan does not see how we could say that the pain of 
one person matters more than the pain of another (including other animals). Pain is 
undesirable always and everywhere, and rational agents should realize this. If someone’s 
emotional attachments are causing unreasonable partiality, Regan suggests that we work 
to bring our sentiments in line with our reason—our reason can tell us who to care for.  
  10 
Regan’s views on the function of reason in producing moral change are quite 
common in the animal ethics literature. That is, many animal ethicists assume that reason 
can alter behavior and reign in our emotions to the degree required by their theories. 
Though I think these claims are misguided, I do not intend to investigate them in any 
detail. What is significant, and somewhat surprising, is how rarely the proponents of 
these claims provide evidence in their support. Hundreds of studies, some of them 
including classic, widely cited experiments, could be cited to illuminate the role of 
reason in producing (or failing to produce) moral change, but they are entirely absent 
from the major publications in the field (the single exception I’m aware of is Varner, 
2012). Animal ethicists seem to adopt a position similar to that summarized above: 
moral psychology does not matter, so long as we correctly identify what we owe to 
animals.  
On such an approach, Regan’s assertions seem puzzling in multiple ways. For 
instance, he is making falsifiable moral psychological claims (e.g., reason resists moral 
arbitrariness, partiality can be reduced through reason, pain is perceived to have equal 
and fundamental moral importance wherever it is found), and is also arguing against 
another normative theory’s moral psychology (the partiality presupposed by care ethics 
is easily modifiable). However, the main motivation behind his approach seems to be the 
objectionable consequences that follow from the moral psychology of care ethics. 
Suppose he is right about this, and care ethics does indeed present an undesirable picture 
of human psychology. The burden would still be on Regan, it would seem, to 
demonstrate that his own moral psychological claims are at least minimally plausible. 
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Without this, all we are left with is his first-person drive to be more rational and bring 
sentiments in line with reason. It is not clear, however, why we would think this applies 
to human beings more broadly.  
 
1.4 Section Outline 
The moral psychology of other theories in animal ethics will be discussed 
throughout other sections of this dissertation. Before investigating claims made by 
animal ethicists specifically, I must say more about why the psychological plausibility of 
ethical theories has implications for ethical theories. Section 2 takes on this task, arguing 
for both minimal and moderate criteria for assessing the psychological plausibility of 
ethical theories. This will fill in and justify some of the claims made in this section. 
Sections 3, 4, and 5 look at specific moral psychological issues with implications 
for the psychological plausibility of theories in animal ethics. Section 3 focuses on 
mental state attributions made to animals, or mentalizing. Though animal ethicists 
frequently use mental states to underpin animals’ moral status, rarely is the relevant 
psychology discussed. I present arguments against the use of certain mental states for 
judgments of both moral considerability and moral significance. 
Section 4 focuses on the role of disgust in producing aversion to animals. 
Ethicists rarely consider what obstacles exist to improved treatment for animals. Disgust, 
I argue, is one of the most prominent obstacles in this regard. I further argue for a 
specific way of understanding animals’ prominence in human lives, despite their disgust-
evoking powers. 
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Section 5 argues against the importance of empathy in ethical theorizing related 
to animals. Empathy has been central to a variety of ethical theories, both in the context 
of animals and in normative ethics generally. I argue against six empirical claims made 
about empathy and its role in producing moral concern for animals, concluding that 
empathy should not be ascribed a privileged role in our moral theorizing about animals. 
If the goal is to increase moral concern for animals (which includes improving our 
treatment of them), ethicists should look to other emotions besides empathy. 
In sections 3, 4, and 5 I evaluate the pertinent theories according to their 
psychological plausibility. I also suggest ways of making theories in animal ethics more 
psychologically plausible. In section 6, I summarize my conclusions and outline the best 
strategies for animal ethicists in going forward. Many theories in animal ethics can be 
improved, rather than discarded entirely, by paying greater attention to what empirical 
research tell us about human psychology.  
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2. PSYCHOLOGICAL PLAUSIBILITY IN ETHICS 
 In the last decade, moral psychologists in both philosophy and psychology have 
made a number of sustained attacks against key assumptions and positions in 
philosophical ethics. Their basic claim is that most work in ethical theory is 
psychologically implausible because human psychology is radically different from what 
these theories assume or require. These criticisms have been largely empirical, 
consisting either of experimental explorations into morality or drawing heavily from 
such research. Despite these dedicated efforts, and much supporting data, many 
professional ethicists remain unconvinced that their theories are deficient or in need of 
revision. Indeed, in animal ethics, even citations of these critiques are absent from the 
major professional journals.  
 In this section, I aim to clarify the general methodology employed by these 
critiques and demonstrate that the methodology has merit. Ethicists might disagree with 
specific empirical critiques of their theories, but, I argue, they should acknowledge the 
general implications of moral psychology for ethics. The focus of my inquiry will be 
what I refer to as the psychological plausibility of ethical theories. The concept of 
psychological plausibility will be further refined throughout the section, as I apply it to 
particular empirical critiques. However, a rough operational definition of this concept is 
as follows:  
An ethical theory is psychologically plausible if human agents are capable of 
responding to it in the right ways.2  
                                                
2 This definition is admittedly vague. This is necessary, however, in order to capture what I take 
to be the core theme across a wide variety of recent empirical critiques of ethical theories. For 
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This idea, so defined, is central to a wide range of empirical critiques of ethical theories.3 
In further clarifying the concept of psychological plausibility, my aim is to assist 
ethicists in both evaluating these sorts of critiques and ensuring that their theories are 
psychologically plausible.  
The first part of this section will discuss Owen Flanagan’s Principle of Minimal 
Psychological Realism, one of the few attempts in the literature at providing basic 
psychological constraints on ethical theories. I will argue that there are certain 
deficiencies in Flanagan’s Principle, and then lay out five criteria of minimal 
psychological plausibility to replace his. These criteria, I argue, provide independently 
necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for psychologically plausible ethical theories. 
If an ethical theory fails to meet any of these criteria, then it must be considered 
psychologically implausible.  
 There are also important issues raised by what I will call moderate (as opposed to 
minimal) psychological plausibility, or theories that meet my minimal conditions but are 
psychologically difficult to achieve. The second half of this section will explore the 
normative implications of psychological constraints at this moderate level of 
                                                                                                                                           
instance, one might expect that this pertains specifically to “ordinary” human agents, or some 
similar qualifier specifying which human beings are in question. However, as I discuss below, 
some ethical prescriptions (e.g., those from virtue ethics) are explicitly aimed at excellent human 
agents, and so I have left the type of human agent unspecified. Similarly, different theories have 
different expectations regarding the “right ways of responding” (e.g., in action or in attitude), 
and so that too has been left unspecified. Later refinements of the concept of psychological 
plausibility will make this clear. 
3 A slightly more refined conception of psychological plausibility is in terms of the flexibility of 
human psychology, and whether it can change when ethical theories dictate that it must. Though 
it is rarely stated explicitly, many empirical critiques of ethical theories suspect that human 
psychology is not as it needs to be to fit certain ethical theories’ goals nor can it be modified to 
meet those goals at some time in the future.  
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psychological plausibility. Traditionally, ethicists have been dismissive of moderate 
psychological constraints, since, it is often argued, these constraints can be overcome by 
incrementally altering relevant social and political conditions. I reject this idea and argue 
that moderate psychological constraints do have normative implications for ethics. I 
draw a comparison between cases of physical impossibility in the “ought implies can” 
literature and cases of psychological difficulty, primarily as they arise in the literature on 
moral ideals. In both cases, I argue, limitations in individual resources limit what ethical 
theories can ask of individuals. I conclude by considering some objections and providing 
an example from animal ethics to illustrate broader implications of my argument. 
 
2.1 Basic Psychological Constraints 
2.1.1 Flanagan’s Principle of Minimal Psychological Realism 
 The classic account of psychological plausibility in morality is Owen Flanagan’s 
(1991) Varieties of Moral Personality. Here, Flanagan introduces his Principle of 
Minimal Psychological Realism (PMPR). This principle states, “Make sure when 
constructing a moral theory or projecting a moral ideal that the character, decision 
processing, and behavior prescribed are possible, or are perceived to be possible, for 
creatures like us” (1991, p. 32). Many who have written about the relationship between 
empirical moral psychology and ethics have cited the PMPR favorably (e.g., Appiah, 
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2008; Casebeer, 2003; DesAutels, 1998; Goldman, 1993; Johnson, 1996). None of the 
advocates of the PMPR have discussed its implications in any detail, however.4 
 One implication Flanagan sees for the PMPR is that ethicists must provide an 
account of the moral psychology required (or entailed) by their theories. The challenge 
for ethicists posed by the PMPR, according to Flanagan, is that “every moral conception 
owes us at least a partial specification of the personality and motivational structure it 
expects of morally mature individuals” (1991, p. 35). That is, every theorist owes an 
account of what moral psychological profiles are demanded by his or her theory. 
Flanagan thinks that specifying these demands should take into consideration what is 
psychologically possible for human beings.  
 Flanagan thinks his formulation of the PMPR is both descriptive and 
prescriptive. That is, he aims to identify a common feature of ethical theories (they in 
fact often aim, even if implicitly, to adhere to the principles contained in the PMPR) as 
well as to provide guidelines for proper use of ethical theories (that they should adhere to 
the principles contained in the PMPR, if they do not already). Two examples he cites of 
theories that violate the PMPR are specific understandings of virtue theory and act 
utilitarianism. Virtue theory violates the PMPR if it requires moral agents to hold every 
relevant virtue, since some virtues are inconsistent with each other (e.g., vivaciousness 
                                                
4 Sabini and Silver (2005), in discussing virtue ethics, note that philosophy has been less than 
explicit in its adherence to something like the PMPR. However, they express the implications 
only in general terms: “Ethics is otiose if it prescribes behavior that people cannot perform or, 
more generally, if it urges people to be the sorts of people they cannot become. But if empirical 
research discovers that no one does (or is) what virtue ethics say they should do (or be), then that 
is, at least, prima facie evidence that people cannot do (or be) what virtue ethics requires” (pp. 
537-538).  
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and serenity), and thus even the most virtuous agent can only possess a certain set of the 
virtues. With respect to act utilitarianism, a version of the theory that violates PMPR is 
one that requires moral agents to maximize outcomes in every “action opportunity.” We 
could conceivably seek out the best actions every second of our life, but such a demand 
would seem to be physically, or computationally, impossible. Since it is impossible for 
human beings to achieve the requirements of both of these theories, they violate the 
PMPR, and must be discarded. 
 Ultimately, however, Flanagan thinks most ethical theories satisfy the PMPR. 
The examples he cites pertaining to virtue ethics and act utilitarianism are purposely 
exaggerated for illustration. Moreover, Flanagan thinks the PMPR serves as only a very 
basic constraint, and is generally unsatisfactory as a guide for moral philosophy, for two 
main reasons: 1) there are many unactualized but possible psychological profiles that we 
disapprove of, and so wouldn’t want to see actualized, and 2) there are numerous 
unactualized but possible psychological profiles that we approve of and would like to see 
actualized. The main project of ethics, Flanagan seems to suggest, is to eradicate the bad 
profiles and seek out the good; on this, the PMPR offers no assistance. The role of 
ethics, one might argue, is to expand our conceptions of what is possible beyond our 
current notions. Flanagan approves of this goal and so applies the PMPR only as the 
most basic constraint on ethical theorizing. 
 While I agree with many of Flanagan’s conclusions, his account of the PMPR is 
too lenient, and concedes too much to ethical theories that should be considered 
psychologically implausible. It is ineffective even as a basic constraint on ethical 
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theorizing. The PMPR prompts ethicists to consider the psychological entailments of 
their theories, and whether they are in fact realizable, but this is not sufficient for 
assessing minimal psychological plausibility.  
For instance, the definition of PMPR does not say anything about how we should 
assess what is possible for human beings, or how overall possibility relates to what is 
possible for currently existing humans. In fact, later in the book, Flanagan broadens his 
conception of possibility considerably:  
 PMPR does not demand that the character and motivational structure required by 
an acceptable ethical theory must now be realized, or have once been realized, or 
be realized on average in actual persons. PMPR requires only that the 
recommended ideals be possible under some conceivable social arrangement or 
other. (p. 201) 
 
Under this augmentation, a theory need only specify “some conceivable social 
arrangement” to become psychologically plausible. This illustrates the PMPR’s inability 
to function as a constraint on ethical theorizing. It would seem to rule out only those 
theories that are, strictly speaking, totally impossible (such as act utilitarianism under 
Flanagan’s construal). This makes the normative aspect of the PMPR—prompting 
ethicists to make sure their theories are realizable—mostly irrelevant. An ethicist need 
only specify some conceivable social arrangement and thus satisfy the PMPR.  
 
2.1.2 Criteria of Psychological Plausibility 
I have suggested that Flanagan’s PMPR is too weak and barely filters out any 
kind of ethical theory as psychologically implausible. Now I will present and defend five 
alternative, stronger, criteria of psychological plausibility to replace Flanagan’s PMPR. 
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These criteria provide independently necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for 
making a theory psychologically plausible. If a theory fails to meet any one of these, I 
will argue that it must be judged psychologically implausible. I will also briefly review 
some of the most prominent recent empirical criticisms of ethical theories in order to 
support the criteria I propose.5 
The first criterion I will refer to as cohesion, or whether one’s theory is supported 
by what we currently know about the psychology of human beings. This criterion 
maintains that the psychological assumptions of ethical theories should be assessed 
according to scientific understandings of human psychology. This is perhaps the most 
general strategy one can find in recent criticisms of ethical theories, and it is also 
arguably the most common. Many critics think ethicists should pay more attention to 
what human beings are really like, and make their theories cohere with what cognitive 
scientists have discovered about the processes undergirding morality. When ethical 
theories are subjected to empirical scrutiny, ethicists should respond by demonstrating 
how the best empirical evidence supports their theories, rather than denying that such 
evidence is relevant. This can be stated as: 
1) Cohesion: An ethical theory is psychologically plausible if it is supported by 
current scientific understandings of the psychology of human beings.  
 
Of course, some ethicists are likely to reject this criterion. Why, they may ask, should 
scientific research impact ethical theories? What can such information teach ethicists? 
                                                
5 Clipsham (forthcoming) argues against some of the critiques I will be discussing on the 
grounds that they do not settle any substantive issues in ethical theory. I am only outlining basic 
constraints on ethical theory, not trying to settle any issues, and so Clipsham’s claims will not be 
addressed further.   
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I will illustrate the importance of this criterion by discussing two experiments 
that have prompted ethicists to look more closely at the cognitive sciences. The first 
experiment comes from Joshua Greene, who has conducted a variety of studies using 
fMRI to determine which parts of the brain are responsible for different aspects of moral 
judgments. In Greene’s most widely known experiment, different types of moral 
reasoning were compared in the context of various moral dilemmas, such as the classic 
trolley problem (Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001). In one trolley 
case, participants were asked whether it was permissible to pull a lever to divert a trolley 
away from five people on one track, toward another track on which there is only one 
person. In another trolley case, participants were asked whether it was permissible to 
push a fat man off a bridge in order to stop the trolley before it reached the five people 
on the track. Participants’ brain activity indicated that there was greater activation in 
emotional areas of the brain in the fat man case than in the lever case. There was also 
greater activation in working memory areas of the brain in the lever case than in the fat 
man case. Greene et al. argue that these results provide evidence of two dissociable 
processes in our moral psychologies, one that is quick, automatic, and emotional, and 
another that is slow and rational. 
 There are of course many criticisms one could make of this experiment. 
However, we can put these aside to get at the issues relevant to psychological 
plausibility. Greene argues that his results show that the element of personal force biases 
our moral judgments. In Greene et al. (2001), as well as subsequent studies (Cushman & 
Greene, 2012; Greene, 2008; Greene et al., 2009), people respond more emotionally 
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when harms are caused by direct force, often by physically pushing another person, than 
when harms are caused more indirectly (e.g., by switching the trolley lever). Since the 
amount of personal force is irrelevant to the resulting harm (whether one or five people 
are harmed), one way of reading this is that our emotionally based judgments are attuned 
to factors that are morally irrelevant.  
One way in which this research can be used to undercut psychological 
assumptions made by ethicists is in defense of consequentialism. The fat man case is 
often cited as a counterexample to consequentialist theories, which generally maintain 
that the right choice in both trolley cases is to save the five, regardless of the steps 
required to do this (Sinnott-Armstrong, 2006). If Greene is right, and personal force 
introduces biases into our moral judgments, then the fat man case should not be relied 
upon in arguing against consequentialism.6  
However, there has been much debate over whether personal force is indeed 
morally irrelevant as well as more generally whether our emotional responses to 
personal force are epistemically reliable (Berker, 2009; Cushman & Young, 2009; 
Kamm, 2009; Kumar & Campbell, 2012; Sauer, 2012a). It is clear that the element of 
personal force influences our evaluation of outcomes, and it does so outside of cognitive 
control, but perhaps this is not problematic. I do not intend to enter into this debate. We 
can see that Greene’s research poses a challenge to ethicists, regardless of whether his 
                                                
6 As he explains the importance of moral psychology, “science does matter for ethics, not 
because one can derive moral truths from scientific truths, but because scientific information can 
challenge factual assumptions on which moral thinking implicitly depends” (Greene, 2008, p. 
67). 
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overall argument is ultimately successful. Those who would use the fat man case to 
argue against consequentialism, for instance, must explain why those intuitions are 
epistemically reliable (i.e., whether they identify the right moral aspects of the trolley 
problem), given that there is now considerable evidence to suggest that they are not. 
Providing a satisfactory response to this challenge would require ethicists to more 
closely investigate the relevant empirical research, as suggested by the cohesion 
criterion.7  
  Another well-known study, illustrating a similar phenomenon, comes from 
Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman (1981), who asked participants to consider a 
hypothetical case in which 600 people are at risk from a new strain of some disease. In 
one condition, participants were asked to make a decision that would yield results 
framed in terms of “saving,” as follows: 
A. 200 people would be saved.  
B. There is a 1/3 probability that 600 people would be saved, and 2/3 probability 
that no one would be saved.  
 
In another condition, participants received choices framed in terms of “dying”: 
C. 400 people would die.  
D. There is a 1/3 probability that no one would die, and a 2/3 probability that 600 
people would die.  
 
The outcomes of each condition are in fact identical. A and C lead to the same outcomes, 
as do B and D. They are just framed differently. Given that the outcomes are the same, 
one might expect people to have consistent preferences across the two cases. However, 
                                                
7 To be clear, looking to the relevant empirical research is necessary but not sufficient for 
addressing the epistemic reliability of our moral intuitions; it will not settle the issue. However, 
providing sufficient answers to moral questions is not required by the cohesion criterion. 
  23 
participants in the first condition overwhelmingly preferred A over B, while participants 
in the second condition overwhelmingly chose D over C, indicating that their 
preferences were not consistent. The generally accepted explanation for these results is 
that the language of “saving” biases people toward outcome A, and the language of 
“dying” biases people against outcome C.  
There are clear parallels here to Greene et al.’s study. In both experiments, 
seemingly irrational processes influence people’s evaluation of outcomes. In Greene et 
al., the irrational processes seem to violate the normative standards of consequentialism 
(though I don’t wish to stake on a claim on whether they in fact do). Tversky and 
Kahneman (1986) argue that people’s responses to the disease case violate what they call 
the principle of invariance. This principle states, “different representations of the same 
choice problem should yield the same preference. That is, the preference between 
options should be independent of their description” (p. 253). This principle is aimed at 
the normative guidance provided by decision theory. The principle of invariance should 
be normatively guiding, they argue, because “Two characterizations that the decision-
maker, on reflection, would view as alternative descriptions of the same problem should 
lead to the same choice—even without the benefit of such reflection” (p. 253). That is, 
people should be able to avoid framing effects, especially ones as simple as those 
exploited in the disease case, and evaluate a decision based solely on its outcomes. 
Ultimately, however, Tversky and Kahneman argue that decision theory cannot provide 
normative guidance because the evidence suggests people are incapable of avoiding 
these effects, even when they have time to reflect on their decision (see Bermúdez, 2009, 
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chapter 3 for further discussion). Thus, both studies illustrate how looking to the 
cognitive sciences can inform and criticize ethical theorizing, as the cohesion criterion 
suggests.  
 To introduce the next three criteria, I will discuss recent criticisms of virtue 
ethics (though I intend what I say to apply to other ethical theories). Arguably the most 
prominent empirical critiques of virtue ethics come from situationists, primarily John 
Doris (1998, 2002, 2010; see also Gilbert Harman 1999, 2009). These criticisms have 
focused on the role and robustness of character traits. As Doris (2002) understands the 
traditional view of character traits within virtue ethics, “If a person possesses a trait, that 
person will engage in trait-relevant behaviours in trait-relevant eliciting conditions with 
markedly above chance probability p” (p. 19). However, Doris and others point to 
experiments in which the relevant eliciting conditions are present but the traits are either 
unexpressed or expressed only weakly, due to other, often trivial, situational factors. For 
example, in Milgram’s (1974) classic study, people were willing to deliver dangerous 
shocks to another individual when instructed to do so by an experimenter; and in Darley 
and Batson’s (1973) study, Princeton seminary students were less willing to provide 
assistance to a person in need of help when they were running late for a lecture. 
Examples such as these abound, suggesting that character traits are frail and 
inefficacious.  
 Situationists also claim that the pervasive causal influence of situational factors 
suggests that traits, when they are expressed, are only expressed in particular situations. 
They do not hold across a broad range of conditions but are fragmentary and narrow. So, 
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for instance, we might express pro-animal virtues when in nature, or when considering 
what foods to buy, but not when considering whether to donate to the Humane Society 
or when providing care for our pets.  
 To state the situationist challenge differently, the traditional view in virtue ethics 
holds that character traits are enduring dispositions capable of producing behaviors 
relevant to the respective virtue. They shouldn’t function in one setting but not another 
similar setting, and their efficacy shouldn’t vary according to trivial modifications in 
situation or circumstance. If character traits aren’t actually expressed in these ways, then 
the traditional theory of virtues appears to be problematic. The strategy here is similar to 
the experiments cited above: virtue ethicists make inaccurate psychological assumptions 
about character traits, and thus virtue ethics should be modified (or discarded).  
 There is a further strategy in many of these critiques, however. The frail and 
fragmentary nature of character traits suggests that being a virtuous agent is difficult, if 
not impossible. As a result, virtue is rare. This is in fact something virtue theorists 
generally embrace. As Merritt (2000) says:  
Now many sympathizers with virtue ethics will want to say, “So what?” The 
experimental evidence shows only that most people aren’t genuinely virtuous. 
(And haven’t we always known this anyway, without needing experimental 
psychology to reveal it?)  That doesn’t mean there’s a problem with the 
normative ideal of virtue ethics.  It just means that being genuinely virtuous is a 
rare and difficult achievement. (pp. 367-368)  
 
This strategy on the part of virtue theorists is interesting. Situationists have generally 
acknowledged that they have no evidence to suggest that virtue is, strictly speaking, 
impossible, yet they still think its rarity has negative implications for virtue ethics. For 
instance, Stich and Doris (2005) claim that, at the very least, the burden has shifted:  
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The advocate of virtue ethics can no longer simply assume that virtue is 
psychologically possible. If she can’t offer compelling evidence—very 
preferably, more than anecdotal evidence—favouring the claim that virtue is 
psychologically possible, then she is in the awkward position of forwarding a 
view that would be undermined if an empirical claim which is not obviously false 
were to turn out to be true, without offering compelling reason to think that it 
won’t turn out to be true. (p. 121) 
 
This reply emphasizes that virtue ethicists owe an account of how virtue is to be 
achieved, given its rarity, if not total impossibility.  
 Thus a further argument can be put to work, in addition to inaccurate 
psychological assumptions made by virtue ethicists. It is not just that virtue ethicists are 
wrong about moral psychology; rather, what we know about moral psychology entails 
that virtue is unachievable, or at least very difficult to achieve. The situationist critique 
of virtue ethics disputes moral psychological claims, but it also goes beyond these claims 
to make a further criticism, to the effect that virtue ethics makes demands that cannot be 
met. This suggests a further criterion of psychological plausibility: 
2) Achievability: An ethical theory is psychologically plausible if it promotes ideas 
and actions that are achievable by human beings.   
 
I understand this criterion as a projective thesis—whether human beings can meet a 
theory’s demands at some unspecified point in the future. As debates over virtue ethics 
have shown, this can vary according to the stipulations of the theory. For instance, if 
only a single person needs to be virtuous to satisfy the demands of virtue theory, then 
virtue is achievable. Most virtue theorists have more ambitious goals, however, which is 
why situationist criticisms seem so compelling.  
 While the achievability criterion is projective, two other criteria serve to link 
what is achievable in the future to currently existing psychological profiles. The first I 
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will call psychological impact. In essence, this holds that an ethical theory must have an 
impact on currently existing human agents who make up that theory’s primary audience 
(e.g., some segment of the population). While achievability refers to what might exist at 
some point in the future, impact refers to the component of a theory that can influence 
what currently exists. As a criterion of psychological plausibility it is stated as follows: 
3) Impact: An ethical theory is psychologically plausible if the ideas it promotes are 
capable of having the intended psychological effect on currently existing human 
beings.  
 
An important feature of this criterion is that impacts must be intended. It would not 
count, for example, if Kantianism leads me to be a better utilitarian, for that is not the 
intent of Kantianism.  
 To illustrate better what I take psychological impact to mean, consider the 
closely related notion of action guidance. A theory that is action guiding is typically 
understood to be a theory that offers criteria for right action in particular situations. 
However, one way a theory can fail to be action guiding is if it does not properly 
accommodate human psychology. G. A. Cohen (2003) notoriously argued against the 
idea of action guidance in political philosophy because the aim of political philosophy is 
not to tell us “what we should do” but rather “what we should think, even when what we 
should think makes no practical difference” (p. 243). But it would be strange to suggest 
that what we think is strongly independent from what we do. One common way of 
determining whether a theory has failed to have the intended psychological impact is to 
observe someone’s behavior. If, for instance, someone in Greene et al.’s trolley 
experiment claims to adhere to a deontological theory that dictates they follow their 
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moral duty not to kill, yet they make consequentialist judgments every time (killing one 
to save five), we will assume that their moral psychology is predominantly 
consequentialist, and that deontology has failed to have the intended impact. 
 I do not take the impact criterion to strictly require action guidance, however. 
What is essential is some specified influence on the psychological profile of currently 
existing human beings. This will interact with the achievability criterion. Virtue theory, 
for instance, might be able to have some intended psychological impact on people (e.g., 
honesty in some specific situation), thus satisfying the impact criterion, but virtue in a 
more general sense might remain unachievable (e.g., honesty across a broad range of 
situations is unattainable). This appears to be exactly what situationists aim to show.  
 The second criterion that links future achievability to currently existing human 
beings is what I call transition. Our moral psychologies are highly plastic, and will 
change over time, but I do not think this entails the absence of psychological constraints. 
Rather, if we want to be sure we change in the right direction, ethicists should be extra 
careful in specifying how this transformation will occur. 
This requirement is reflected in the quote above from Doris and Stich, in 
claiming that virtue theorists owe an account of how virtue is to be achieved. Becoming 
a virtuous agent requires transformation—in many cases extensive transformation. 
Given this demand, virtue theorists must identify how this process of transformation 
works. As a criterion of psychological plausibility this can be stated as such: 
4) Transition: If an ethical theory requires currently existing psychological profiles 
to undergo significant modification, that ethical theory is psychologically 
plausible only if it can explain how the psychological transition could occur, 
given current understandings of human psychology.  
  29 
It is important that this criterion not be interpreted too strictly. Thorough understanding 
of the psychological transition is not necessary to make an ethical theory psychologically 
plausible. The claim is merely that one should have at least some idea of the attendant 
psychological demands implied by the theory—to explain how current psychological 
impacts are connected to future ideals. For example, we can be pretty sure that people 
are capable of becoming vegetarians, but a theory arguing for vegetarianism is not 
psychologically plausible if it cannot explain—in at least a general way—how the 
transition to vegetarianism is supposed to work, psychologically.  
 I will discuss a third prominent empirical critique, from Jonathan Haidt, in order 
to introduce the fifth criterion. Haidt’s critique focuses on yet another popular theme in 
the history of ethics: the centrality of harm in moral transgressions. Haidt contends that 
the sphere of morality goes far beyond harm, to include violations of purity, loyalty, and 
much else. According to Haidt’s research, human morality is determined by six moral 
foundations, which include liberty/oppression, fairness/cheating, care/harm, 
loyalty/betrayal, sanctity/degradation and authority/subversion (Haidt & Graham, 2009; 
Haidt & Kesebir, 2010). Across 12 different world regions, Haidt and his colleagues 
found significant differences between people who valued fairness and harm on the one 
hand, and people who valued loyalty, authority, and sanctity on the other (Graham et al., 
2011; Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009; Haidt & Joseph, 2004; Van Leeuwen & Park, 
2009). This suggests that people possess, at least to a certain extent, non-overlapping 
moral foundations. Some tend to value fairness and harm more than loyalty and 
dominance hierarchies, while others, though they are not insensitive to harm and justice, 
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tend to value loyalty and other values associated with dominance hierarchies. This is a 
problem for ethics because many prominent ethical theories focus primarily on harm and 
justice, and tend to ignore the other moral foundations.  
 An example will help illustrate why this is a problem. Although people drawing 
from any of these foundations will be attentive to harm, Haidt and his colleagues found 
that moralizing of non-harmful behaviors was more prevalent among non-Western 
societies and people who were low in socioeconomic status (Haidt, Koller, & Dias, 
1993). Brazilians, to take one example, tended to treat the wearing of uniforms to school 
as universally binding—a characteristic feature of moral norms—but denied that anyone 
was harmed by the violation of this norm. A conclusion that can be taken from this 
research is that a harm-based ethical theory will fail to resonate in the right way, 
morally, with certain psychological profiles. For example, someone who does not 
ground their morality in care/harm will be able to perceive and be sensitive to certain 
types of harm, such as animal cruelty, but without drawing more heavily from care/harm 
it is unlikely that they will refrain from particular types of wrongdoing because they 
cause harm. They would be less likely to see animal abuse as morally wrong, for 
instance. Haidt’s research thus predicts that ethicists promoting moral principles based in 
harm are less likely to gain reception among those who ground their moral norms in 
loyalty and authority (conversely, an ethical theory focused solely on loyalty and 
tradition would similarly have difficulty in resonating with people who ground morality 
in harm).  
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 Haidt shares with Doris and Greene the strategy of identifying inaccurate factual 
assumptions as a way of criticizing ethical claims. Those who think their moral 
foundations are universal, or think that everyone will recognize the fundamental nature 
of harm transgressions, are wrong, and presumably this should have implications for the 
ethical claims such people wish to make (Prinz, 2007). Haidt and Fredrik Bjorklund 
(2008) press the importance of this when they assert, “All ethical statements should be 
marked with an asterisk, and the asterisk refers down to a statement of the speaker’s 
implicit understanding of human nature as it is developed within his culture” (p. 214).  
 A more fundamental strategy found in Haidt’s work, however, is demonstrating 
how incompatible moral foundations frustrate the goals of ethical theorizing. If, as Haidt 
suspects, most ethical theories proposed by professional philosophers appeal primarily to 
harm, liberty, and fairness, then the results of ethical theorizing will be unpersuasive to 
large segments of the population, who draw from other moral foundations. 
Commentators on Haidt’s research have been frustrated by this aspect of his work, as it 
is not clear if ethical theories do in fact aim to be broadly persuasive. For example, they 
may only aim for truth, and it may be the case that some moral foundations are more 
truth-apt than others. If persuasion is indeed the goal, however, Haidt’s reasoning seems 
sound. Constantly making claims only from narrow foundations is bound to be 
unpersuasive if a significant body of people do not share, or prioritize, those 
foundations.  
 As a criterion of psychological plausibility, I will state this strategy as follows: 
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5) Congruence: An ethical theory is psychologically plausible if its moral 
psychological claims and assumptions do not oppose, and are broadly consistent 
with, the main goals of the theory.  
 
Haidt’s research is one particularly prominent application of this strategy. Many ethicists 
design their theories hoping to convince others who disagree with them, yet, according 
to Haidt, the content of their theories draw from a small set of moral foundations (e.g., 
only harm), thus failing to convince others of their moral claims.  
Others use this strategy as well, though for goals unrelated to persuasion. Stocker 
(1976), for instance, provides one classic formulation of this criterion. He argues that a 
moral theory that does not provide a supporting motivational structure or provides a 
motivational structure with opposing motivations results in “moral schizophrenia.” The 
basic idea shared by Haidt, Stocker, and others is that an ethical theory becomes 
psychologically implausible if its moral psychological claims are self-defeating in some 
way. Consider virtue theory again. If a goal of virtue theory is to make all people more 
virtuous, then it would seem self-defeating to promote rarity.  As Doris (1998, p. 512) 
says, “to what extent does reflection on a few extraordinary individuals facilitate 
ethically desirable behavior? Or more broadly: what exactly are the practical advantages 
enjoyed by ideals of virtue?” Focusing only on the moral psychology of those who are 
already morally excellent would seem to raise difficulties about addressing, 
psychologically, those who are less excellent. Even if this is false (and I do not wish to 
take a stance on whether it is), the example helps to illustrate the form of reasoning 
behind the congruence criterion, and why it is important. Making psychological claims 
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and assumptions that run counter to one’s main goals is presumably something most 
ethicists would hope to avoid. 
 There are of course a number of replies one could give in defense of virtue theory 
(as well as the centrality of harm). As mentioned already, however, for the purposes of 
my investigation it does not matter if one accepts these particular critiques. What are 
more important are the general strategies behind these critiques—why the form of 
critique provided by Greene, Tversky and Kahneman, Doris, and Haidt might be 
compelling.  
 More specific criticisms I make of theories in animal ethics in later sections will 
generally conform to these five criteria of psychological plausibility (which I will 
henceforth refer to as CPP). That is, I will argue that many ethical theories fail to abide 
by one or more of these criteria, and I plan to show how and in what ways they do so.  
 
2.1.3 Replacing the PMPR 
My argument, then, is that the criteria just outlined are preferable to Flanagan’s 
PMPR. One general reason to prefer the CPP is that they provide much more meaningful 
constraints on ethical theories than the PMPR. I claimed that the PMPR is too lenient, 
and fails to place any meaningful constraints on ethical theorizing. For instance, there 
would seem to be numerous morally commendable psychological profiles that could 
exist under some conceivable social arrangement, as the PMPR promotes. It is not clear, 
however, why such potentialities should be taken seriously if 1) they conflict with 
everything we currently know about human psychology, 2) it’s not clear what social 
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arrangements would actually be sufficient to make the profiles achievable, 3) they have 
no psychological impact on currently existing human beings, 4) no ethical theory can 
explain how such potentialities are to be attained, or 5) they conflict with the explicitly 
stated goals of specific ethical theories. Ethicists who insist that we retain access to 
certain psychologically distant profiles must, according to the CPP, address these 
concerns.   
 Another benefit provided by my criteria is that they make our ethical options 
more manageable. The CPP are not intended to be overly restrictive; rather, they 
crystallize our theoretical options by rejecting those theories that do not meet standards 
of minimal plausibility. They restrict the range of conceivable options to those that are 
more likely to have “psychological grip” on ordinary human beings. Certain 
psychological profiles that we might wish we could have must be rejected, but there will 
certainly be numerous attractive options remaining. The CPP allow us to focus on these 
attractive—and more plausible—alternatives.  
 A third reason to prefer my criteria, complementary to the second, is that they 
have more to say to currently existing psychological profiles. The CPP offer more 
specific advice on how to assess theories according to psychological standards, while the 
PMPR merely says that moral theories should adhere to what is possible for human 
beings, without specifying what this means. This greater specificity of the CPP has the 
effect of providing greater assistance to currently existing people in assessing their 
ethical options. For instance, the PMPR allows for currently existing profiles to undergo 
nearly limitless change (within “conceivable social arrangements.”). By contrast, the 
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CPP rule out options for change that are psychologically implausible, and identify steps 
one could take in making this decision.   
 A corollary of the two reasons just mentioned is that the CPP use currently 
existing psychological profiles to limit what ethical theories should promote, if they 
want to have an impact. This entails that the CPP not only have more to say to currently 
existing profiles, they also place greater normative significance on current profiles. This 
offers a different tool for ethical theorizing than does the PMPR. While the PMPR 
focuses on conceivable social arrangements, and a basic idea of psychological 
possibility, the CPP place emphasis on currently existing human beings to inform ethical 
aims. Many ethicists and political theorists have claimed that it counts against an ethical 
theory if it is not action guiding, or if the only action guidance it can give to agents is to 
find new action options (e.g., Copp, 2008; Gheaus, 2013; Valentini, 2009; Velleman, 
2013). Moral prescriptions are generally expected to offer guidance on options available 
to the agent, and not just those that exist somewhere else in psychological space. Though 
the PMPR does not reject action guidance, it does not support it in any direct way. The 
CPP, by contrast, place emphasis on action guidance by focusing on currently existing 
profiles, and the moral options currently available to moral agents.   
 These considerations, as well as those discussed above, provide reasons to accept 
the CPP over the PMPR as basic constraints on ethical theories. The CPP will be used in 
later sections to illustrate how animal ethicists in particular can benefit from 
psychologically plausible theories. Having offered some considerations for basic 
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psychological plausibility, now I will turn to moderate psychological constraints, or 
constraints applying to theories that meet the basic conditions outlined thus far. 
 
2.2 Moderate Psychological Constraints 
 In this section, I will make a distinction between the basic criteria set out above 
and more moderate constraints on ethical theories. I will do so by elaborating on and 
clarifying the achievability criterion. The achievability criterion is pertinent here 
because, as I will explain, many ethicists and political philosophers assume that any 
psychological limitations can be overcome incrementally, and thus such limitations do 
not hold any implications for the achievability of ethical theories or moral ideals. I will 
argue against this idea by turning to two related debates in the philosophical literature: 
“ought implies can” (OIC) and “ideal theory.” First I discuss the relevance of constraints 
for political and ethical ideals, primarily as these ideas have been developed in political 
philosophy. The main problem I identify here is that individuals do not possess the 
resources (of various sorts) to overcome psychological limitations in the way societies 
do, and thus individuals’ pursuit of ideals is likely to require significant resource 
tradeoffs. I then discuss recent debates over the relevance of resource limitations in 
determining whether various formulations of OIC are true. I argue that when personal 
resources are limited, as I suggest they often are when attempting to meet ideals, people 
cannot be expected to meet various ethical prescriptions. This follows from prominent 
discussions of OIC. I conclude by applying the lessons learned from the OIC literature to 
debates over ideals. 
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2.2.1 Achievability and Ideals 
An important and illustrative statement of the role of ideals in ethics can be 
found in Paul Taylor’s (1986) classic Respect for Nature:  
The main function of the ideal is to provide a focus for practical goals. It does 
this by specifying a kind of world order whose gradual realization is the 
permanent long-range moral purpose behind the exercise of instrumental 
rationality by moral agents. In getting a clear grasp of the content of the ideal, 
agents know the overall direction they wish to take in setting practical goals. The 
immediate tasks they set for themselves are aimed at changes in the actual world 
that they believe will make it more closely approximate the ideal world as they 
conceive of it. It is because they envision the final outcome of their endeavors in 
terms of the ethical ideal that they use their factual knowledge the way they do in 
choosing practical ends and the best means to those ends…. The ends and means 
are sought not for their own sake but for the sake of the ideal…for the sake of 
making the world a better place by bringing it one step closer to what it should 
be. (p. 310) 
 
In this passage, Taylor identifies a number of possible benefits provided by ideals, many 
of which are echoed in the ethical literature on ideals. Ideals provide focus and direction, 
telling us what to aim for and how—a harmonious conjunction of means and ends. As 
many other prominent accounts have argued, ideals help us make sense of what we are 
doing in our moral lives (e.g., Velleman, 2002).8 Rawls (1999) famously claimed that 
ethical theory in fact presupposes ideals, because “until the ideal is identified, at least in 
outline…non-ideal theory lacks an objective, an aim, by reference to which its queries 
can be answered” (p. 90).  
 Among ethicists, the richest discussion of achievability comes out of debates 
over the role of political, social, and economic limitations on ideals. These sorts of 
                                                
8 Aaltola (2012), for instance, claims that ideals “concern goals that will always remain elusive, 
but without which ethics dwindles into something blank, directionless and cynical…. It is 
finding the right direction, rather than getting there, that matters” (p. 124). 
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limitations are almost always considered unproblematic. The unachievability of ideals, 
on these accounts, is typically understood to be a contingent feature of current political, 
social, and economic conditions—all of which can be changed. 9  
 The strategy usually adopted in overcoming these limitations to ideals is to take 
slow, incremental steps. This view is shared by just about every commentator on the role 
of constraints in ethics and political philosophy. For instance, Gilabert and Lawford-
Smith (2012) distinguish between hard and soft constraints. Hard constraints are things 
like the laws of nature, or immutable facts about human nature such as our mortality or 
need for oxygen, while soft constraints are things that can be modified through learning 
or altering one’s circumstances. Only the former constrain specifically political ideals, 
because only they are resistant to incremental changes. According to Gilabert and 
Lawford-Smith, any economic, institutional, and cultural constraints should be 
considered soft constraints, because “the limits are neither permanent nor absolute” (p. 
813).10 
                                                
9 Farrelly (2007) provides a broader list of relevant constraints, including non-compliance, 
unfavourable historical, social or economic conditions, indeterminacy, fallibility, disagreement, 
human vulnerability, human nature, and problems of institutional design. All of these are 
generally treated as changeable and therefore unproblematic. 
10 Flanagan identifies three different psychological constraints relevant here, ranging from soft to 
hard on Gilabert and Lawford-Smith’s scale. The first is distance in societal circumstances, 
either historically or culturally. For example, someone born in contemporary America will have 
a very different view of dogs than will someone born among the Pembans of Tanzania, who 
believe that God does not like dogs and that spiritual cleansing is required if one should come 
into contact with a dog. Adopting the Pemban moral outlook on dogs is in some sense a 
possibility for the contemporary American, but only through radical moral change. A second is 
the difficulty in changing powerful biases. Transitioning from carnivore to vegetarian, for 
instance, may require the modification of biases concerning human use of animals, what is 
considered edible, the importance of cultural traditions, and many others, all of which make 
some psychological profiles difficult to achieve. The third feature is changing basic 
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 Similarly, Mark Jensen (2009), borrowing from Mele (2006), makes a distinction 
between three different types of human capacities: abilities we currently express 
(synchronic), latent abilities that we eventually come to express (diachronic), and latent 
abilities that we could develop but do not (indirect diachronic). For example, someone 
could currently be a vegetarian, or if they aren’t they could learn to be a vegetarian, or 
perhaps they never make the transition to vegetarianism but it is within their capacity.11 
Jensen argues that most psychological constraints are only relevant to currently 
expressed abilities, and not diachronic abilities, which are generally the focus of ethical 
and political ideals. Psychological constraints have no normative force, on his account, 
because 1) we can usually make changes to our psychological profiles, and 2) most 
proposed changes are meant to be incremental, thus gradually modifying any constraints.  
 According to these accounts, psychological limitations merely constitute 
potential costs or obstacles to change. But these do not alter normative prescriptions. For 
instance, here are Donaldson and Kymlicka (2011) discussing the obstacles present in 
converting to vegetarianism: 
In the transition period there can be a sense of deprivation of past freedoms and 
opportunities, and a powerful awareness of the burden of new practices. So there 
                                                                                                                                           
psychological machinery, such as fundamental psychological processes like reward and 
punishment. For example, it would be quite difficult, as part of a campaign against meat eating, 
to modify our ability to find food appetizing or to need to eat food at all.    
11 Suppose someone needs to eat meat to survive. If they go more than a few days without meat, 
they will die. Such an individual would lack both the synchronic and diachronic ability to be a 
vegetarian; there’s no way they could ever learn to become a vegetarian. They could, however, 
have an indirect diachronic ability to become a vegetarian. For instance, someone could develop 
medicine to help this individual to survive without meat. Even if this medicine was developed 
long after the individual has died, the indirect diachronic ability always existed. That person’s 
disposition to be cured by the medicine was always there, such that if the medicine had been 
discovered sooner, they would have been able to become a vegetarian. 
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needs to be a transition strategy to deal with this (e.g. incremental changes, lots 
of experimentation, compensations, and so on). But in judging what are 
reasonable efforts to bring about the circumstances of justice, the fundamental 
issue is not the transition costs (which can be offset), but whether the transition 
leads to fair and sustainable practices in the long term. (p. 202) 
 
This would seem to reduce the significance of any relevant constraints. The difficulty or 
improbability of realizing an ideal holds no implications for the merit of the ideal. The 
only real challenge is constructing a transition strategy.12 And arguing against an ideal 
on the grounds that it would be difficult to achieve seems defeatist, or as Gilabert and 
Lawford-Smith say, would be to endorse “cynical realism” about moral progress.13 
 The problem I see with all of these accounts is that they aim at modifying human 
behavior at a societal level, through the tools available to governments and nations. But 
ethical prescriptions are frequently made for individuals, who have relatively limited 
resources. Taking incremental steps at a policy or societal level has the benefit of 
enormous resources and time to complete the change (not to mention that someone else 
will likely bear the brunt of the costs). Individuals do not have these benefits.14 Aside 
                                                
12 The only question would be whether the cost of achieving the transition is justifiable. And in 
the case of animals, many ethicists are likely to say yes, they are. Cochrane (2012), for instance, 
argues that when animal lives are at stake, we should be willing to absorb any costs. 
13 Rawls (2001) offers a similar analysis, “there is a question about how the limits of the 
practicable are discerned and what the conditions of our social world in fact are; the problem 
here is that the limits of the possible are not given by the actual, for we can to a greater or lesser 
extent change political and social institutions, and much else” (pp. 4–5).  
14 There are also numerous criticisms of ideal theory more broadly. Sen (2006, 2009), for 
instance, argues that achieving more justice in our current world does not require that we 
understand what ideal justice is or what it might look like. And Goodin (1995) argues that 
focusing only on ideals often makes us overlook second- and third-best normative options, where 
ethical prescriptions might have greater force but still satisfy moral demands. I find these 
accounts persuasive, but they do not address the criticisms I have in mind.  For other good 
discussions of constraints within the context of ideal and non-ideal theory, see Farrelly (2007), 
Gheaus (2013), Gilabert (2011), Simmons (2010), Stemplowska (2008), and Swift (2008). 
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from the obvious differences in financial resources and human capital, individuals also 
possess limited psychological resources in ways governments and nations do not. 
Psychologists can measure depletions in ego, willpower, motivation, self-control, and 
many other psychological features that factor into our moral behavior and limit what we 
are capable of. These human limitations do not affect governments and nations as much 
because at a societal level these limitations are more distributed (in a variety of 
dimensions), and any one government entity can receive support from other 
governmental entities, all of which have more resources than are available to individual 
human beings. 
 As I understand the nature of ideals, meeting them incrementally requires us to 
pursue a long chain of duties, which will take an extensive period of time, or demand a 
lot from us over a short period of time, or potentially both.15 This entails that there will 
always be significant tradeoffs in meeting any particular set of duties in the service of an 
ideal. Given the strain on our personal resources, we can only pursue so many ideals, 
and we pursue some at the expense of others. This exacerbates individuals’ limitations in 
meeting ideals.  
These considerations indicate that it makes a difference whether an ethical 
theory’s prescriptions have broader societal support and whether people possess the 
resources to meet those prescriptions. Donaldson and Kymlicka, for instance, seem to 
                                                
15 Brownlee (2010) argues that this is an overly instrumental conception of ideals, and ignores all 
the ways in which ideals restructure our lives without specifying any particular path or endpoint. 
I agree with Brownlee, but am focusing specifically on cases where ideals are conceived 
instrumentally, where the ideal is something that is to be approximated through incremental 
steps. 
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assume that individuals can expect infrastructural support for vegetarianism. However, 
even in wealthy countries (like the U.S.), it is much easier to be a vegetarian in some 
places than in others. If only minimal support exists, it is less clear whether individuals 
actually have a duty to convert to vegetarianism, given that they will need to invest 
extensive personal resources in the conversion, and are likely pursuing other moral 
ideals that make similar demands on personal resources. For example, someone devoted 
to famine relief may invest significant time, money, and motivation into famine relief 
efforts, resources that would thus become unavailable, or sufficiently depleted, such that 
investing in vegetarianism would be extremely difficult.16 
 This raises the broader issue of whether someone can have a reason or an 
obligation to perform an action they in fact cannot perform, or the claim that is more 
generally known as “ought implies can” (OIC). Much of this section is relevant to OIC, 
though the OIC literature tends to neglect psychological “cans.” In the next section, I 
attempt to carve out a space in the OIC literature for psychological plausibility, before 
returning to the issues raised here concerning ideals. 
 
2.2.2 “Ought Implies Can” and Psychology 
 The OIC literature tends to focus solely on physical impossibilities limiting 
individual acts (Graham, 2011; Vranas, 2007). Common examples and thought-
experiments consist of single-shot opportunities, where any psychological limitations are 
                                                
16 Moreover, famine relief may require one to support meat production and consumption, 
depending on where the famine is located and the food options in the region. 
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due only to lack of willpower (or perhaps competing obligations, creating motivational 
conflicts). For example, do I have an obligation to stop a murder that is about to happen 
in Paris, France, when I am currently in College Station, Texas? It would seem not, 
because I cannot fulfill such an obligation. Do I have an obligation to stop a murder 
happening in Paris if it were happening next week (assuming I am uniquely capable of 
preventing the murder)? It would seem I do, and the only limitation would be my ability 
to will myself through the necessary steps (e.g., buying plane tickets, getting on the 
plane, etc.). I aim to get a clearer idea of how psychological constraints fit into the OIC 
literature, particularly with respect to individuals. Specifically, I will highlight certain 
analogies between these one-shot physical impossibility cases and psychological cases 
including multiple steps.17 
One recent influential defense of OIC, with implications for psychological 
plausibility, comes from Streumer (2007). He defends the following claim: 
There cannot be a reason for a person to perform an action if it is impossible that 
this person will perform this action. (p. 351) 
 
The truth of this claim, he argues, demonstrates the truth of a further claim, which is a 
relatively straightforward formulation of OIC:  
It cannot be the case that a person ought to perform an action if this person 
                                                
17 One challenge is, as just mentioned, most OIC accounts discuss psychological constraints 
solely in terms of weakness of will. This matches how ideal theorists tend to discuss 
psychological limitations as well (e.g., Gilabert & Lawford-Smith, 2012). Weakness of will, 
though important, encompasses only a small range of the psychological processes relevant to 
ethics. Another common way of understanding psychological limitations among ideal theorists is 
as a conflict between selfishness and altruism (e.g., Murphy, 2000). This too includes only a 
small fraction of the relevant psychological constraints. As such, much of this literature has 
failed to address the phenomena I see as most pertinent to psychological plausibility.  
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cannot perform this action. (p. 351) 
 
His main support for these claims comes from a set of thought experiments. I will 
mention two. 
The first he calls the “argument from crazy reasons.” For instance, Jane, a person 
living in the twenty-first century, seems to have reasons to prevent the crusades, given 
how bad the crusades were (as well as the slavery and two world wars that followed), 
even though, to do this, she would have to travel back in time and single-handedly 
change the course of history. Or suppose Bob, who is standing on the ground, is told that 
there is a plane full of passengers with failing engines in the sky above him. Bob seems 
to have a reason to save the passengers on this plane, given how bad plane crashes are, 
even though, to do this, he would have to jump thousands of feet into the sky and single-
handedly repair this plane’s engines. 
The second is what Streumer calls the “argument from tables and chairs.” The 
argument from crazy reasons is supposed to demonstrate that there are clear cases where 
there is nothing for human agents to do to make a goal more achievable. The argument 
from tables and chairs generalizes this to indicate a fundamental difference in types of 
agents: agents who can do things and agents who cannot (or rather, some things are not 
agents at all). Streumer’s argument is stated as follows: 
There cannot be a reason for a table or a chair to perform an action, because it is 
impossible for a table or a chair to perform an action. When it is impossible for a 
person to perform an action, this person is in the same position with regard to this 
action that a table or a chair is in with regard to all actions. Therefore, just as 
there cannot be a reason for a table or a chair to perform an action, there cannot 
be a reason for this person to perform this action. (p. 362) 
 
This argument is important because it introduces agential capacities into discussions of 
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OIC. The agential capacities of human beings are impotent in the argument from crazy 
reasons, such that agents can take actions (e.g., perhaps Bob could climb the tallest tree) 
but ultimately can do no more to achieve their goals than could tables and chairs. 
Various objections have been raised against Streumer. A popular idea pertaining 
to ideals is that one has reason to meet an ideal only if one can make a “legitimate 
attempt” at reaching the ideal, or make a “real try.” Not just any initial goal should count 
in favor of the plausibility of reaching an ideal—only those that constitute “real tries.” 
Heuer (2010) understands Streumer’s “argument from crazy reasons” as describing cases 
where a “real try” is not available; there is nothing for the agent to try to do. An agent 
can only really try to do something if trying takes him or her closer to achieving that 
thing. Streumer’s crazy cases do not fulfill this requirement.  
Heuer amends Streumer’s claim to accommodate trying, offering the following 
formulation:  
A person has a reason to Φ, even if she cannot Φ, if there is a reason for Φ-ing, 
and if she can try to Φ (or take other efficient steps).  
 
Heuer further explains what trying consists of: 
 ‘trying to Φ’…requires that a person takes steps which are appropriate in the 
sense that they get her closer to Φ-ing: They must be steps in the right 
direction.18  (p. 241)  
 
                                                
18 Heuer’s definition of an efficient step is as follows: “A person takes an efficient step towards 
Φ-ing ... if her action is done with the intention to Φ, and if it is a necessary part of a plan that, if 
completed, achieves the intended result” (p. 241). Her definition of trying works just as well, 
however, and is more suited to my discussion. 
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Streumer (2010) embraces these amendments to his account, though he does not take 
them to speak against his arguments, as Heuer intends them to. I side with Streumer 
here, and will show how his position illuminates the relevance of psychological 
constraints.  
Streumer’s crazy cases illustrate the difficulty in specifying what it means to take 
an efficient step towards reaching a goal. There is a wide range of different actions the 
agents could take without ever making progress towards their goals. For instance, 
perhaps Bob has time to run to the top of the highest building, cutting the distance 
between him and the plane dramatically. But even in such a case, Bob isn’t actually 
closer to achieving his goal, and therefore there is no corresponding increase in his 
obligation to save the plane. Heuer contends that this is problematic only because of 
Bob’s extreme limitations in time and resources. More legitimate and interesting cases, 
she suggests, are those that include real tries. But this is a mistake: our resources are 
frequently limited when striving to meet ethical goals, as I argued in the last section. We 
also frequently take actions towards a goal only to find out that we have not in fact made 
any progress towards reaching that goal.  
Streumer’s cases involve extreme examples of physical impossibility to show 
that ought does indeed imply can. The reason OIC holds in these cases is because of 
limitations in resources and the resulting inability to identify what would constitute a 
real try. This same issue arises, I submit, in cases of meeting psychologically difficult 
ideals. The use of ideals can be thought of as a way to avoid resource limitations and the 
“real try” problem by providing agents with a series of steps they can meet, over an 
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extended period of time. The challenge of OIC can be minimized by saying that ought 
implies “can take the next step” (an idea first proposed by Stocker, 1971). However, 
Streumer’s crazy cases indicate the difficulties present in taking the next step—we can 
take a number of steps that do not actually get us closer to our goal. Psychologically 
difficult ideals are not impossible to meet in the way Streumer’s cases suggest, but 
similar obstacles do exist. For instance, at every step it will be the case that limitations in 
personal resources will restrict what people are capable of. When people are so limited, 
they will be able to take action, but these actions might not constitute real tries.    
For illustration, consider Donaldson and Kymlicka’s vegetarian example. I take 
vegetarianism to possess significant psychological difficulties, at least for some 
individuals. If individuals do not have broader societal support, they will be in a 
situation similar to Jane and Bob. They must be able to take efficient steps towards 
becoming a vegetarian in order to say that they ought to be vegetarians. This follows 
from Streumer’s account. And given limited resources, there will be times in which this 
will not be possible. Eating a single meal that excludes meat is obviously insufficient, 
since presumably everyone has done that at some point. Even if a meatless meal is 
consumed with the moral ideal in mind, it is simply too meager of an act; it can easily be 
reversed with the next meal. Even significantly reducing one’s meat consumption might 
not count either, depending on broader societal support. If reduced meat consumption is 
unsustainable, for whatever reason, and must eventually be reversed, it is not clear why 
we would count a reduction in meat consumption for even a considerable length of 
time—say, a year—as a step towards becoming a vegetarian. If resources are sufficiently 
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depleted such that any step the aspiring vegetarian might take will not necessarily bring 
them any closer to becoming a vegetarian, then there would be no obligation to become 
a vegetarian. It would not be, strictly speaking, impossible, but the limitations in 
resources would still dictate that no moral obligation exists. 
To briefly consider another example, let’s return to the previous discussion of 
situationist critiques of virtue theory. Suppose a virtue theorist recommends I act as a 
virtuous agent would. Situationists would contend, in opposition, that I am constrained 
by my inability to overcome situational constraints. The virtue theorist could outline a 
series of steps for me to meet, but this would just delude me into thinking that situational 
constraints could be overcome. This is analogous to what is going on in Streumer’s 
cases. Human agents attempting to be more virtuous can take a number of actions that 
are attributable to the ideal of acting like a virtuous agent, but these “don’t count” unless 
they constitute real tries. Situationist critiques suggest that many attempts to be more 
virtuous do not meet this standard. 
To briefly summarize, my main claim is that when resources are limited, people 
cannot be expected to meet psychologically difficult ideals. The resource limitations 
pertinent to OIC are also pertinent to meeting ideals. Ethicists tend to think of OIC in 
terms of physical impossibilities, but, I have suggested, there are clear parallels to 
psychological impossibilities as well as psychological difficulties more generally. The 
final section will elaborate on the implications of this and address certain objections. 
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2.3 Conclusion: Implications of Psychologically Difficult Ideals 
 I will conclude by discussing two possible objections someone might have to my 
arguments. These are not exhaustive, but are prominent in the literature on ideals and 
OIC. I will also discuss one example from the animal ethics literature to illustrate the 
implications of my argument in this section.  
A natural objection someone might have to the argument in the previous section 
is that personal resources are not always so limited. And even if they are, we usually will 
not know when. Various accounts in the OIC literature have acknowledged this 
possibility by arguing that ought does not “conversationally” imply can. That is, in moral 
deliberation we often disregard considerations of what we are capable of in order to 
more directly assess what we ought to do. These accounts attempt to retain discussions 
of moral obligations in moral discourse, even if occasionally we cannot meet such 
obligations.   
Sinnott-Armstrong (1984), for example, accepts the truth of OIC, but also argues 
for the claim “if cannot, might yet be true that I ought.” This claim allows for changes in 
circumstances. For example, perhaps I currently have no obligation to become a 
vegetarian because I have no societal support, but if this support improved, I would need 
to possess the ideal of vegetarianism in order to take advantage of it. Or perhaps I cannot 
take efficient steps towards an ideal right now, but I need to keep the ideal in mind for 
the future when such steps become available.19  
                                                
19 A related objection comes from Estlund (2011), who argues that when people possess limited 
resources, they have a responsibility to increase their access to resources, such that actions they 
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 I do not intend to deny these possibilities. However, there must be some standard 
for determining which ideals should be pursued. There are likely to be many competing 
ideals with significant ethical merit. We possess many oughts conversationally. 
Appealing to the difficulty of ideals is one way of choosing among these oughts, and 
eliminating some from consideration. Moral ideals must be carefully selected to take into 
account various constraints, and help individuals either overcome or work within them. 
Referring only to what obligations would hold across counterfactual situations fails to 
address currently existing constraints. While I agree that ideals should be retained in 
moral discourse, some ideals hold greater merit in moral discourse by virtue of their 
plausibility. Those that address the most plausible “cans” are more helpful than those 
that address only future possibilities. 
 Another objection comes from Gilabert and Lawford-Smith’s remarks above, 
claiming that using psychological limitations in the way I have is a form of “cynical 
realism.” Am I not being unfair to the flexibility of individuals and the potential for 
things to change? Why should we think that psychological change is anything like 
Streumer’s crazy cases? 
 Consider the following spectrum of positions one could take on the normative 
implications of psychologically improbable moral paradigms: 
Cynical Realism: individuals can never change and there is no use asking them to try.  
Optimistic Realism: individuals probably will not change, but that should not stop us 
from asking them to try. 
                                                                                                                                           
cannot currently perform will be within their capacity in the future. However, this ignores the 
fact that resource limitations also constrain people’s pursuit of resource accessibility, and so I 
will not discuss this objection in any detail. 
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Practical Idealism: individuals can change, but we should focus on the most realistic 
options when asking them to try. 
Starry-Eyed Idealism: individuals can change; it just takes time and effort. 
 
I reject both of the extremes here, and favor a position that falls somewhere in between 
Optimistic Realism and Practical Idealism. I am certain that individuals can and will 
change, but not without significant support. And without this support, they cannot meet 
various moral obligations, and thus do not have those obligations. Individuals cannot 
count on social and cultural change to actually occur, and they cannot enact such change 
on their own. If such a state of affairs exists, it would be particularly Starry-Eyed to 
maintain that individuals’ moral obligations remain unchanged. Saying this, however, 
does not make me a Cynical Realist. Rather, I am nudging ethicists toward the huge 
unexplored conceptual space between these extremes.  
 I will discuss one example from the animal ethics literature to illustrate what I 
have in mind here. Gary Steiner (2013, pp. 146-147) argues that some of the most 
prominent theories in animal ethics are not sufficiently demanding (also see Francione 
2000). Animal welfare positions, he argues, make too many compromises. If they were 
consistent, they would endorse the animal rights position he favors. Animal welfarists 
think it is permissible to kill and eat animals, so long as they are not made to suffer in 
the process, while animal rightists think all human use of animals is impermissible. In 
making concessions to meat-eating, animal welfarists fool us into thinking that we are 
making moral progress, when in fact things have not improved much at all.  
Steiner’s position on animal rights and animal welfare can best be characterized 
as an instance of Starry-Eyed Idealism. The animal rights position claims that it does not 
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matter what people currently believe or do, killing animals is wrong, and people can 
eventually come to realize this, and so that is what we should demand of human agents. 
In arguing against animal welfarists, Steiner is rejecting something along the lines of 
Practical Idealism. Though I don’t wish to make an argument for Practical Idealism 
specifically, it is much more psychologically plausible than Steiner’s animal rights 
position. It is notable that animal welfarism still demands quite a lot from human agents 
and improves treatment of animals considerably. Whether it somehow reinforces poor 
treatment of animals is an empirical question. For his Starry-Eyed Idealism, Steiner 
comes off as a Cynical Realist in assuming that animal welfarism will be the last stop for 
improving animal treatment.20  
This should serve as an example for animal ethicists who wish to make their 
theories more psychologically plausible. Even with the constraints I have identified—
which might seem overly strict to some—there still exists substantial room for moral 
progress. Though I intend for my criteria to have a significant impact on animal ethics, 
this does not imply that animal ethicists should settle for poor treatment of animals. In 
fact, if my arguments have been right, ethicists contribute to poor treatment of animals 
by proposing ineffective and psychologically implausible ideals. Ethicists can improve 
their theories, however, by becoming more informed about the relevant psychological 
issues and working to meet the criteria I have outlined.  
                                                
20 Garner (2013) makes similar criticisms of Steiner and Francione in the context of nonideal 
theories of justice. Garner does not discuss the issue of psychological constraints, however, and 
my project is not concerned with justice specifically, so Garner’s views will not be discussed 
further.  
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3. MENTALIZING ANIMALS: IMPLICATIONS FOR ANIMAL ETHICS 
 Ethicists have tended to treat the psychology of attributing mental states to 
animals (henceforth “mentalizing”) as an entirely separate issue from the moral 
importance of animals’ mental states. In this section I bring these two issues together. I 
draw from recent empirical research on mentalizing to argue that ordinary human agents 
use what are generally called phenomenal mental states to assign moral considerability 
to animals, or to identify which animals are owed basic moral obligations. For normal 
psychological profiles, I argue, phenomenal mental states are both necessary and 
sufficient for judging an animal to be morally considerable. This claim is central to what 
I will refer to as the phenomenal account of mentalizing. 
While the phenomenal account is congruent in many ways with current 
consensus in animal ethics, I also argue that the behavioral triggers we possess for 
attributing phenomenal states to animals are quite narrow—primarily animals that look 
and act like human beings. This presents a challenge to animal ethics, as most theories 
require people to recognize that a wide range of animals, far beyond those that look and 
act like human beings, are capable of phenomenal experiences (also usually described as 
sentience).  
I will frame the implications of the phenomenal account for animal ethics in 
terms of moral considerability, as explained above, and moral significance, which refers 
to animals’ relative moral importance (e.g., a frog compared to a human being). In the 
first section, I explain the distinction between considerability and significance in more 
detail in order to sketch, in a general way, the relationship between animal ethics and the 
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psychology of mentalizing. I will outline the most fundamental ways animal ethicists use 
mental states to assign moral importance and summarize how this compares to research 
on mentalizing.  
The second section provides empirical evidence in favor of the phenomenal 
account, including evidence that we attribute phenomenal states based on an entity’s 
physical and functional similarity to human beings. In the literature, this evidence is 
framed in terms of Experience, which is synonymous with phenomenal states, and 
includes the ability to feel pain, fear, joy, and other emotions, and in terms of Agency, 
which includes the ability to use language, form intentions, plan, and make decisions. I 
argue that the evidence indicates that the perception of Experiential states are necessary 
and sufficient, psychologically, for assigning moral considerability. I also address 
potential objections to my argument, specifically those claiming that Agency is 
necessary and sufficient for assigning moral considerability. 
The third section explores the relevance of the phenomenal account for moral 
significance. I highlight the fact that limitations in judgments about moral 
considerability necessarily limit judgments about moral significance as well. Limitations 
in phenomenal mentalizing narrow the range of animals deemed morally considerable, 
which, in turn, prohibits animals’ agential states from ever becoming relevant.  
In the final section, I assess the psychological plausibility of theories in animal 
ethics in accordance with the criteria outlined in the previous section. My overall 
conclusion is that purely agential theories are so psychologically implausible that they 
should be abandoned, but that many other views in animal ethics are sufficiently 
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congruent with the phenomenal account to only require certain revisions. The 
phenomenal account challenges animal ethics in various ways, but it also suggests that 
the field has been moving in a positive direction for the last 40 years. 
  
3.1 Moral Considerability and Moral Significance 
 In this section, I first explain how animal ethicists understand and use the 
concepts of moral considerability and moral significance. I then discuss how ethicists 
use mental states to assign moral considerability and significance. I will also briefly 
sketch the phenomenal account in order to summarize how ethicists’ use of animal 
mental states compares to research on the psychology of mentalizing.  
 
3.1.1 The Basic Distinction 
A common distinction in animal ethics, classically made by Kenneth Goodpaster 
(1978), is between moral considerability and moral significance. Moral considerability 
refers to an entity’s status as being worthy of basic moral attention—as deserving moral 
attention at all—while moral significance refers to an entity’s relative moral importance 
(e.g., the moral status of a human being as opposed to a frog). Being morally 
considerable marks off an agent as having surpassed a minimum threshold, beyond 
which is the realm of entities to whom we possess varying degrees of moral 
responsibilities. There are many additional ways of carving up our moral judgments 
concerning animals, but these two concepts capture the predominant approach within 
animal ethics. I will discuss each in turn. 
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Other phrases used as alternatives for moral considerability are “moral status” 
and “moral standing.” In this section, I take these terms to be synonymous.21Arguably 
the most common way of thinking about moral considerability is in terms of an entity’s 
interests. The interests of a morally considerable entity matter, ethically. As David 
DeGrazia (2008) says “To say that X has moral status is to say that (1) moral agents 
have obligations regarding X, (2) X has interests, and (3) the obligations are based on 
X’s interests” (p. 183). For instance, many ethicists take there to be a conceptual link 
between suffering and aversiveness, such that the suffering of an animal entails that it 
has an interest in avoiding that suffering. This automatically confers on us a prima facie 
moral obligation to prevent or alleviate that suffering. 
The chief question, which forms the bulk of discussion among animal ethicists, is 
what being morally considerable implies, or what kind of treatment should follow from 
being morally considerable. For instance, perhaps this only means an animal’s interests 
should not be hindered, or perhaps instead it means its interests should be furthered; the 
animal should be assisted in meeting those interests. In some cases it is not clear if either 
is the case (e.g. wild animals who, it is often argued, should not be interfered with). As 
was discussed in the last section, some ethicists argue that killing and eating animals is 
consistent with their moral considerability, so long as they are not made to suffer. 
Conversely, others argue that being morally considerable means that animals should not 
                                                
21  Mary Anne Warren’s (2000) classic definition also seems to take these three terms as 
ultimately interchangeable: “to have moral status is to be morally considerable, or to have moral 
standing. It is to be an entity towards which moral agents have, or can have, moral obligations” 
(p. 3). 
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be used for human ends, regardless of whether or not that use would cause suffering.  
 These latter issues raise questions pertaining to moral significance. Even if 
animals are morally considerable, one might think that human interest in eating them is 
justifiable because of our relative moral importance—our interests trump theirs. Their 
moral considerability still dictates that they should not be made to suffer, but this might 
be all they are entitled to. If an animal is entitled to much more than this, it is because we 
have assigned them greater moral significance. For example, it is often thought that the 
great apes cannot be eaten because their moral significance is on par with our own 
(indeed, human beings are classified as one of the great apes).  
 The feature animal ethicists use most often to assign moral considerability and 
moral significance is an animal’s psychological capacities. Apes’ moral significance, for 
instance, is thought to be a function of their intelligence. The next section will explain 
how mental states are used to dictate moral importance. 
 
3.1.2 Moral Importance and Mental States 
 As mentioned above, animals’ capacity for suffering is widely understood to 
provide grounds for assigning moral considerability. However, suffering is just one of 
many mental states thought to indicate sentience, which provides a more broad-based 
justification for assigning moral considerability. As Peter Singer defines it in Animal 
Liberation, sentience is “the capacity to suffer and/or experience enjoyment” (1990, p. 
8). However, as Singer goes on to explain, sentience consists of mental states generally 
characterized as phenomenally conscious. This means that an animal’s suffering and joy 
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have a subjective quality and feel a certain way to that animal.22 Varner (2012) thus 
defines sentience more aptly as “the capacity for phenomenally conscious suffering 
and/or enjoyment” (p. 108). This definition will be important throughout this section. 
A potential objection to this definition must be considered before proceeding. 
Sytsma and Machery (2010) object to the use of the term “phenomenal consciousness” 
because of the debate within consciousness studies over whether phenomenality is 
indeed central to consciousness. According to them, characterizing consciousness as 
“phenomenal” begs the question against theories of consciousness that deny that 
conscious states are characterized by their subjective quality. I do not wish to take a 
stance on this issue, as the problem can be sidestepped in the case of animals by focusing 
on emotional states. Emotions are often said to be valenced, which means they possess a 
positive or negative subjective quality (or possess positive or negative hedonic value). 
This is indeed why Singer and many other animal ethicists have focused on suffering 
and joy—they are clearly valenced. Thus, valenced states are unambiguously 
phenomenal. Sytsma and Machery’s point is that valenced states do not exhaust the full 
                                                
22 For instance, in Practical Ethics (2012) Singer says, “Terms like ‘pleasure’ and ‘happiness’ 
lack precision, but it is clear that they refer to something that is experienced or felt—in other 
words, to states of consciousness” (2012, p. 77). He furthermore connects these felt experiences 
to moral considerability, “If a being is not capable of suffering, or of experiencing enjoyment or 
happiness, there is nothing to be taken into account” (p. 50). Mark Bernstein, in his book On 
Moral Considerability (1998), similarly asserts, “experientialism dictates that all and only those 
with moral standing are phenomenological or sentient individuals” (p. 24). The well-known 
animal welfare scientist Francoise Wemelsfelder (1999) also seems to support this basic idea, 
“The concept of consciousness, as it functions in common-sense interaction with animals, 
denotes that animals are not mere objects but subjects; that is, it indicates that a level of 
behavioural organization is present which requires a non-mechanistic, subject-related, first 
person perspective level of explanation” (p. 42). This connection between conscious states and 
moral considerability is nicely drawn together in the phrase “experiential well-being” (Palmer, 
2010). 
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range of conscious mental states. This point will not affect the discussion here, however, 
nor does it affect the definition of sentience. 
There are three broad views one can take on the relationship between animals’ 
mental states and moral importance. The first I will call pure phenomenal views. These 
use animals’ capacity for phenomenal experiences to grant them great moral 
significance. Steiner (2008, 2013) and Francione’s (2000) animal rights theories typify 
this view. As discussed in the previous section, they argue that animals’ sentience entails 
that they cannot be used for human ends. This does not mean animals and human beings 
possess equal moral significance, but the gap has been significantly narrowed, based 
solely on phenomenal states.  
Pure phenomenal views, as I understand them, are polar opposites of the second 
type of view, which I will call pure agential views. As mentioned above, common 
agential capacities include the ability to use language, form intentions, plan, and make 
decisions. Pure phenomenal views exclude the importance of agential abilities, while 
pure agential views exclude the importance of phenomenal abilities. Raymond Frey and 
Donald Davidson’s accounts of language typify this view. For both Frey (as expressed in 
his earliest work) and Davidson, language is a prerequisite for even moral 
considerability. Frey (1980) argues that language is necessary for beliefs, beliefs are 
necessary for desires, and desires are necessary for interests. He reasons that an agent 
must believe he or she has a deficiency with respect to some need of theirs (e.g., water) 
in order to desire that need. So although animals can respond to pain in such a way that 
indicates they need to avoid pain, they cannot truly desire to avoid that pain without a 
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relevant belief. On Frey’s account of belief, having a belief consists of judging sentences 
to be true or false, which is a linguistic activity. Since animals do not have language, 
they cannot have beliefs, desires, or interests, thereby excluding them from moral 
considerability.23  
Davidson holds a similar view. As he says, “a creature cannot have a thought 
unless it has a language” (1985, p. 477). On Davidson's holistic view of language, in 
order to have a belief, one must have many general beliefs, and this requires a network 
of communicators. Animals, he argues, do not have this. For example, perhaps a dog 
understands, in some sense, that his owner is home, but he does not know that his owner 
is called Mr. Smith, is the president of a bank, and a number of other facts that ordinary 
language users would know (Davidson, 1980, p. 164). This limits the sorts of beliefs we 
can ascribe to the dog. As Davidson (1985) explains, “We identify thoughts, distinguish 
between them, describe them for what they are, only as they can be located within a 
dense network of related beliefs. If we really can intelligibly ascribe single beliefs to a 
dog, we must be able to imagine how we would decide whether the dog has many other 
beliefs of the kind necessary for making sense of the first” (p. 475).  
Pure agential views, like pure phenomenal views, narrow the gap between moral 
considerability and significance. Frey and Davidson’s account of language entails that 
                                                
23 Frey (2014) clearly states that he thinks animals do have beliefs and desires and can suffer, 
indicating that his views have changed. His discussion of agential abilities has also shifted to 
primarily emphasize the differences in autonomy between humans and animals, rather than 
language (Frey, 1987, 2014). What I say about Frey here and throughout the dissertation should 
thus be understood as pertaining primarily to his early views. I adopt this strategy because his 
early views were widely influential, are illustrative of the pure agential position, and are similar 
in important respects to Davidson’s.   
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animals are not morally considerable, and so lack any moral significance. However, if an 
animal turns out to be a language-user, Frey and Davidson’s view would automatically 
grant that animal great moral significance, regardless of any other capacities it might 
possess.24 Great apes, for example, would not need to have the capacity for sentience so 
long as they are highly linguistic—they would still be on moral par with human beings.  
The third type of view I will simply call mixed. Theories in animal ethics can be 
understood on a spectrum from pure phenomenality to pure agency, the majority of 
which fall in between these two poles, and are thus mixed. I will discuss Varner’s (2012) 
categories of sentient, near-persons, and persons to illustrate how mixed views generally 
work.  
According to Varner’s (2012, p. 113, 123) well-known taxonomy of pain-feeling 
animals, the animals that appear to be sentient (in the phenomenal sense) include all 
vertebrates, which encompass all mammals, birds, reptiles, and amphibians. Thus, all 
vertebrates should be judged morally considerable, and different levels of moral 
significance can be granted among the different types of vertebrates, some of which are 
persons or near-persons. Persons and near-persons, on Varner’s account, possess an 
array of cognitive capacities that qualify them for great moral significance: near-persons 
can think about their past and their future; persons possess a biographical sense of self 
                                                
24 Carruthers (1992) and Korsgaard (1996) seem to hold views similar to the early Frey and 
Davidson in that rationality, according to them, is a prerequisite for moral standing (though their 
conceptions of rationality diverge from one another). They differ from the early Frey and 
Davidson, however, in that they grant beliefs, desires, and some level of intelligence to animals. 
Since the early Frey and Davidson are “purer” in this respect, I will not discuss Carruthers and 
Korsgaard’s views in any detail. Suffice to say that they are on the agential end of the spectrum. 
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and the ability to see their lives in narrative terms. According to Varner, only human 
beings are persons, while apes, cetaceans (e.g., dolphins), corvids (e.g., Western Scrub 
Jays), and elephants are the best candidates for near-persons, based on the most current 
empirical research (which he reviews in detail). Importantly, the reason these cognitive 
capacities matter, on Varner’s account, is that they enhance an animal’s phenomenal 
states. As he explains the importance of narrative abilities, “the abilities to consciously 
remember the past and to consciously anticipate the future allow the individual to 
reexperience good (and bad) states of consciousness and to anticipate (and dread) future 
experiences” (p. 162). Narratives are phenomenally rich, and the more phenomenally 
rich they are, the more moral significance they carry. Meeting one’s goals, for instance, 
can be thought of as realizing—consciously—that one’s desires have been satisfied. The 
desires (or goals) provide one layer of phenomenality, and the conscious realization of 
those desires (or goals) being met or frustrated adds another layer, and so on.  
Varner’s mixed approach maintains that some animals are more morally 
significant because of the way cognitive capacities affect their phenomenal states. This 
places his view closer to the phenomenal end of the spectrum. However, arguably a 
more common view is to focus on agential states, and exclude phenomenal states, when 
discussing moral significance. This is illustrated by Frey and Davidson’s views 
discussed above. Agential states enhance an entity’s moral significance without entailing 
any change in phenomenality. We can thus make a further distinction among mixed 
views, between those that emphasize agency and those that emphasize phenomenal 
states. For example, suppose Frey and Davidson modify their view to allow that animals 
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can suffer (phenomenally), and are thus morally considerable, but they maintain a purely 
agential account of language. Such a modification, though it introduces phenomenality at 
one level, might still allow humans to use all animals in a wide variety of exploitative 
ways (so long as they do not cause suffering) because humans are language-users and 
animals are not. 
 
3.1.3 Animal Ethics and the Psychology of Mentalizing 
 In the next section I will present research on the psychology of mentalizing in 
support of the phenomenal account. First, however, I will outline the incongruences I see 
between the theoretical options provided above and the psychology of mentalizing. In 
order to do this, I will briefly sketch the phenomenal account.  
The phenomenal account holds that ordinary human agents use phenomenal 
states to assign moral considerability to animals. More precisely, according to human 
psychology, phenomenal mental states are both necessary and sufficient for judging an 
animal to be morally considerable. The moral psychological claim made by the 
phenomenal account is captured nicely by Philip Robbins (2008): 
If a being has phenomenal experience of any sort (i.e., if there is something that 
it is like to be that being), we are morally obliged to take that experience into 
consideration. In other words, it is not just that we feel morally obliged to 
consider others’ pains; we also feel morally obliged to consider their pleasures, 
and perhaps even their hedonically neutral experiences, as factors in deciding 
how we should act. (p. 20) 
 
The basic idea is that something about an animal’s ability to experience phenomenal 
states (of which pain is a perspicuous example) naturally leads people to think it is 
worthy of the most basic form of moral consideration.  
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 The connection the phenomenal account makes between phenomenal states and 
moral considerability matches well with current consensus in animal ethics. Though 
ethicists dispute what a phenomenal being is owed, they are broadly in agreement that 
such a being is owed something. This is what distinguishes many animals from various 
other nonhuman entities (e.g. trees).  
However, this does not necessarily mean the phenomenal account favors pure 
phenomenal views. The phenomenal account holds that an animal will be assigned moral 
considerability if it possesses phenomenal states. This entails that the animal is morally 
significant to some degree—it has reached the basic level of significance—but it does 
not hold any further implications for the animal’s moral significance. As a psychological 
thesis, the phenomenal account does not claim that attributing phenomenal states will 
lead people to assign great moral importance to an animal. It only holds that phenomenal 
states determine basic judgments of moral considerability. The phenomenal account does 
not speak against pure phenomenal views in ethics, but it does not directly support them 
either, except insofar as pure phenomenal views hold phenomenal states to be crucial for 
moral considerability. 
The phenomenal account does, however, speak against pure agency views. Frey 
and Davidson’s linguistic argument, for example, is particularly problematic. According 
to the phenomenal account, ordinary human beings are likely to reject this approach 
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because it does not grant any role to phenomenal states.25 People perceive the ability to 
have linguistically-based beliefs to be separate from the question of animals’ moral 
considerability. This has implications for moral significance as well. According to the 
phenomenal account, an entity thought to be highly linguistic but lacking phenomenal 
experiences would not even be morally considerable. And an entity that is not morally 
considerable has no moral significance. Robots, for instance, as indicated in the research 
discussed below, possess various complex cognitive abilities, and can simulate certain 
aspects of language, but are often denied moral considerability (and thereby moral 
significance) because these abilities do not entail any corresponding phenomenal states. 
 The general implications of the phenomenal account, then, are that pure 
phenomenal views of moral considerability are supported, but in a somewhat trivial way, 
while pure agential views are entirely incongruent with human psychology. Similar 
implications hold for mixed views. Varner’s view, for example, appears to be strongly 
supported by the phenomenal account, because agential states are important only insofar 
as they modify phenomenal states. Views that take cognitive capacities to be important 
in their own right, however—regardless of how they relate to phenomenality—are not 
congruent with the phenomenal account. However, the exact implications for mixed 
views will vary according to the specifics of the theory. I will return to this issue in the 
final section, after examining the evidence in favor of the phenomenal account in more 
detail.    
                                                
25 It should be emphasized that Frey in particular does think that an entity’s experiential life is 
what matters for determining its moral status. The problem, in both his earlier and his later 
views, is that he does not think there is much experience present without language. 
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3.2 The Phenomenal Account 
Here I review evidence in favor of the phenomenal account. I also consider 
evidence that might be taken to oppose the phenomenal account. Specifically, I will 
review evidence for the necessity and sufficiency of agential abilities in determining 
moral considerability. I argue that agency is not necessary for moral considerability and 
is sufficient only when it entails a change in phenomenal states. Lastly, I review 
evidence indicating that we attribute phenomenal states to entities according to their 
physical and functional similarity to human beings, which presents a challenge for 
animal ethics. 
The label “phenomenal account,” at least with respect to the link between 
mentalizing and moral psychology, originated with Philip Robbins and Anthony Jack 
(2006), but the relevant research has been discussed primarily in the context of the 
“valence account,” as proposed by Jesse Prinz, Joshua Knobe, Justin Sytsma, and 
Edouard Machery. The valence account is a more specific variety of phenomenal 
account, focusing particularly on the role of emotion, or hedonic mental states, in 
determining moral judgments. The evidence provided by each account is quite similar, 
and both accounts make similar hypotheses concerning the relationship between 
mentalizing and moral judgments about animals. Thus I will discuss the relevant 
evidence under the single heading of the phenomenal account. 
 
3.2.1 Phenomenal States and Moral Considerability 
 The departure point for discussing the connection between phenomenal mental 
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states and moral judgments is Gray, Gray, and Wegner’s (2007) influential two-
dimensional account of mind perception. They conducted a relatively large survey (over 
2000 respondents) in which people were asked to compare different types of agents on a 
wide variety of mental attributes. Participants in the survey were presented with pictures 
and descriptions of 13 different agents26 as well as descriptions of 18 different mental 
states.27  The agents and mental states were then presented in 78 pairwise comparisons. 
For instance, a chimpanzee and a human fetus might be presented as a pair, and people 
would have to rate which one was more capable of experiencing pain (or if they were 
equal). Gray et al. used these responses to create a mind index, categorized according to 
two dimensions. One categorizing feature they termed Agency, which referred to an 
agent’s ability to make choices, have intentions, and control their own thoughts. Entities 
that scored high on Agency included God and human beings. The other categorizing 
feature was Experience, which referred to an agent’s ability to have sensations and feel 
emotions such as hunger, fear, pain, and pleasure. Entities that scored high on 
Experience included chimpanzees and human infants. 
 As mentioned above, experiential mental states can be understood as 
synonymous with phenomenal mental states. Indeed, many cite this experiment to argue 
that the possession of phenomenal mental states determines mentalizing specifically 
                                                
26 These included a frog, a dog, a young chimpanzee, a human fetus, a human infant, a 5-year-
old human female, a 38-year-old human female, a 30-year-old human male, the person taking the 
survey (a self-rating), a man in a persistent vegetative state, a deceased woman (described so as 
to elicit opinions on deceased people in general), God, an intelligent robot. 
27 These included communication, consciousness, desire, embarrassment, emotion recognition, 
fear, hunger, joy, memory, morality, pain, personality, planning, pleasure, pride, rage, self 
control, thought.
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related to morality. The primary piece of evidence Gray et al. cite is from a single 
question they posed to participants, asking which entities they would avoid inflicting 
harm upon.28 They found that the desire to avoid harming an entity correlated 
significantly more strongly with Experience than with Agency (r=0.85 versus r=0.26).  
The phenomenal account generalizes Gray et al.’s data to claim that moral 
judgments will diverge as a function of the two dimensions identified. Put simply, the 
phenomenal account predicts that agents who are attributed experiential mental states 
will be judged morally considerable. I will defend a stronger claim: being attributed 
experiential states is both necessary and sufficient for being judged morally 
considerable. This claim will be defended and elaborated upon once the relevant 
evidence is in full view.   
Studies conducted by Justin Sytsma and Edouard Machery (2010, 2012) provide 
crucial support for the phenomenal account. Their surveys focused on mentalizing not 
animals but robots. They found that when people were asked to attribute mental states to 
a robot performing simple tasks, they were willing to attribute to the robot the ability to 
perceive the color red and smell an unknown chemical substance. They were not willing, 
however, to attribute the mental states of anger, pain, or the ability to smell a banana. 
Participants were willing to attribute all of these states when the agent in question was a 
human being and not a robot. The explanation for these results offered by Sytsma and 
Machery is that unknown chemicals and the color red do not produce valenced mental 
                                                
28 The exact question asked was "If you were forced to harm one of these characters, which one 
would it be more painful for you to harm?" 
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states—they have no hedonic value and do not feel any certain way when experienced—
and so are considered within the capacities of robot perception. These results illustrate 
that mentalizing different types of agents varies as a function of whether those agents are 
perceived to experience the positive or negative feeling of certain mental states.29 
Another important piece of evidence for the phenomenal account comes from 
Bastian, Laham, Wilson, Haslam, and Koval (2011). They presented participants with 
descriptions of 24 groups of people that varied on dimensions of Experience and Agency 
(groups were relatively broad, including athletes, children, lawyers, and so on). For 
example, those high in Experience were described as “emotionally responsive” and 
“warm towards others.” Those high in Agency were described as “culturally refined” 
and “rational or logical.” They then presented participants with a scale from Gray and 
Wegner (2009) designed to measure experiential states (including an expanded set of 
questions querying group members’ ability to feel pain). They also asked participants 
whether they would “intervene” or “take a moral stand” for members of each group, if 
they were recipients of moral harm (e.g., if someone broke a promise to them). As 
predicted, the experiential descriptions were positively correlated with willingness to 
take moral action. Agential descriptions were in fact slightly negatively correlated with 
willingness to take moral action.  
                                                
29 Buckwalter & Phelan (2013) provide evidence to suggest that these mental state attributions to 
the robot vary according to differences in functional abilities. They found that people would 
attribute valenced states if the robot was described as being functionally capable of doing so. 
Though this provides evidence against Sytsma and Machery (2010), it is consistent with how I 
understand the role of behaviors in phenomenal mentalizing. More will be explained on this 
below.  
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The two studies just mentioned provide general support for the phenomenal 
account. Now I will mention a series of studies that provide support for the specific role 
of phenomenal states in moral judgments concerning animals. One of the first pieces of 
evidence for the phenomenal account, with respect to animals, comes from surveys 
conducted by Joshua Knobe and Jesse Prinz (2008). They presented people with 
descriptions of a researcher studying fish. In one condition, the researcher was described 
as studying fishes’ ability to remember where food is in a lake. In the other condition, 
the researcher was studying fish’s ability to have feelings. The participants were then 
asked, “Why do you think he [the researcher] might want to know this? Why might the 
question be important to him?” The results were quite striking: 100 percent of the 
participants in the feeling group connected the study to moral issues,30 while 100 percent 
of the participants in the memory condition mentioned items related to predicting and 
explaining the behavior of fish31 (with only 9 percent mentioning moral issues). This 
study is somewhat crude, but the stark difference in results for the phenomenal question 
and the agential question are nonetheless significant (one could argue the crudeness 
makes the results even more surprising). 
More recently, Jack and Robbins (2012) and Sytsma and Machery (2012) have 
provided evidence to support the phenomenal account. Jack and Robbins asked people to 
                                                
30 Sample response: “He might want to know whether fish genuinely feel things because in doing 
his job, he does lots of things to the fish that might possibly hurt them if they can really feel 
things. It might be important to him to find out if he causes them pain because he might feel it is 
unethical or immoral to cause harm to other things. He could hold this belief for several reasons 
such as religion.” 
31 Sample response: “So it will be easier to feed them, b/c he only has to distribute food in one 
place or so he’ll know where to go in order to give bait, if they are capable of remembering such 
things.”  
  71 
read stories about the harvesting of lobsters. In one condition people were told that 
lobsters possessed the sorts of states that would be considered Agential in Gray et al.’s 
sense: they were described as intelligent, able to perform elaborate foraging strategies, 
and having great memories. In this condition lobsters were also described as feeling little 
to no emotion. In a second condition participants were asked about states that were 
consistent with Experience in Gray et al.’s study: lobsters were described as possessing 
the ability to feel emotions such as depression and anxiety but not having much 
intelligence. Participants were asked to rate on a 10-point scale how concerned they 
were about lobsters, how they would feel if they themselves were harvesting the lobsters, 
and how severe the penalty should be if the harvesting was made illegal. In all three 
cases, those in the Experience condition scored significantly higher than those in the 
Agency condition.  
 Sytsma and Machery conducted a study similar to this one but focused on 
primates. They presented people with a story in which monkeys were being used to test 
the effects of wound-healing antibiotics and scientists were puzzling over which of five 
species to use for the experiment. They again varied both Experience (described as the 
ability feel pleasure and pain) and Agency (described as the capacity for intelligence and 
inquisitiveness) in describing the species under question. Participants in all conditions 
were asked to rate on a 7-point scale whether it was morally wrong for the scientists to 
use the particular species presented to them. They found that Experience had a 
significant impact on moral ratings but Agency did not.  
 The evidence reviewed thus far indicates that attributing phenomenal states to 
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animals is strongly correlated with judgments of moral considerability.32 It also seems to 
indicate that agential states are not involved with such judgments. However, I also made 
the stronger argument that the phenomenal account holds that phenomenal states are 
both necessary and sufficient for moral considerability. To substantiate this, I need to 
further show the insignificance of agential states in determining judgments about moral 
considerability. 
 
3.2.2 Agential States and Moral Considerability 
 Sytsma and Machery (2012) argue that “Experience and Agency are important, 
independent cues for lay ascriptions of moral standing” (p. 11). As outlined above, they 
found that describing monkeys in experiential terms was more likely to produce moral 
concern than describing them in agential terms. However, the influence of agential terms 
was very close to statistical significance (p=0.13). The average ratings of moral concern 
(on a 7 point scale) for agency were also relatively high (4.37 for high agency and low 
experience; by comparison, high experience and low agency was 5.34). This provides 
some evidence in favor of the role of agency in determining judgments of moral 
considerability. 
 Their main source of evidence for the role of agency, however, comes from 
                                                
32 One other suggestive, but nonessential, piece of evidence is that mental state ascriptions to 
animals seem to utilize the same emotion processing areas of the brain that are used to ascribe 
mental states to human beings. For instance, in one study, Mitchell, Banaji, and Macrae (2005) 
asked people to judge whether certain words could “describe a person” or “describe a dog” (e.g., 
the word “curious”). When mental predicates were judged to be applicable to both persons and 
dogs, more activation was seen in dorsal areas of the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), an area of 
the brain known to process emotion. 
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another study they conducted. They presented people with vignettes featuring a newly 
discovered alien species from another planet, called atlans. The “high experience” atlans 
were described as looking similar to slugs. They could feel pleasure and pain, but lacked 
intelligence, opinions, beliefs, and desires. The “high agency” atlans were described as 
looking similar to human beings except they were hard and metallic, like a humanoid 
robot. They could feel neither pain nor pleasure, but they did have thoughts, opinions, 
beliefs, and desires. Participants were then asked the same questions that were posed 
concerning the monkey experiment above: whether it would be wrong to capture the 
atlans for use in experiments, to use the atlans for human colonization, to kill the atlans, 
or to destroy “the atlan way of life.” There were in fact two variations of this study, one 
in which these questions were asked of the entire species, and one in which these 
questions were asked of a particular atlan. In both variations, responses to all four 
questions were significantly correlated with agential descriptions. Agential descriptions 
led people to show greater moral concern, regardless of whether participants were 
considering an individual atlan or the whole species. The experiential descriptions, by 
contrast, differed depending on the target. When considering the whole species, there 
was no significant effect. When considering an individual atlan, only the question of 
capturing the atlan was statistically significant (i.e., below the 0.05 threshold for 
statistical significance). The other three (using for human colonization, killing atlans, or 
destroying the atlan way of life) narrowly failed to reach statistical significance (i.e., 
were slightly above the 0.05 threshold and thus were not sufficiently related to showing 
those types of moral concern). 
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 This study would appear to support Sytsma and Machery’s hypothesis that 
Agency is also important for moral considerability. But there are problems here. First, 
the use of desires to indicate agency (without experience) is problematic. This would 
appear to be a nontraditional understanding of desire. Desires are typically understood to 
be an emotional or motivational state—something indicating valence. This is certainly 
the case in the ethical literature pertaining to animal desires (e.g., DeGrazia, 1996; 
Varner, 1998). Furthermore, in Gray et al.’s (2007) study desire is classified as an 
experiential state, possessing an Experience rating comparable with “Rage” and 
“Consciousness.” Thus, in describing the atlans as possessing desires, Sytsma and 
Machery have introduced an element of Experience.  
 Second, Sytsma and Machery describe the high Experience atlans as 
unintelligent, nonsocial, and spending most of their time sitting on rocks, while the high 
Agency atlans were described as highly social and possessing “highly developed literary, 
musical, and artistic traditions, in addition to having made great advances in the 
sciences.” These descriptions would appear to modify the nature of Experience in 
problematic ways. For instance, here being nonsocial is classified as an Experiential 
state, but no other study categorizes it in this way. Jack and Robbins, for one, describe 
experiential agents as being “emotionally responsive” and “warm towards others.” Being 
completely nonsocial might indicate to people that they are unfeeling in a particularly 
morally salient way (even if they can feel other emotions, like pain and pleasure). The 
high Agency atlans, on the other hand, are described as social and interested in music 
and art, which implies significant Experience. 
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Of course, to clinch my argument against Agency, it would be nice to have 
supporting data, in addition to my criticisms of Sytsma and Machery’s methodology. 
Nevertheless, given my criticisms, the best evidence suggests that agential states are 
unnecessary for basic judgments of moral considerability. Rather, the best explanation 
for the data presented thus far is that phenomenal states are both necessary and sufficient 
for attributing moral considerability to a being. When animals are attributed phenomenal 
mental states, they are also judged to be morally considerable. And when an animal is 
determined to be incapable of phenomenal states (or particularly unfeeling), no amount 
of Agency-related qualities lead people to judge the animal morally considerable. More 
research is of course needed to confirm these claims, but at present they are well-
supported by the data.33 
However, someone might object that highly complex agential states are sufficient 
for moral considerability. As Sytsma and Machery (2012) say, “But Agency seems to 
matter too: People seem more willing to grant moral standing to animals whose 
cognition and lifestyle are complex. In fact, the more complex these are, the more people 
seem to be willing to grant moral standing.”34 A claim that seems to be widely shared 
                                                
33 Another study that might be taken to oppose the phenomenal account comes from Arico, Fiala, 
Goldberg, and Nichols (2011). 70% of participants in their experiment attributed anger, 
happiness, and pain to insects, but only about 6% did so to vehicles, clouds, or a blizzard, and 
10% did so to plants. They did not ask any questions involving moral judgments, however, so 
it’s not clear whether these acts of mentalizing would be sufficient to lead people to grant moral 
considerability to insects. This study is interesting, but at this point it is too inconclusive and 
anomalous to have any clear impact on the phenomenal account.   
34 Similarly, Martha Nussbaum (2006) has urged ethicists to adopt what she calls a “disjunctive 
approach” to moral considerability, which puts agential and experiential states on equal ground, 
“if a creature has either the capacity for pleasure and pain or the capacity for movement from 
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among ethicists is that agential states entail a certain degree of phenomenal states. This 
idea is illustrated by what I said above about music and art. These activities indicate the 
presence of complex cognition as well as phenomenal abilities. Something similar, we 
might think, is involved with other agential capacities, such as memory, language, and 
decision-making. Episodic memory, for instance, is typically thought of as being 
phenomenally rich (e.g., Varner, 2012). These states have an impact on an agent’s moral 
importance because they entail a certain type of phenomenal state. Thus, in some cases 
high-level agential attributes are sufficient to lead to judgments of moral considerability.   
I fully accept that certain (though not all) complex cognitive states can be 
sufficient for assigning moral considerability. This is consistent with the phenomenal 
account’s necessity and sufficiency claims. In fact it supports the phenomenal account, 
because the reason certain complex cognitive states are sufficient for moral 
considerability is that they entail phenomenal states. This offers some reason for animal 
ethicists to emphasize agential states, but they would do so because of the phenomenal 
states entailed by certain types of agential states—namely, those of the right sort of 
complexity to entail changes in phenomenal experiences. Agential states that do not 
entail phenomenal states would not be sufficient to lead to judgments of moral 
considerability. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                           
place to place or the capacity for emotion and affiliation or the capacity for reasoning, and so 
forth (we might add play, tool use and others), then that creature has moral standing” (p. 362). 
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3.2.3 The Role of Bodies in Phenomenal Mentalizing 
A number of studies have found that an entity’s body and behavior influence how 
it is mentalized. Here I will focus specifically on how phenomenal state mentalizing is 
influenced by such factors. The evidence, I suggest, indicates that a relatively narrow 
range of animals will be attributed phenomenal mental states. I will provide reasons to 
think this is problematic for assigning moral considerability. 
That phenomenal mentalizing is suited to specific entities is evident simply from 
looking at which nonhuman entities scored highest in Experience on Grey et al.’s (2007) 
scale: apes and dogs. Both animals possess pronounced facial features similar to human 
beings, engage in complex social relationships, and display features (e.g. big eyes) that 
trigger the well-known “cute response” in human beings (Herzog, 2010). Apes can also 
occasionally walk bipedally and are phylogenetically close to human beings. All of these 
features tend to predict mentalizing of animals (Horowitz & Bekoff, 2007; Eddy, 
Povinelli, & Gallup, 1993).  
Further evidence for the role of bodies in phenomenal mentalizing comes from 
Phillips and McCulloch (2005). They surveyed people from a large cross-national 
sample about their views on the sentience of various animal species. People were asked 
to rate the degree to which each species could feel pain, happiness, fear and boredom, in 
comparison to normal adult human beings. Their responses were then combined to create 
an aggregate sentience score. The final rankings, across all countries, went in the 
following order: monkey, dog, newborn baby (human), fox, pig, chicken, rat, fish. On 
the high end, monkeys, dogs, and newborn babies were judged to be about 80% as 
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sentient as normal adult human beings. At the bottom end, chickens and rats were judged 
about 60% and fish 47% as sentient as normal adult human beings. This study clearly 
indicates that sentience ratings are dictated by similarity to human beings. 
Corroborating evidence that people’s attitudes to animals are largely determined 
by similarity to human beings comes from Batt (2009). She presented people with 
pictures of 40 different species and asked them to rank how much they liked each 
species in comparison to all the others. She also created a ranking of each species 
according to their biological similarity to humans (which was calculated using a 
combination of behavioral, ecological, and anatomical information about each species). 
She then mapped people’s preferences for each species onto the species’ biological 
similarity to humans. The correlation between the two was quite high (r = 0.542, P < 
0.01). Batt did not assess moral evaluations, but it is enough to show that biological 
similarity dictates general preferences. This indicates that people do indeed take such 
information into account. 
As mentioned above, there is widespread agreement that all vertebrates are 
sentient, and thus morally considerable. But the evidence suggests people do not 
naturally attribute phenomenal states to all vertebrates. Rather, they attribute 
phenomenal states according to physical, functional, and phylogenetic similarity to 
humans.  
To see the potential implications of this, consider the Phillips and McCulloch 
study again. This study did not ask any questions pertaining to morality, but one could 
argue that, if we had to set a moral considerability threshold according to sentience, the 
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75-80% range looks pretty accurate. Foxes and pigs were rated 65% and 67% 
respectively, but are arguably treated more like chickens and rats in contemporary 
Western society than monkeys and dogs (e.g., in being considered easily expendable). If 
this is right, and animals in the lower ranges are attributed “less” sentience because of 
their lack of similarity to humans, then a wide range of animals who are actually morally 
considerable (according to our attributions of phenomenal states) will fail to be 
evaluated accurately. 
Even if this is not right, and the sentience-moral considerability threshold is 
much lower, the study nonetheless shows that similarity to human beings determines 
sentience ratings. This is enough for ethicists to be concerned. Suppose the threshold is 
at 50%, right above fish. Chickens, rats, foxes, and pigs would all be sufficiently sentient 
to be deemed morally considerable. Though this might seem significant, this fails to 
cover the thousands of amphibian and reptile species who physically resemble fish more 
than mammals, and would likely receive low sentience ratings.  
One particularly problematic aspect of the way bodies and behavior influence 
mentalizing is that this process appears to be a type of ingroup bias, where we show a 
preference towards anything that possesses ingroup markers. This sort of psychological 
process is thought to be evolutionarily ancient and highly unmodifiable (Gil-White, 
2001).35 Human ingroups tend to use external physical features to identify group 
                                                
35 To be clear, what I am suggesting is unmodifiable in this paragraph is the process of using 
physical markers to distinguish ingroup and outgroup membership. By contrast, the actual 
physical markers used in the process of distinguishing ingroup and outgroup membership are 
modifiable at least in principle, though still resistant to change. So, for instance, the features used 
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membership (e.g., skin color, clothing, body modification). This applies to the case of 
animals as well. Animals’ physical features are used to determine the extent to which 
they are part of our ingroup and thereby worthy of receiving phenomenal state 
attributions. A potential upshot of this is that human beings can learn new ingroup 
markers. So while we might currently use various mammalian or hominoid features to 
identify things “like us” (e.g., hairiness), perhaps in the future we could learn to use 
markers that apply to vertebrates more broadly. For instance, perhaps we could learn to 
use reptilian skin as a marker of sentience. While this might be possible, the evidence 
cited here suggests it is highly unlikely. The behavior and physical appearance of 
reptiles, amphibians, and many of the “lower mammals” are highly dissimilar from ours. 
The differences would appear to be much larger than that between most exclusive human 
groups. It would thus be incredibly difficult to convince people that animals bearing no 
resemblance to human beings should be deemed morally considerable.  
The conclusion I take from this research is that animal ethicists who hope to 
convince people that a broad range of animals deserve moral consideration will meet 
great resistance. The mind assessment system we have inherited is primarily activated by 
organisms that are grossly similar to human beings. We are most familiar with 
mentalizing agents who are physically and functionally similar to ourselves, and so 
animals that bear little similarity to human beings will be denied the phenomenal mental 
                                                                                                                                           
to distinguish ingroup membership could be changed with great investment of effort and 
resources, but no amount of resources can eradicate the process of basic ingroup/outgroup 
psychology. 
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states needed to be judged morally considerable.36 In the next section I expand on the 
implications of the role of bodies in mentalizing, arguing that they impact moral 
significance judgments as well. 
 
3.3 Phenomenal States and Moral Significance  
Nearly every commentator on Gray et al. (2007) has interpreted their data as 
being relevant only to moral considerability (including Grey at al.). Nobody has yet 
asked whether the phenomenal account holds implications for moral significance.37 The 
implications I see are relatively straightforward, stemming from the role of bodies in 
modifying phenomenal mentalizing as just outlined.  
The basic idea here is simple. Animal bodies limit the range of entities assigned 
moral considerability, and an animal denied moral considerability has no moral 
significance. Regardless of how morally significant an animal’s agential qualities 
actually are, they will only be relevant if the animal is first perceived to be capable of 
phenomenal experiences. The range of morally significant animals never expands 
beyond the range of morally considerable animals. And as I have argued, the role of 
animal bodies in phenomenal mentalizing narrows this range considerably. 
                                                
36 It has also been suggested that the robot in Sytsma and Machery’s study is not ascribed 
phenomenal states because robots clearly lack the right type of bodily structures (Huebner, 
2010a). 
37 As Sytsma and Machery (2012) point out, the categories of Experience and Agency map 
nicely onto dominant views in animal ethics. However, they apply these dimensions only to 
moral considerability. For instance, they explain, “An entity has moral standing if and only if it 
can be morally wronged. Thus, it is when, and only when, an entity has moral standing that the 
effects of a moral agent's actions on the entity directly…matter for the moral assessment of the 
actions. Entities that have moral standing deserve moral consideration, or concern, from moral 
agents” (p. 2) This is a textbook definition of moral considerability. 
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 The animals that would seem to be most impacted by this feature of our 
psychologies are highly intelligent animals who do not physically resemble human 
beings. Dolphins, elephants, and various bird species are prime examples here. Though 
these intelligent species also express various human-like behaviors (e.g., sociality), they 
are very physically dissimilar from us. If they are not first attributed phenomenal mental 
states, their various complex cognitive capacities will never be brought to bear on their 
moral significance.  
 This point about the role of bodies follows directly from the above discussion of 
moral considerability, and I assume does not require further argumentation. What is 
more contentious is the role of complex cognitive capacities in determining the moral 
significance of animals already deemed morally considerable. Evidence is lacking here, 
but in the next subsection I will provide reasons to think that purely agential states will 
fail to have an impact on moral significance judgments, just as they fail with respect to 
considerability judgments. 
 
3.3.1 Agential Capacities and Moral Significance 
 I suggested above that complex agential capacities are sufficient for moral 
considerability if they entail phenomenal states. They are not sufficient for moral 
considerability, however, if they are understood as purely agential. But what about for 
moral significance? Can purely agential capacities be brought to bear on the moral 
importance of animals already deemed capable of phenomenal experiences? 
  One high profile attempt to use cognitive abilities to argue for greater moral 
  83 
significance is the great ape project (Cavalieri & Singer, 1993). Many who argue for the 
moral significance of great apes highlight apes’ linguistic abilities (Savage-Rumbaugh, 
Shanker, & Taylor, 2001). These linguistic abilities, however, are usually described in 
purely agential terms. Kanzi the bonobo, for instance, is claimed to have an enhanced 
ability to communicate and think abstractly, but rarely is it claimed that his phenomenal 
experiences have changed as a result (though see Segerdahl, Fields, & Savage-
Rumbaugh, 2005). The increase in moral importance demanded by apes’ linguistic 
abilities is not claimed to be a result of any change in phenomenal states.  
Though there might be reasons to support this idea, I am skeptical that ordinary 
human agents think language—understood as a purely agential capacity—is relevant to 
moral significance (nor for any other cognitive capacity). Unfortunately, there is not 
much evidence to appeal to on this question. Potentially suggestive results can be found 
in Knobe and Prinz’s (2008) study, discussed above. For instance, only 9 percent of 
participants reported that studying a fish’s memory would be related to moral concerns. 
The question posed to participants concerned morality in general, not just minimum 
considerability. This would seem to provide prima facie evidence against agential states 
being connected even to judgments of moral significance. However, there are problems. 
One is that people may not think fish are morally considerable, and so would not identify 
a memory question as pertinent to either considerability or significance. Another is that 
people might not think fish have good memories, and therefore would not grant them 
moral significance, even if they did think fish were morally considerable.  
  The other studies discussed above in support of the phenomenal account also 
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provide reasons to be at least somewhat skeptical of the role of complex cognitive 
capacities in determining moral significance. Nearly every study cited to demonstrate the 
ineffectiveness of agential states in determining moral considerability describes agents in 
terms of complex cognitive capacities. Planning and communication were highly rated 
as agential states in Gray et al. (2007); Bastian et al. (2011) described agents as “rational 
or logical”; and Sytsma and Machery’s (2012) highly agential monkeys were described 
as intelligent and inquisitive. In all cases, these descriptions failed to produce moral 
concern. The limitation in these studies is that they did not focus on animals that were 
already deemed morally considerable. This is what is needed to provide a proper 
assessment of the role of agential abilities in moral significance judgments.  
 Nonetheless, a tentative conclusion can be made: agential states do not determine 
moral significance judgments, absent inclusion of phenomenal states. More evidence is 
needed to substantiate this claim, however. I will discuss the implications of this further 
in the next section, where I outline the ethical implications of the phenomenal account. 
 
3.4 Ethical Implications of the Phenomenal Account 
 In this section, I situate the preceding discussion in terms of psychological 
plausibility, as outlined in the last section. As stated previously, the clearest implication 
of the phenomenal account is that it is incongruent with pure agential accounts of moral 
considerability. I also stated that pure phenomenal accounts were supported in a 
somewhat trivial way, and that implications for mixed views would vary case-by-case. I 
will address all of these different types of theories here.  
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3.4.1 Psychologically Implausible Theories 
The criteria of psychological plausibility most pertinent here are Impact, 
Achievability, and Transition. These criteria require ethical theories to have an impact 
on currently existing psychological profiles, or if they do not have any impact, their 
proponents must provide an account to explain how the theories might have an impact at 
some point in the future. In essence, we should ask whether theories in animal ethics can 
accommodate the evidence that currently existing human beings attribute moral 
considerability based on the ability to experience phenomenal states, or, if they cannot, 
whether they can provide a strategy for modifying the role of phenomenal states in 
human moral psychology. 
Two main psychological processes I have outlined raise challenges for animal 
ethics. One is the role of animal bodies and behavior in constraining our phenomenal 
mentalizing, and the other is the absence of moral evaluations from agential mentalizing. 
Both of these processes exclude animals from moral considerability in cases where 
ethicists say otherwise.  
These processes are particularly challenging because they are evolutionarily 
ancient and deeply engrained in our psychologies, and are thus extremely difficult to 
modify. Without significant intervention (e.g. a large segment of the population 
receiving years of experience with certain types of animals), the necessary changes 
would likely be unobtainable. First, we appear to be stuck with our bias towards things 
that look and act like us. This is problematic because the range of legitimately sentient 
animals is much broader than we are disposed to recognize. So while phenomenally-
  86 
based theories are, in general, psychologically plausible, they will be implausible to the 
extent they require people to assign moral considerability to a wide range of animals (as 
is required for most theories in animal ethics; Garner, 2013). This is not achievable for 
ordinary human beings.  
One possible strategy for avoiding this limitation is to teach people about 
different types of animals, and show how the possession of phenomenal states is 
dissociable from whether an animal looks or acts like human beings. Huebner (2010b), 
for instance, objects to research on phenomenal mentalizing on the grounds that it does 
not allow for learning about animal bodies over time. He suggests that our perceptions of 
animal mental states will change as we come to know more about them.  
Though being informed about animals certainly changes our mentalizing of them, 
I find it unlikely that this would be sufficient to overturn the phenomenal account. This 
education would need to have significant breadth and depth (enough to demonstrate that 
vertebrates are sentient) and would need to reach a wide audience (not just highly trained 
scientists). While this may be possible, it would take significant resources to 
successfully avoid our bias towards things that look and act like us. Overall, my 
assessment of theories that require people generally to attribute sentience to a wide range 
of animals is, firstly, that some theories will meet the minimum criteria for psychological 
plausibility, but will still need to overcome significant psychological limitations. And 
secondly, many other theories will not be minimally plausible without a rigorous 
transition strategy. 
The most consistent finding of the research reviewed in this section is that 
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agential views are especially problematic. Agential states are not used to assign moral 
considerability by ordinary human beings. And while some people are clearly capable of 
using agential states to assign moral considerability (indeed, many philosophers!), 
clearly the intent of agential views (e.g., that of the early Frey) is for people generally to 
use agential states in this way. Given the evidence I have reviewed, that does not seem to 
be the case. Agential views thus appear to violate both the impact and achievability 
criteria.  
It is also not clear how a transition to an agent-based moral psychology would 
look. Agent-detection is quite old, evolutionarily, and is also one of the first abilities 
developed in infancy (Arico et al., 2011). Physical cues for detecting agency include eye 
gaze, goal directedness, and contingent reactivity (e.g., responding flexibly to another 
agent). These are features even young infants (perhaps by 3 months) use to distinguish 
between agents and non-agents (Biro & Leslie, 2007). Attempts to modify moral 
considerability judgments to include attributions of agency would likely be building “on 
top of” these more fundamental agency-detection processes. Judgments of moral 
considerability based on phenomenal states, by contrast, seem to be “built into” 
phenomenal state attribution processes (according to the evidence reviewed above). Any 
proposal for transitioning to an agent-based moral psychology would thus need to 
explain how attributions of agency might come to be more strongly integrated with 
judgments of moral considerability, and also how attributions of phenomenal states that 
would otherwise drive these judgments might be suppressed. Overall, my assessment is 
that, given current evidence, agential views do not even meet the minimal criteria for 
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psychological plausibility. 
Mixed views are less straightforward to classify in terms of psychological 
plausibility. There are two general types of mixed theories that would seem to be in 
question. The first includes agential states that entail phenomenal states (e.g., complex 
cognitive capacities like episodic memory and musical abilities). The second includes 
agential states applied to animals already deemed morally considerable (e.g., language in 
apes). Above, I suggested that agential states of the first sort can be sufficient for moral 
considerability judgments, and speculated that agential states of the second sort do not 
factor into moral significance judgments.  
The crucial issue in both cases is achievability. With respect to entailment 
theories, we must ask which agential states entail phenomenality, and whether people’s 
views on entailment can be changed. For example, consider Knobe and Prinz’s 
experiment, in which a researcher was studying fish memory. If participants were 
interpreting this in terms of episodic memory—a phenomenal state—then, according to 
the phenomenal account, they would have connected the memory study to moral 
concerns. They did not, however, suggesting that they understood memory agentially. So 
it is possible that ethicists and ordinary agents will disagree about which agential states 
entail phenomenality. But what if it was made explicit that phenomenal states related to 
memory were being studied? Or perhaps a comparison was made between agential and 
phenomenal memory? Answers to these questions would illustrate whether people’s 
concepts of agency are flexible with respect to entailing phenomenality. Despite the lack 
of data on this question, there are nonetheless good grounds to claim that entailment 
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theories pass the minimum standards for psychological plausibility. 
Another type of mixed view that might be problematic is one in which agential 
and phenomenal states are combined but no phenomenal entailment is specified. Tom 
Regan’s “subject of a life” criterion for moral considerability appears to fit this 
classification. His classic definition of being a “subject of a life” states: 
Individuals are subjects of a life if they have beliefs and desires; perception, 
memory and a sense of the future, including their own future; an emotional life 
together with feelings of pleasure and pain; preference and welfare interests; a 
psychological unity over time and an individual welfare in the sense that their 
experiential life fares well or ill for them. (1983, p. 244)  
 
This definition blends together a dizzying array of mental states, some agential and some 
phenomenal. He also says that subjects of a life “are individuals who have an 
experiential welfare – whose experiential life fares well or ill, depending on what 
happens to, or is done to or for, them” (Regan, 1983, p. 262). This makes his theory 
psychologically plausible, but it’s not clear whether the other agential states he 
emphasizes would have a counteractive effect. 
Things are similarly complicated with respect to agential views that do not entail 
phenomenality. The question here is whether ordinary human agents will use, or learn to 
use, pure agential states to assign moral significance. Answering this is difficult because 
the animal in question has been judged phenomenally capable, and thus any agential 
states might be assumed to have an impact on phenomenal states. A crucial test for this 
would be asking people to rank the moral significance of different phenomenally capable 
animals (or animal species) according to purely agential states. For instance, the Border 
collie Chaser has demonstrated the ability to comprehend over 1,000 English words 
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(Pilley & Reid, 2011). This would seem to be a purely agential ability. This sort of view 
about agential states could be tested by comparing Chaser’s moral significance to an 
array of other dogs, all of which must be described as phenomenally capable but non-
linguistic. My prediction would be that Chaser would not be judged to have greater 
moral significance, just as Kanzi the bonobo would not be judged to have greater moral 
significance than other bonobos. If, however, Chaser (or Kanzi) is granted increased 
moral significance, there would need to be an additional assessment of whether 
phenomenal states factored into their judgments. This would be relatively simple, and 
could be achieved by asking participants to fill out a basic mentalizing survey on Chaser 
and the other dogs. Without such evidence, however, it is difficult to assess the 
psychological plausibility of this view. It would seem to violate the minimum criteria, 
but the issue here is less that of needing a transition strategy and more needing data to 
assess how people actually use agential states to determine moral significance. 
 
3.4.2 Concluding Thoughts 
One upshot of this section is that it suggests animal ethics has been moving in a 
positive direction for the last 40 years. Phenomenal states have risen to particular 
prominence relatively recently, perhaps sometime in the 1970s in conjunction with work 
by Peter Singer and others on the concept of sentience (though of course there are many 
historical precursors, further substantiating the validity of the phenomenal account). The 
phenomenal account suggests that theories in animal ethics have thereby become 
increasingly psychologically plausible.  
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The issue with arguably the greatest significance here is the role of animal bodies 
in mentalizing. There are many questions unanswered concerning our ability to learn 
more about animals, and potentially learn to mentalize more accurately. This is 
particularly important because of what is at stake. If all vertebrates truly are sentient, 
then we are making a grave mistake in failing to attribute phenomenal states to them, 
thereby denying them moral considerability. So long as a creature is morally 
considerable, it is assured that its interests will be taken into account. This is absolutely 
fundamental, morally speaking. Future research on mentalizing would thus do well to 
achieve greater clarity on what makes us deny phenomenal states to legitimately morally 
considerable animals. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  92 
4. ANIMALS AND DISGUST 
 Among disgust researchers, the disgust-eliciting properties of animals are well 
known. The most influential research on the role of animals in causing disgust comes 
from Graham Davey and Paul Rozin, both of whom place animals at the center of the 
evolved functions of disgust. Rozin’s theory of disgust, which is arguably the most 
widely accepted over the last 25 years, places special emphasis on animals. As he and 
his colleagues claim in a recent survey article, the evolved function of disgust is to 
protect us from seeing ourselves as “lowered, debased, and mortal” (Rozin, Haidt, & 
McCauley, 2008, p. 762). This includes being in the company of animals, because 
“anything that reminds us that we are animals elicits disgust” (p. 761).  
    Despite the centrality of animals in the history of disgust research, the most 
prominent philosophical accounts place animals in the periphery. McGinn (2011), for 
instance, makes little mention of the disgust-eliciting properties of animals, focusing 
only on the symbolic nature of animal disgust (that we do not wish to see ourselves as 
animal-like). Dan Kelly’s (2011) influential account, though it is strongly rooted in 
evolutionary history and is broadly Rozinian in its claims, does not investigate the role 
of animals in any detail.  
This section attempts to fill this gap in the literature. I draw from Rozin’s theory 
of disgust, as well as Kelly (2011), to argue that animals elicit disgust in two ways. One 
is by triggering disease-protection mechanisms, and the other is by eliciting what is 
called mortality salience, or thoughts of death (as indicated in Rozin’s comments above). 
Both of these indicate that animals cause aversive and avoidant reactions in human 
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beings.  
These aversive reactions caused by animals raise two further challenges, one 
pertaining to moral psychology and another pertaining to ethics. With respect to the 
former, it seems odd that animals would cause disgust, given their prominence in human 
lives. I attempt to account for this by utilizing research by Nick Haslam (2006) on 
infrahumanization and dehumanization. I argue that this research suggests that we cope 
with animals, despite their disgust evoking powers, by attributing them mental states that 
include positive evaluations but simultaneously function to cement animals’ status as 
inferior beings. While I think this adequately addresses the psychological challenge, it 
indicates that improving treatment for animals will be incredibly difficult. Both the 
aversiveness of animals and the way we “dehumanize” them present significant 
psychological obstacles for ethicists aiming to improve the moral status of animals. I 
conclude by discussing recent objections to the importance of disgust in normative ethics 
raised by those Dan Kelly calls “disgust skeptics.” I draw from the discussion of 
psychological plausibility in section 2 to respond to these objections. 
 
4.1 Animals as Disgust Elicitors 
4.1.1 Core Disgust  
I will begin by outlining animals’ role in what is known as core disgust. Core 
disgust is so named because it is hypothesized to represent the evolutionary functional 
core of disgust. This is a natural starting point for providing an account of disgust, given 
that animals have a constant presence in human evolutionary history.  
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 Rozin et al. (2008) argue that core disgust consists of three different features: 
oral incorporation, a sense of offensiveness, and contamination. As Kelly (2011), 
following Rozin, characterizes the emotion, disgust consists of “aversion with a 
pronounced oral feel” (p. 17). The evolutionary function of disgust, on this account, is to 
protect against potential contaminants.38 The primary way of doing this is by blocking 
contaminants from invading the body, particularly through the mouth. This is what is 
meant by oral incorporation.  
It might be obvious why animals are relevant here. As food and as vectors of 
disease, animals have served as a primary cause of death and illness in our evolutionary 
history. This is why core disgust functions to keep us away from certain animals, and 
particularly to avoid putting some of them in our mouths. 
That we would develop a disgust response to animals makes sense when thinking 
about the history of disease transmission. For instance, of the 25 most deadly diseases in 
human history, 9 are due primarily to animal vectors, and in 20 of the 25 cases the 
transmission vector is classified as core disgust—things like feces, bodily fluids, lice, 
flies, and other bugs (Oaten, Stevensen, & Case, 2011; also see Curtis and Biran, 2001). 
This provides a reason to think that animals factor centrally in disgust. It’s also 
interesting that all 25 of these diseases possess behavioral indicators of the disease in 
those infected, 23 of which can be observed from looking at the face. So not only are 
animals the cause of various diseases, and so likely to be at the core of disgust, but the 
                                                
38 Davey and Rozin proposed early on that disgust functions as a disease-avoidance mechanism 
(Davey, 1992, Rozin & Fallon, 1987) 
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diseases they cause are also highly public. This makes it likely that people will be aware 
of the link between animals and the diseases they transmit to human beings. 
Other studies have shed light on disgust-eliciting food, particularly with respect 
to meat. Martins and Pliner (2006) found that unfamiliar foods are rated as disgusting 
largely to the extent that they have animal origins. This would seem to be a result of a 
disgust-disease-avoidance mechanism. Other suggestive evidence comes from Fessler 
and Navarrete (2003), who looked at food consumption in 78 different cultures and 
found that meat was the most highly regulated food item. Given the possibility of 
infection from eating meat, it would make sense for people to regulate its consumption, 
and for disgust mechanisms to be driving such regulation. 
Given this evidence, it would appear that animals factor into core disgust either 
by being consumed or by transmitting disease through some other entryway into the 
human body. This dual role of animals in causing disgust has also been pointed out by 
Kelly (2011). Kelly’s account of disgust diverges slightly from Rozin, but the 
differences do not raise any significant issues that need addressing here. I will briefly 
describe Kelly’s account as complementary to Rozin’s in order to illustrate how this dual 
role might work.  
On Kelly’s account, disgust consists of two “entangled” mechanisms: the poison 
mechanism and the parasite mechanism. They were once independent, according to 
Kelly, but in human beings are currently combined as a single disgust response. The 
poison mechanism responds to poisonous substances we might put in our mouths, and is 
responsible for providing the affect of disgust—what we feel. The parasite mechanism 
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responds to things that indicate the presence of toxins—things like parasites and other 
pathogens. As Kelly points out, animals are important here because of their relevance to 
both categories. Animals are frequently ingested and frequently carry parasites and other 
pathogens. Simply the presence of animals might be a health risk, even if we are not in 
direct contact with them.  
Kelly’s account helps makes sense of why we would avoid animals. As Kelly 
explains, the disgust system is geared to be overly sensitive and to produce a high rate of 
false positives. A single false negative—failing to identify a legitimate risk—could be 
fatal, so it is worth erring on the side of caution. Many diseases are airborne, and, as we 
will see below, many are carried by flying insects. These factors are likely to be 
represented in our disgust responses, leading us to exaggerate our avoidance of animals 
and steer clear of them more than is necessary. For instance, simply avoiding their 
ingestion, via the poison mechanism, would not be sufficient. This avoidance response, 
as well as other functions of disgust, will be explained in the next section.  
  
4.1.2 How Disgust Works 
 As I just mentioned, one main function of disgust is to be overly sensitive to 
potential contaminants, in a way that produces many false positives. There are a number 
of well-known examples of this: chocolate can elicit disgust if made to look like feces, 
and people will refuse to drink out of a glass that previously contained a dried and 
sterilized cockroach, even if they are told that doing so would be safe (Rozin, Millman, 
& Nemeroff, 1986). This is just one of many features of disgust that suggest the disgust 
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response is automatic and invariant to a significant degree. Once the disgust mechanism 
is triggered, it cannot be modified. The system flings itself into action to protect against 
the contaminant, rather than work to determine whether the contaminant does in fact 
carry the risk of infection. As Kelly (2011) describes it, the disgust system is “elicitor 
neutral” (p. 19) and “unified” or “clustered” (p. 40) in its response. In essence, this 
means that nearly anything can be made disgusting, and once that status is achieved, a 
chain of responses follows automatically. 
 I will describe three different behavioral responses that are part of the disgust 
system. Each of these responses appears to be automatic and invariant, as just described. 
These do not exhaust the disgust response, but they are essential functions of the system, 
particularly in responding to animal triggers. 
 The first response is protection of the “bodily envelope.” Though many disgust 
researchers agree that disgust is the foremost protector of the mouth, it also functions to 
protect any gateway to the body. For instance, in a classic study, Rozin, Nemeroff, 
Horowitz, Gordon, and Voet (1995) asked people how they would feel if either a clean 
Q-tip or a Q-tip that had been licked by a stranger was placed in or on different parts of 
their body. The parts of the body that elicited the strongest negative emotions were those 
that serve as gateways to the body, primarily the mouth and genitalia. People are also 
more disgusted by the thought of transplanting “interface parts,” or those that serve the 
gateway function (like the mouth), than they are other internal parts of the body (Fessler 
& Haley, 2006).  
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 The second response expands on the oral incorporation feature already described. 
Since disgust primarily protects the mouth, as the chief gatekeeper of the body, it may be 
no surprise that the disgust response activates the entire digestive system. Even things 
that are not normally consumed, such as blood and feces, still activate a disgust response 
that employs the digestive system. For instance, nausea and increased salivation are part 
of the disgust response, as is the classic “gape” face (think about the way someone’s face 
looks right before they begin to vomit). Anyone who has experienced extreme nausea or 
has spent extended periods of time in a state of near-vomit knows that these experiences 
are highly noxious and unpleasant.  This is important to note because these responses are 
part of any disgust response, not just those related to ingestion. So, for example, 
someone who is disgusted by animals will undergo this sort of visceral and gustatory 
response, regardless of whether or not they consume animals or have consumption-
specific disgust. 
 The third response follows from the two already mentioned. Perhaps the most 
crucial feature of disgust is that it is an aversive emotion. It is hypothesized to be driven 
by two different systems with the same acronym: the Behavioral Inhibition System 
(Carver & White, 1994; Olatunji, Haidt, McKay, & David, 2008) and the Behavioral 
Immune System (Schaller, 2006; Schaller & Duncan, 2007; Schaller & Murray, 2008). 
Both systems are important in that they motivate withdrawal. The Behavioral Immune 
System is involved with protection from potential contaminants of both a biological (e.g. 
bodily fluids) and social nature (e.g., people who one finds disgusting). The Behavioral 
Inhibition System includes a variety of emotions (like fear and sadness) that motivate 
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withdrawal and removing oneself from whatever is triggering the system. For disgust, 
the trigger is potential contagion. For instance, the response that follows from being 
disgusted by animals is dislike, aversion, and avoidance. As might be obvious, the 
reason it does this is to protect the bodily envelope, particularly the mouth. So not only 
does disgust produce high rates of false positives, it also produces exaggerated 
avoidance responses. This ensures adequate protection from disease.  
 A key question, of course, is which animals elicit disgust. It is not the case that 
all animals elicit the same level of disgust, and some animals possess features that can 
override our natural disgust response. These issues will be explored in the next section.  
 
4.1.3 Which Animals Elicit Core Disgust? 
Identifying the ethical implications of disgust responses requires us to more 
clearly outline which animals cause which types of avoidance responses. A taxonomy 
widely used by disgust researchers distinguishes between predators, who primarily elicit 
fear, slimy invertebrates, who primarily elicit disgust, and a category in between these 
two containing a wide variety of different animals that elicit both fear and disgust. Tigers 
and sharks, for example, elicit fear, while snails and maggots elicit disgust, and rats, 
cockroaches, and spiders elicit both fear and disgust (Matchett and Davey, 1991; Ware, 
Jain, Burgess, & Davey, 1994; Webb & Davey, 1992; for cross-cultural support see 
Davey et al., 1998).  
What is important in providing an account of animals as disgust elicitors, 
however, is proving that they cause disgust because they are linked to disease and other 
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pathogens. Roughly, what we should look for is evidence that disgust responses to 
animals are related to disease avoidance, or confer some sort of health benefit. I will 
discuss three experiments that help illustrate such a relationship. 
One widely cited study comes from Curtis, Aunger, and Rabie (2004). They 
conducted a large cross-cultural study (over 40,000 participants), comparing people’s 
reactions to a variety of different disgusting photos. Some of the photos were disease-
relevant while others were disease-irrelevant, but participants were not informed of this 
difference. For instance, lice, which can transmit diseases to humans, were compared to 
wasps, which cannot. Another example is Ascaris worms (disease-relevant), which were 
compared to caterpillars (disease-irrelevant). The results showed that people indeed rated 
the disease-relevant photos as more disgusting than the highly disgusting but disease 
irrelevant photos. This would seem to provide evidence in favor of the disgust-disease 
relationship. 
Another study comes from Prokop, Fančovičová, and Fedor (2010). They 
presented people with the pictures from Curtis, Aunger, and Rabie’s experiment (some 
of which were disease-relevant and others that were not), and asked them to rate the 
extent to which they were afraid or disgusted by each picture. Participants also took a 
standard health survey that included questions about the participants’ antiparasite 
behaviors, some of which were relevant to animals. For instance, one question asked, 
“Do you pet wandering/home cats/dogs?” As expected, the disease-relevant insects 
elicited more fear and more disgust than the disease-irrelevant insects. Interestingly, 
people who were more disgusted by disease-relevant insects as well as those who were 
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more fearful of disease-irrelevant insects also reported more antiparasite behaviors. 
Though the animal-related questions did not receive their own analysis, these results 
suggest those who are disgusted by and afraid of insects are likely to engage in animal 
avoidance more broadly.  
The third experiment addresses disgust oriented towards domestic pets. Prokop 
and Fančovičová (2011) asked pet owners to fill out a survey designed to assess their 
vulnerability to disease. Participants were also asked to rate four additional questions 
pertaining to their pets, two relevant to parasite transmission (“I allow my dog/cat to lick 
me,” “I allow my dog/cat to sleep in my bed”) and two associated with parasite 
avoidance (“I worm my dog/cat regularly,” “I frequently get rid of my dog/cats feces”). 
They found that pet owners generally perceive themselves as having low vulnerability to 
disease in general. Interestingly, however, parasite transmission was positively 
correlated with parasite avoidance. That is, pet owners who made themselves more 
available to parasite transmission through close contact with their pets also made greater 
efforts to ensure that their pets were free of parasites. This suggests that pet owners 
perceive themselves to be less sensitive to disgust elicitors, except when they are 
knowingly putting themselves in direct contact with potential pathogens, just as the core 
disgust account would predict. 
 
4.1.4 Implications of Core Animal Disgust 
Before moving onto the second type of animal-elicited disgust, I will briefly 
review the implications of the research I have presented thus far. I take the experiments 
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cited here to show 1) a wide range of animals reliably elicit disgust in human beings, and 
2) they do so because of their relationship to disease transmission. The main problem 
pertaining to ethics arises out of the avoidance response produced by core animal 
disgust. People are likely to avoid animals and refrain from, say, providing assistance to 
them, insofar as doing so would require them to be in contact with animals. Proactively 
helping animals requires approach—not avoidance—motivations. If an animal is ill, 
disease-ridden, or injured, it is likely to possess even more of the disgust elicitors it 
would normally express. An amplified disgust response would be predicted on the part 
of human beings in such cases, which is likely to lead to continued neglect and denial of 
assistance. That is, our disgust mechanism predicts avoidance of animals precisely in the 
cases where animals are likely to require the greatest assistance.  
  This avoidance response, when combined with other evidence reviewed thus far, 
presents a significant challenge for ethicists. Our disgust response to animals is likely to 
be exaggerated and contain many false positives, it will be engaged simply by animals’ 
presence, regardless of whether they are for consumption or might actually be placed 
near our mouths, and it is invariant and automatic. Once an animal is perceived to be 
disgusting, the avoidance response follows automatically. Disgust researchers also 
generally agree that disgust is highly unmodifiable and unresponsive to cognitive control 
(e.g., Russell & Giner-Sorolla, 2013). Core disgust elicitors are hard to unlearn, even 
with habitual exposure. For instance, treatment for spider phobias tends not to generalize 
beyond spiders (Smits, Telch, & Randall, 2002). In one suggestive study from Rozin 
(2008), the disgust responses of medical students who regularly dissected cadavers were 
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only reduced over time in response to cold bodies, but not recently deceased warm 
bodies. From this, Rozin concluded that learning new information about a disgust 
elicitor is uninformative about any other disgust elicitor. With respect to animals, this 
suggests that reducing one’s disgust response for any one particular type of animal will 
fail to generalize to any others.  
But, as is clear from these studies, the primary disgust-eliciting animals tend to 
be invertebrates and insects (particularly the slimy ones). For many animal ethicists, 
these animals do not possess moral status anyway (because they are not sentient) and so 
do not cause any problems for their theories. Spiders, for instance, are commonly cited 
as the most widely disliked creature in the animal kingdom (Davey, 1994; Davey & 
Marzillier, 2009), but spiders rarely feature heavily in discussions of moral status. 
Among vertebrates, the primary disgust eliciting animals are rodents, while farm 
animals, for instance, appear to cause more fear than disgust (Arrindell, Mulkins, Kok, 
and Vollenbroek, 1999). While rodents are certainly important for animal ethics, they 
arguably are not near as central or salient as farm animals and other “higher mammals.” 
And these do not appear to cause a problematic level of disgust.  
The obstacles caused by core disgust might thus appear to be relatively 
innocuous. The level of disgust elicited by the most morally significant animals will 
likely produce some level of avoidance, but not near as much as towards invertebrates 
and other organisms lower in moral significance. From the evidence cited thus far, core 
disgust does not obviously present insurmountable problems for animal ethics. However, 
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in the next section I turn to the second category of disgust elicited by animals, and as we 
will see, the obstacles there are much more significant. 
 
4.2 Animal Reminder, Mortality Salience, and Terror Management 
4.2.1 Animal Reminder Disgust 
As mentioned already, the Rozinian account of disgust claims that disgust 
protects us from seeing ourselves as “lowered, debased, and mortal.” The discussion of 
core disgust above, however, characterized disgust as a protector against various 
pathogens. So what connection is there supposed to be between contamination and 
mortality? 
 The line of research that has pursued this connection in greatest detail is known 
as terror management theory (TMT). TMT primarily derives from work in anthropology 
by Ernest Becker (1971, 1973, 1975). Within psychology, TMT was first developed by 
Sheldon Solomon, Jeff Greenberg, Thomas Pyszczynski, and colleagues (Greenberg, 
Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 1986; Greenberg, Pyszczynski, Solomon, Simon, & Breus, 
1994; Rosenblatt, Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszczynski, & Lyon, 1989; Solomon, 
Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 1991). TMT starts from the assumption that human beings 
are regularly confronted with and experience acute feelings of existential anxiety. It is 
important for normal functioning that these feelings stay beneath the surface of 
consciousness, so we have developed various methods for repelling these feelings when 
they bubble to the top (for reviews of TMT see Burke, Martens, & Faucher, 2010; 
Goldenberg, Pyszczynski, Greenberg, & Solomon, 2000; Greenberg, Solomon, & 
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Pyszcynski, 1997; Hayes, Schimel, Arndt, & Faucher, 2010; and Solomon, Greenberg, 
& Pyszczynski, 2004).  
The hypothesized reason we possess this anxiety, at least with respect to animals, 
is that animals remind us we are mortal. This is what is referred to as animal reminder or 
mortality salience. According to Rozin and his colleagues, disgust is both “a defensive 
emotion that guards against the recognition of our animality” (Haidt, McCauley, & 
Rozin, 1994, p. 712) and “a defense against a universal fear of death” (Rozin, Haidt, & 
McCauley, 2000, p. 643). The result of these supposed threats is that human beings 
“wish to avoid any ambiguity about their status by accentuating the human-animal 
boundary” (Rozin and Fallon, 1987, p. 28). This process is perhaps best explained by 
Goldenberg, Pyszczynski, Greenberg, and Solomon (2000): 
The terror management solution to the problem of death is to live our lives on an 
abstract symbolic plane: We cope with the threat of death by embedding 
ourselves in a meaningful culture and living up to the culture’s standards. In this 
way, we elevate ourselves above the rest of the animal kingdom. (p. 203)  
 
The basic connection between disgust and TMT is that disgust helps us avoid those 
things that cause us existential anxiety: animals. 
One way of testing TMT is by manipulating people’s thoughts of death (thus 
modifying mortality salience). Making death more salient increases people’s existential 
anxiety, or so the hypothesis runs. The traditional method of doing this is by presenting 
participants with a death prompt. The most commonly used death prompt asks 
participants to describe the emotions they feel when they think of their own death and 
what they think will happen, physically, when they die. Other popular and more implicit 
death primes include reading articles about death, word searches and sentence 
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completion tasks that include death-related words, and interviewing participants in or 
near a cemetery or funeral home. The typical result of the death prompt is that people are 
inclined to rate death and disgust-related items negatively.  
Though these death primes might seem somewhat artificial and uncommon in 
everyday life, TMT researchers generally suppose that our lives are filled with more 
mundane death primes that function in essentially the same way. For instance, other 
effective elicitors of mortality salience include cancer (Arndt, Cook, Goldenberg, and 
Cox (2007), breast exams (Goldenberg, Arndt, Hart, & Routledge, 2008), 9/11 (Landau 
et al., 2004), old people (Martens, Greenberg, Schimel, & Landau, 2004), people with 
disabilities (Hirschberger, Florian, & Mikulincer, 2005), and fecal matter (Dunkel, 
2009), among many others. These are relatively common. The prevalence of these 
mundane death primes makes it especially problematic that animals too function to 
prime death-related thoughts.  
What comes after the death prompt in TMT studies generally varies according to 
other variables being measured. Rather than test anxiety as such, TMT researchers 
typically measure the predicted response to repelling this anxiety (though direct studies 
of anxiety and other mental states exist as well; e.g., Routledge, Ostafin, Juhl, Sedikides, 
Cathey, & Liao, 2010). The most well-confirmed methods for repelling the anxiety 
produced by mortality salience include 1) affirming one’s core values and beliefs, or the 
values and beliefs of one’s culture, and 2) increasing one’s self-esteem (Gailliot, 
Stillman, Schmeichel, Maner, & Plant, 2008; Harmon-Jones et al., 1997; Schmeichel et 
al., 2009; Schmeichel & Martens, 2005).  
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I will briefly discuss three experiments illustrating that animals cause death-
related thoughts and that this process incorporates disgust. In a classic study, Goldenberg 
et al. (2001) presented participants with the traditional death prompt, followed by a 
disgust assessment. As the core disgust account would predict, the death prompt led to 
higher ratings of disgust for body products as well as maggots, worms, rats, and 
cockroaches, but not other types of disgust elicitors. This indicates that mortality 
salience does indeed activate disgust mechanisms specific to animals. 
Another illustrative experiment comes from Cox, Goldenberg, Pyszczynski, and 
Weise (2007). They found that presenting people with descriptions of core disgust items 
(e.g., “It would bother me to see a bowel movement left unflushed in a public toilet”), 
when combined with a human-animal similarity prime, led to increased use of death-
related words in a word completion task. The core disgust prime was insufficient on its 
own to produce increased thoughts of death, indicating that that the human-animal 
similarity prime played a crucial causal role.  
Perhaps the best evidence in support of the claim that animals elicit mortality 
salience comes from Beatson and Halloran (2007). They presented participants with the 
traditional death prompt as well as an animal stimulus, which was a video of bonobos 
having sex. In the High Creatureliness condition, as they called it, the researchers 
emphasized to participants how similar bonobo sex is to human sex. In the Low 
Creatureliness condition, the differences between the species’ sex habits were 
emphasized. Participants’ self-esteem was measured, as were their attitudes to animals. 
The results were consistent with TMT and indicate that bonobo sex elicits mortality 
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salience. Among those in the High Creatureliness condition, where bonobo sex was 
compared to human sex, those with low self-esteem evaluated animals more negatively, 
while those high in self-esteem evaluated animals more positively. These results are 
exactly as would be predicted by other classic TMT studies.39 Reminding people of their 
animal nature caused negative evaluations, unless the level of self-esteem was sufficient 
to fend off the attendant existential anxiety. 
These experiments indicate that animals do indeed function as mortality salience 
enhancers, and that this leads people to judge animals negatively. I will outline the 
implications of this research for animal ethics in a later section. First, however, I will 
address some criticisms of TMT, particularly with respect to animals.  
 
4.2.2 Criticisms of Terror Management Theory 
 There have been a wide variety of criticisms of TMT, many of them aimed at the 
role of animals. While the results themselves seem extraordinarily robust, the theoretical 
foundations of TMT are quite shaky. A well-known article by Tybur, Griskevicius, and 
Lieberman (2009) identifies a number of the pertinent theoretical problems. One is that 
it’s not clear why existential anxiety would have any adaptive function, particularly 
anxiety caused by animal reminders. It is incapacitating, and it’s not clear why or what it 
helps us accomplish. It’s also not clear why a disgust response, appealing to one’s 
worldview, or increasing one’s self-esteem would be particularly suited for repelling 
existential anxiety. Lastly, it’s not evident that people actually avoid being reminded of 
                                                
39 For a replication with pet-owning participants see Beatson, Loughnan, & Halloran (2009). 
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their animality. In fact it seems unlikely that animals would be a source of anxiety, given 
the close proximity of animals and human throughout our history (see Navarrete, 2005 
and Kirkpatrick & Navarrete, 2006 for similar criticisms of TMT). 
 For the most part, I find these criticisms compelling. However, I will address one 
additional criticism made by Tybur et al. stemming from those just mentioned. Tybur et 
al. argue that there isn’t any feature in common between different types of animal 
reminder stimuli. Sex, bad hygiene, corpses, and flesh wounds all elicit animal reminder 
disgust and are classified as such, but these factors do not seem to have anything in 
common with animals (or each other). If anything, they are all pathogen related, not 
reminders of our animality. Furthermore, avoidance of pathogens has a clear 
evolutionary purpose, and being sensitive to animal reminders does not.  
 My response to Tybur et al. is that the unifying feature of animal reminder 
elicitors is simply that they all cause a certain expected response. That is, they all cause 
anxiety that is alleviated by broadening the human-animal boundary, by affirming one’s 
worldview, and increasing one’s self-esteem. This is a quite specific response that is not 
caused by a number of other things, including a number of other disgust elicitors. For 
instance, reading about animal abuse does not increase thoughts of death (Das, 
Bushman, Bezemer, Kerkhof, & Vermeulen, 2009).40  
                                                
40 Or, consider another classic finding in TMT research, that those who score high in neuroticism 
(according to traditional clinical diagnoses) tend to rate the physical aspects of sex much more 
negatively compared to the romantic aspects (Goldenberg, Pyszczynski, McCoy, Greenberg, & 
Solomon, 1999). Interestingly, this can be replicated in non-neurotics simply by telling them that 
humans are similar to animals. It can also be reversed in neurotics by telling them that humans 
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It may not be obvious why they would share this feature, but this is not 
necessarily detrimental to the theory. Though I share Tybur et al.’s skepticism of TMT’s 
theoretical foundations, the evidence in its favor is hard to deny. There are hundreds of 
other studies, besides the ones I have already reviewed, confirming the basic role of 
mortality salience in causing anxiety that is alleviated primarily by increasing one’s self 
esteem and affirming one’s worldview. Many of these studies also test a wide variety of 
alternative explanations, none of which have proved tenable (e.g., increased arousal or 
other sources of anxiety; see Goldenberg et al., 2000 and Greenberg et al., 2008 for a 
review). In short, we can accept the basic phenomena of TMT without accepting its full 
theoretical implications.41  
 A remaining issue with TMT as it relates to animals is precisely how problematic 
animals specifically—and not other animal reminders, like dead bodies—are for our 
evaluations of animals. Dead and diseased animals elicit both core and animal reminder 
disgust, but this is relatively unsurprising. There is also some evidence that animal 
reminder disgust fails to be elicited by animals as much as would be expected. For 
instance, Fessler and Navarrete (2005) report that Costa Ricans are exposed to dead and 
decaying animals more than people from most countries, but do not appear to have 
heightened animal reminder disgust. And in one study (Burris and Rempel, 2004), 
                                                                                                                                           
are different from animals (Goldenberg, Cox, Pyszczynski, Greenberg, & Solomon, 2002). This 
would seem to provide good evidence for TMT (and the role of animals within the theory). 
41 Various other evidence supports the claim that animal reminder disgust functions as 
hypothesized within TMT. For instance, it’s notable that animal reminder disgust has 
consistently been found to be a dissociable component of the disgust response, even cross-
culturally (Olatunji, Haidt, McKay, & David, 2008; Olatunji et al., 2009).  
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people who read a graphic description about dust mites subsequently increased their 
worldview defense but did not show an increase in thoughts about death. So how much, 
exactly, do animals cause us existential anxiety in a way that leads us to treat and 
evaluate them negatively? Can the effects of animal reminder disgust be strongly 
separated from core disgust? 
 Notwithstanding the evidence I have described, in many cases I suspect we will 
not be able to tell whether disgust towards animals is due to their mortality salience or 
their status as potential transmitters of disease. Fortunately, this is not problematic. It is 
enough to know, as described previously, that animals elicit aversive behaviors in human 
beings. The discussion of core disgust suggested that this might be limited to the “lower” 
animals, such as invertebrates, but the research presented here on animal reminder 
disgust should illustrate that the disgust response towards animals will encompass many 
“higher” animals as well. Studies on TMT indicate that animals—even pets—can elicit 
negative evaluations. We do not have to accept that the reason for this is that they cause 
us existential anxiety. It is enough to focus on the effects of animals’ presence. They 
appear to increase thoughts of death, which, for whatever reason, lead us to judge 
animals negatively.42 
                                                
42 Someone might object at this point that I have focused too much on biological disgust and too 
little on moral disgust. However, there is a rich empirical literature on the connection between 
the two (e.g., Chapman & Anderson, 2013; Eskine, Kacinik, & Prinz, 2011; Schnall et al., 2008; 
Tybur et al., 2013). To briefly summarize, the evidence suggests that the two are part of the same 
system, and that biological disgust in many ways drives our moral evaluations. Current thought 
on why moral disgust would be connected to biological disgust is that they both function to 
protect against contaminants (Rozin, Haidt, & Fincher, 2009). Activation of either system elicits 
the same facial expressions (Chapman, Kim, Susskind, & Anderson, 2009), the bitter taste 
rejection response (Rozin, Haidt, & Fincher, 2009), and the same avoidance action tendencies 
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4.3 Dehumanization and Infrahumanization 
The widespread presence of animals in human lives seems somewhat 
paradoxical, given the research discussed thus far. Animals tend to trigger feelings of 
disgust and thoughts of death in human beings, leading us to avoid them and judge them 
negatively. So how do we explain their presence in our lives? How do we cope with 
them, given that they elicit disgust? I will address these questions in this section in the 
context of research on dehumanization and infrahumanization. 
Some of the most exciting research on our moral evaluations of nonhumans has 
come from studies of how we use the classification of “animal” to demean other human 
beings. Various studies have shown that this process is primarily driven by feelings of 
disgust and frequently targets outgroups. This maps well onto research on perception of 
nonhumans. To consider some highlights: Boccato, Capozza, Falvo, and Durante (2008) 
found that subliminal presentation of monkey faces facilitated identification of outgroup 
names but human faces did not; Costello and Hodson (2010) found that people who 
perceived a greater divide between humans and other animals were more likely to 
engage in racial dehumanization (among human beings); and Buckels and Trapnell 
(2013) found that experimentally induced disgust produced stronger implicit associations 
between animals and an outgroup than did induced sadness or induced neutral mood. 
                                                                                                                                           
(Carver & White, 1994). Biological and moral disgust also activate a similar network of brain 
regions (e.g., the globis pallidus, putamen, caudate head, and amygdala; Schaich Borg, 
Leiberman, & Kiehl, 2008).  
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In general, there are two types of processes people use in these sorts of 
classifications (Haslam & Loughnan, 2014). One is called dehumanization, which refers 
to the process of explicitly identifying other people (or groups of people) as nonhuman. 
The other process is called infrahumanization, which refers to the process of identifying 
other people (or groups of people) as inferior human beings. While they are still 
attributed various key human qualities, they are treated as inferior to some other group 
by comparison. What is surprising in infrahumanization is that it produces a certain level 
of positive evaluation. It is not thoroughly intended to demean others, just enough to 
make it clear who is superior. This maps well onto how we treat some nonhumans. We 
live with them and show them care, but in many cases, continue to see ourselves as 
dramatically superior.  
In this section, I will make a proposal. The discussion of disgust thus far has 
raised a problem for explaining the role of animals in human lives. Namely, it’s not clear 
why we ever show them moral concern or affection, given that they are universal disgust 
elicitors (along multiple dimensions). The processes of dehumanization and 
infrahumanization potentially illustrate why this is and how this works. Animals, just 
like human outgroups, cannot really be avoided. We must live with them. Animals and 
humans were in close contact long before domestication (Serpell, 1996). And it’s hard to 
imagine how anyone in contemporary societies could avoid animals entirely. People are 
thus forced to live among disgust elicitors.  
The prediction would be that some sort of coping mechanism must be in place 
for this. A strategy that comes out of the TMT discussion above is that we would find 
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ways to elevate ourselves above animals. This in itself is not sufficient, however, since 
animals are pervasive in contemporary society, so we would need to apply this coping 
mechanism constantly. It also fails to explain why we frequently find animals appealing 
and judge them positively. Rather, I think we should look to the positive evaluations that 
result from dehumanization and infrahumanization for assistance. On the face of it, this 
too is a puzzling feature of our disgust response. The role played by disgust in these 
processes is to remove “contaminated” others from ourselves—consistent with the 
biological origins of disgust. Yet dehumanized others still receive various positive 
attributions. The solution I see is as follows. We can’t always avoid those we have 
dehumanized or find disgusting, such as animals. For instance, in human evolutionary 
history it would have been costly to avoid animals, regardless of the disgust they caused. 
Attributing various positive human qualities to dehumanized others—sometimes even to 
the point of explicit exaggeration (as in anthropomorphism)—makes it easier to live 
among things that elicit disgust.  
Developing this proposal requires further discussion of dehumanization and 
infrahumanization. Leyens et al. (2001) was the first to propose roughly the 
classification system described above. Haslam (2006) refined this further to identify two 
further processes that lie at the heart of dehumanization and infrahumanization. One 
type, called human uniqueness, denies to another entity properties that are considered 
uniquely human. This is what is often denied to animals. Accusing others of being 
shameless, lacking humility, or being unsophisticated are common examples. The 
second type, called human nature, pertains to properties that are essentially human, 
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though they may not be unique to humans. Common examples include accusing 
someone of being insensitive, unreflective, or reckless. These tend to be denied to robots 
and machines. 
So what this predicts is that animals, and various human outgroups, will be 
denied uniquely human traits but still be attributed essential human traits. What actually 
happens, however, is that animals in particular are attributed these essential traits to a 
greater degree than other human beings. In one widely cited study of this (Haslam, 
Kashima, Loughnan, Shi, & Suitner, 2008),43 animals were judged to be more 
perceptually capable than humans, in having a greater ability to hear, smell, taste, and 
see. Their ability to experience basic emotions (like anger, disgust, excitement, fear, and 
surprise) and volitional states (like needing, wanting, and willing) were judged to be 
nearly equivalent to human beings. The states that were denied to them were higher 
cognitive states (like knowing, reasoning, and imagining), and more complex emotions 
(like admiration, enjoyment, love, pride, and resentment). So animals are not as 
reflective as human beings and lack complex emotional abilities, but are more perceptual 
and possess similar basic emotions. It is problematic, of course, that Haslam et al. did 
not specify to participants which animals were in question, but this basic phenomenon is 
interesting nonetheless. 
One prominent feature commonly cited in explaining why we like animals and 
(for some of us) bring them into our homes is that they provide companionship. Indeed, 
                                                
43 The sample consisted of participants from Australia, China, and Italy. 37 mental states total 
were measured for animals, robots, and supernatural beings. 
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recent studies by Epley, Waytz, and Cacioppo (2007) show that people who score high 
in a need for social connection are more likely to attribute mental states to animals. The 
problem I have highlighted is that the disgust eliciting powers of animals make this seem 
strange. But by hypothesis, even those who like animals for companionship would be 
bothered if their pets were not clearly relegated to an inferior class of beings.  
Given the pervasiveness of pets, it is helpful for us to have a stock of 
anthropomorphic terms to describe their behaviors. The proposal I am making is that this 
is precisely what allows us to not feel threatened by animals. The particular mental states 
we attribute them solidifies their infrahumanized status. They are evaluated positively 
(e.g., being adept perceptually) but in a way that indicates they are not human. Though I 
do not know of any research that would confirm this, TMT studies demonstrate that the 
human-animal boundary is comforting when we are presented with reminders of our 
mortality. If animals do indeed make mortality salient to us, it would be helpful to have a 
quick way of reinforcing the human-animal boundary. The mental states we attribute 
animals—the ones resulting from a disgust-driven infrahumanization process—seem to 
play this role perfectly. 
 
4.4 Ethical Implications of Disgust Toward Animals 
It is clear from what I have said thus far that I think disgust research has 
normative implications for our treatment of animals. However, some ethicists are highly 
skeptical that disgust responses should have any bearing on normative questions, and 
would deny that the empirical research I have outlined is relevant to any substantive 
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problems in animal ethics. Dan Kelly (2011) refers to these ethicists as “disgust 
skeptics.” In short, disgust skeptics acknowledge that disgust responses place various 
limits on our moral judgments, but they do not think these limitations should have any 
role in normative ethics. Here I will attempt to refute “disgust skeptics.” First I will 
discuss arguments provided by Kelly and Martha Nussbaum, which state that disgust is 
not an epistemically reliable moral guide. Then I will discuss more generally the 
revisability of our disgust responses.  
 To be clear, I will not be arguing that moral disgust is a reliable guide to moral 
truth, nor will I argue that we should abandon the project of justifying our disgust 
responses. I am also not an advocate of the view, often criticized by disgust skeptics, that 
there is wisdom in repugnance (or that we inherit sound moral judgments through our 
disgust responses; Kass, 1997). Nonetheless, I think the disgust responses summarized 
thus far limit what ethicists can ask of people in their treatment of animals. To make my 
case, I will return to the discussion of psychological plausibility from section 2. Against 
Kelly and Nussbaum I argue that individuals’ disgust responses limit their moral 
obligation to animals. Here I draw specifically from the previous discussion of “ought 
implies can.” To supplement my argument against Kelly and Nussbaum, I also review 
research on the revisability of disgust, and suggest that the evidence further supports my 
claim that individual’s disgust responses limit their moral obligations. 
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4.4.1 Disgust Skepticism 
Dan Kelly and Martha Nussbaum share the view that disgust is unreliable as a 
moral guide. They are opposed to those who think that deep moral wisdom is contained 
in our disgust responses (e.g., Kass, 1997). According to Kelly (2011), “widespread 
feelings of disgust are…simply irrelevant to the question of whether or not the norm 
itself is morally problematic or acceptable” (p. 149; also see Kelly and Morar, 
forthcoming). Nussbaum’s arguments against disgust are directed primarily at its role in 
law, but her conclusion is much the same as Kelly’s: “Disgust…offers limited guidance 
in a narrow set of laws concerned with physical distaste and danger. But when it 
becomes a constructive criterion of legally regulable conduct, and especially when it 
conduces to the political subordination and marginalization of vulnerable groups and 
people, disgust is a dangerous social sentiment” (Nussbaum, 2004, p. 171). Both are 
primarily concerned with human groups whose disgustingness has been cited as 
justification for differential treatment in law, politics, ethics, and society generally. The 
disgust some feel towards homosexuals, for instance, has been used as an explicit 
justification for differential treatment.  
 One could argue that disgust skepticism violates the minimum criteria for 
psychological plausibility. Disgust is pervasive in our moral lives, and any account of 
disgust must provide reasons to think we can manage our disgust in a way that avoids its 
negative consequences. However, Kelly and Nussbaum’s proposals on this topic are 
sufficiently insightful as to decrease the threat of total psychological implausibility. The 
bigger problem with disgust skepticism, which will be my focus, is that it is clearly 
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aimed at ethical prescriptions at the level of policy and law, and does not address what 
we can ask of individuals or groups of individuals. As discussed in section 2, ethical 
prescriptions at a societal level have the benefit of an abundance of resources, while the 
personal resources of individuals are much more limited.         
To see the problem here, let’s consider Nussbaum’s view in more detail. Her 
main argument is that disgust has no role in a society that ascribes to the ideal that all 
persons are of equal worth. A strategy Nussbaum (2010) outlines in order to eradicate 
disgust and live up to this ideal is to adopt a “politics of humanity,” where we all 
recognize the humanity we share with groups of people sometimes found disgusting (e.g. 
homosexuals). The most obvious problem with this is that it explicitly excludes 
nonhumans. However, we can imagine a “politics of animality,” which focuses on 
similarities between humans and nonhumans. This might allow us to better control the 
disgust we feel towards animals. For instance, Nussbaum (2003, p. 423) urges societies 
to stop appealing to disgust in public policy and portraying entities as disgusting, even if 
that is in fact the primary emotion they evoke. These practices violate shared animality 
just as they violate shared humanity. 
There are problems with this, however. First, and most obviously, Terror 
Management Theory predicts that highlighting shared animality will increase disgust felt 
towards animals. Though Nussbaum seems to recognize this problem, her solution is 
inadequate. For instance, drawing from Rozin’s research, she suggests, “if the real issue 
underlying disgust is the fear and loathing people have for their animal bodies and their 
own mortality, then a society that wants to counteract its damages must go further, 
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addressing the body itself, and our anxieties about it” (2003, p. 424). Unfortunately, she 
offers no details on how societies are supposed to face this challenge. And even if she 
could do so, one wonders what this would entail for individuals. Mortality salience is 
thought to be deeply rooted in our psychologies. Without significant external support in 
overcoming the effects of mortality salience, individuals’ efforts would be totally 
insufficient. “Addressing the body itself,” as Nussbaum suggests, would only enhance 
the psychological threat. 
Second, Nussbaum in fact rejects perfect equality between humans and 
nonhumans. Though she has argued at length that current inequalities between humans 
and nonhumans are unjustified, she nonetheless appears to think certain inequalities are 
justified, given fundamental metaphysical differences between humans and nonhumans 
(Nussbaum, 2004b, 2006). For example, in justifying certain types of animal 
experimentation, she states, “complex forms of life have more complex (good) 
capabilities to be blighted, so they can suffer more and different types of harms” (2006, 
p. 361). So a politics of animality would appear to be based on a false premise, even by 
Nussbaum’s own lights. One could perhaps argue that feeling disgust towards certain 
animals is justified, given these inequalities. 
Assume for the sake of argument, however, that equality between humans and 
nonhumans becomes enshrined in law, and all disgust responses to animals have been 
eradicated from relevant laws and policies. This appears to be what disgust skeptics 
strive for. Even if this occurred, we cannot assume that disgust toward animals would be 
similarly eradicated from human psychologies. It is at least possible that human 
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psychology would remain unchanged, and thus individuals would face the same 
psychological constraints. On my account of psychological plausibility, as discussed in 
section 2, what would be asked of people legally, in such a case, would differ from what 
would be asked of them ethically. This follows from the previous discussion of ought 
implies can. If individuals cannot overcome their disgust responses, such that they 
cannot meet various moral obligations to animals, then they have no relevant moral 
obligations. An ethical theory suggesting otherwise would, on my account, be 
considered psychologically implausible. 
In summary, my main objection to disgust skeptics is that their solutions are 
aimed at law and policy, and thus do not have implications for individual disgust 
responses. Of course, a disgust skeptic might reply with an account of how individual 
disgust responses are to be managed. In the next section, I will provide a sketch of such 
an account on behalf of disgust skeptics, aimed at the revisability of disgust. 
 
4.4.2 Revisability of Disgust 
Perhaps the key feature of disgust is that it is highly unmodifiable and automatic. 
Numerous experiments illustrate that disgust is extraordinarily resistant to change 
through reason (Russell & Giner-Sorolla, 2011; Shweder, Much, Mahapatra, & Park, 
1997). Consider Jonathan Haidt’s (2001) “moral dumbfounding” experiments. In these 
experiments, people were given vignettes describing acts that tended to elicit disgust and 
subsequent moral disapprobation but did not involve any harm. For example, one 
vignette described a case where a family eats its dead dog; another described eating a 
  122 
dead chicken one has just had sex with. Participants in these experiments tended to say 
that these actions were morally wrong, but, when pressed by the researchers, they were 
incapable of cogently explaining why they were wrong—they were dumbfounded. The 
explanation Haidt offers is that moral judgments are driven by emotionally based 
intuitions, while other more reflective processes factor in later and at the margins of our 
moral judgments.  
These results are relevant to the revisability of moral emotions, which many 
think is fundamental to moral judgment (e.g., neosentimentalists like D’Arms and 
Jacobson 2000, 2003, 2007 and McShane, 2007, 2011). Many ethicists do not deny the 
intransigence of emotions. For normative ethics, however, ethicists tend to emphasize 
the importance of the attitude we take towards our emotional responses. As D’Arms and 
Jacobson (2000) say, “to make an evaluative judgment is not to have but to endorse a 
sentiment” (their emphasis; p. 729). For instance, an observation many ethicists rely on 
is that we all experience moments where we disagree with our emotional responses. 
And, more importantly, this disagreement at least occasionally results in a change in our 
emotional responses, and with them our moral judgments. In this way moral inquiry 
seems to be characterized by its open-endedness, where whatever I currently am 
disposed to think is right or wrong is, in principle, revisable. Even if we know emotions 
are intransigent, the ethically right thing to do is to evaluate and attempt to change them 
if necessary.  
But Haidt’s research indicates that the revisability of moral judgments does not 
entail actual revision; reflection often leaves the content unchanged (Haidt, 2010). That 
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is, even if it is possible for us to appraise our emotional and moral responses, this does 
not mean we actually do so with any regularity, or that, when we do, any revision 
actually ensues. Moreover, Haidt also contends that reflecting on one’s emotions 
sometimes only reinforces their power and influence. Reflection commonly is used to 
justify our initial reactions, rather than work to revise them. As he explains the results of 
his dumbfounding experiments, “The refutation of…arguments does not cause people to 
change their minds; it only forces them to work harder to find replacement arguments” 
(Haidt, 2006, p. 218). So even at the margins of our moral lives, reason often fails to 
actually lead to revision in moral beliefs and emotions. 
There have been various criticisms of Haidt’s dumbfounding experiments, as 
well as of the more general claim that reason is ineffective in revising our emotions. A 
number of critics have argued that Haidt has overstated his claims about the role of 
automatic attitudes, and that in fact reason has a larger influence than he recognizes. For 
instance, in reviewing the empirical evidence for the revisability of emotions, Hanno 
Sauer claims:  
Although emotions are often beyond our rational control, they can still be 
rationally amenable. This feature might also be called the reason-responsiveness 
of emotions. They are the proper object of evaluation and critical reflection, and 
we can—and often do—ask whether having a particular emotional response to a 
particular emotionally significant event makes sense. (2012b, p. 103)44 
 
                                                
44 These sorts of claims are also frequently made by neosentimentalists. For instance, D’Arms 
(2005) says our emotions are “responsive to reason” (p. 10). D’Arms (2013, p. 6) claims that it is 
“not implausible” that we can develop control over our emotions. Other times (e.g., D’Arms and 
Jacobson, 2003, p. 144) neosentimentalists assert that we are capable of controlling our emotions 
to a sufficient degree, even while acknowledging that emotions are elicited automatically and 
frequently outside of conscious control.  
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I think most of the criticisms of Haidt’s research are largely incapable of affecting the 
arguments I have presented here. For my purpose—responding to disgust skeptics—all 
that needs to be shown is that it is extremely difficult to control automatic attitudes, not 
that they are entirely unrevisable. Disgust, for instance, is “rationally amenable” in a 
way that matters only if individuals can have a reasonable chance to revise their disgust 
responses with the resources available to them. The research on disgust, however, 
especially that cited by Sauer and others (e.g., Kennett and Fine, 2009), fails to 
demonstrate this.  
For instance, consider a study by Gallo, Keil, McCulloch, Rockstroh, and 
Gollwitzer (2009), which Sauer (2011) cites in support of the revisability of disgust. 
What the results of this experiment showed was that telling oneself “If I see blood, then I 
will stay calm and relaxed!” decreased disgust responses to pictures of blood, but “I will 
not get disgusted!” had no effect. An identical phenomenon was observed with fear of 
spiders. This is evidence that disgust is revisable, but only with significant support. 
Successfully modifying one’s disgust response requires “implementation intentions,” or 
basic if-then commands that, at least in this experiment, prepare the participant for the 
oncoming stimulus and dictate a specific response. Desiring to change one’s emotional 
response and even making a concerted effort to do so are insufficient. Without the right 
“coaching” or some form of properly informed external support, it is unlikely that 
individuals will be able to modify their disgust response. This experiment only proves 
Haidt's (and my) point that automatic attitudes are enormously difficult to revise.  
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I conclude that Haidt’s research, and research from psychology more generally, 
indicates that moral emotions generally, and disgust specifically, are incredibly difficult 
to revise. Ethicists might be right that it is important to revise our emotional responses 
when morality demands it, but they need to provide some explanation for how ordinary 
human agents could eventually come to see this as well. The research I have summarized 
suggests that readily revising our moral emotions is not a prominent feature of our moral 
psychologies.  
This provides a further response to disgust skeptics. Nussbaum’s position in 
particular, as described above, largely avoids modifying individual disgust responses. 
Instead, she seeks to change the role of disgust in law and policy. However, I have 
suggested that individuals cannot revise their disgust responses by their own powers of 
reflection. If this is true, then individuals’ moral obligations to animals would seem to be 
unaffected by Nussbaum’s argument (and the argument of disgust skeptics more 
generally). Various moral duties to animals will require people to overcome their disgust 
responses, but without sufficient external support in doing this, people cannot be 
expected to meet those moral demands.   
 
4.4.3 Concluding Thoughts 
Ethicists should strive to provide normative prescriptions that are ethically 
acceptable while still acknowledging psychological limitations. The best evidence we 
have suggests that modifying our disgust responses to animals is incredibly difficult. 
Putting forth a theory that requires or presupposes that animals do not elicit disgust is 
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thus psychologically implausible. Urging universal compassion for animals or 
unqualified benevolence are the sorts of views that would seem to be excluded by my 
account. A general class of views that seem problematic, but would require more 
analysis than I can provide here, are those that adhere to what Garner (2013) calls the 
“equal consideration of interests principle” (as originally developed by Peter Singer). In 
short, these views require that the comparable interests of sentient beings deserve equal 
consideration, regardless of whether the beings in question are human or nonhuman. 
These views seem problematic because the disgust response, specifically when driven by 
TMT, is specifically attuned to whether something is human or nonhuman, and will 
influence one’s treatment of a being’s interests. In practice, therefore, people will be 
unlikely to abide by the equal consideration of interests principle. This is particularly 
problematic for views like that of Donaldson and Kymlicka (2011), where people are 
asked to accept animals as “co-citizens,” and treat animal interests roughly on par with 
the interests of other marginalized human citizens (like those with disabilities). My 
prediction would be that such an explicit comparison of humans to nonhumans would 
elicit disgust-based avoidance, leading people to reject this sort of proposal.  
My main recommendation is for ethicists to focus on ethically acceptable options 
that exist within the constraints provided by disgust. Typically there will be many such 
options, though I leave it to ethicists to determine what these options are within their 
theories. By outlining the role of disgust in evaluating animals, I hope to have provided a 
way for ethicists to hone in on their psychologically plausible normative options. 
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5. REJECTING EMPATHY FOR ANIMAL ETHICS 
 A source of frustration for animal ethicists (as well as many animal advocates) is 
persisting apathy in the face of obvious moral harms done to animals. The remedy often 
recommended for this problem is to emphasize and promote empathy in human moral 
psychology. 45 For instance, we might think apathy results from a failure to understand 
what it feels like to be an animal under blighted conditions. Maybe dogs kept in kennels 
all day, pigs whipped and prodded on their way to slaughter, immobilized chickens in 
battery cages, monkeys forced to perform tricks for movie producers, and predatory 
animals confined to small glass-encased rooms for zoo audiences could all be avoided if 
people just understood what it felt like to be in such circumstances. Perhaps empathy can 
provide this sort of insight.46 
 My argument here will be that empathy should not have a privileged role in our 
theorizing about animals. My argument is based on the rejection of the idea that empathy 
is central to moral concern. The centrality thesis, as I will call it, is a psychological 
claim: empathy is psychologically central to showing moral concern for animals. Moral 
concern, as I understand it, consists of being attentive to another’s positive well-being. 
                                                
45 The role of empathy in moral judgment and action has seen something of a revival in recent 
years, among both philosophers and psychologists (e.g., Coplan & Goldie, 2011; Held, 2006; 
Howe, 2013; Oxley, 2011; Slote, 2007, 2010; Stueber, 2006, 2012). This has been the case in 
animal ethics as well. Notably, the increased emphasis on empathy in animal ethics has been 
quite rigorously tied to new empirical studies in cognitive science. Lori Gruen (2009, 2012) and 
Elisa Aaltola (2012), for instance, both draw heavily from the latest research in cognitive science 
to advance their own theories of how empathy improves moral treatment of animals. This stands 
in contrast to earlier writings on empathy and animal ethics that failed to draw on relevant 
empirical research (e.g., Donovan, 1996, Luke, 1995; Shapiro 1994).  
46 As Martha Nussbaum says, in commenting on a passage on empathy from J. M. Coetzee’s 
novel The Lives of Animals, “[I]magining the lives of animals makes them real to us in a primary 
way, as potential subjects of justice” (Nussbaum, 2006a, p. 355).  
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This can be expressed in action or attitude. For instance, worrying that feral cats in my 
neighborhood are not having their basic needs met is an expression of moral concern, as 
is actively providing these cats with food and water. The basic claim of the centrality 
thesis is that empathy produces moral concern for animals better than any other emotion 
or psychological process. Ultimately I deny that that this is true; I reject the centrality 
thesis. I argue that other moral emotions, particularly moral anger, are more central to 
producing moral concern for animals, and thus more suitable than empathy for various 
normative aims in animal ethics.47 
To make my case against the centrality of empathy, I investigate six different 
empirical claims commonly made about empathy towards animals: (1) empathy predicts 
moral concern for animals (Aaltola, 2012; Donovan, 1996; Gruen, 2009; Luke, 1995; 
Sevillano, Aragonés, & Schultz, 2007; Shapiro, 1994), (2) high levels of moral concern 
for animals are caused by high levels of empathy (Gruen, 2004; Rachels, 2011; Signal & 
Taylor, 2007), (3) empathy towards animals causes empathy towards human beings 
(Ascione, 1992; Ascione, 2008; Munro, 2005), (4) cruelty towards animals is caused by 
a lack of empathy (Aaltola, 2012; Ascione, 1999; Fox & McLean, 2008), (5) empathy 
expands our moral concern to outgroups (Gruen, 2009; Gruen 2012; Solomon, 1999), 
                                                
47 My analysis is similar in nature to Jesse Prinz’s (2011a, 2011b) arguments against the 
necessity of empathy for moral concern (particularly with respect to human beings). For 
instance, he asks, without empathy, will we will judge animals negatively and deny their needs? 
Without empathy, can we meet our moral duties towards animals? These questions provide the 
background to my investigation. I more directly address the question of centrality, which is 
slightly different. Even if empathy is not necessary for morality, we still might think that it is 
much more important than any other moral emotion. For instance, perhaps it is empathy that 
primarily determines positive evaluations of animals, even if other routes to positive evaluations 
exist as well. 
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and (6) empathy motivates us to act on our moral duties to animals (Aaltola, 2012; 
Berenguer, 2007. If the empirical evidence fails to support these claims, then it is not 
clear how empathy could be central to showing moral concern for animals. I find all six 
claims to be problematic, though some are more plausible than others.   
First, however, I will attempt to get clear on what empathy means and which 
features of empathy are most relevant to showing moral concern for animals. The first 
section will take on this task. After laying out what I take empathy to be and how it 
functions with respect to animals, I will address each of the six empirical claims in turn. 
The final section will explore the implications of my arguments for animal ethics more 
broadly. 
 
5.1 What is Empathy? 
In this section, I provide a basic explanation of what empathy is and how it 
works, particularly with respect to nonhumans. First, I will outline emotion-sharing, 
which is the process I take to be essential to empathy, and the observations of emotional 
expressions and external conditions (which includes one’s immediate surroundings and 
life circumstances) that can create shared emotions. Second, I will argue against the 
relative importance of cognitive empathy. Third, I will discuss the emotions that often 
result from empathy, and explain why they seem to pose significant challenges to the 
hypothesis that empathy is central to producing moral concern. 
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5.1.1 Emotion Sharing 
The most crucial element of empathy is emotion-sharing. The functional aim of 
empathizing is to share in the emotions of another, or what is sometimes called vicarious 
emotion, emotional transfer, or affective resonance. 48 Though high-level cognition can 
influence this process in various ways, most psychologists and neuroscientists agree that 
empathy is largely automatic and unconscious. For instance, empathy is often described 
in terms of emotional contagion, or the rapid, unconscious sharing of emotions that 
results from observing another’s emotional expressions (Hatfield, Rapson, & Li, 2009; 
Klimecki & Singer, 2013; Prinz, 2011b). Typical examples of emotional contagion are 
instances where we see someone smile or frown and cannot help but feel happy or sad 
ourselves. To be clear, empathy is not reducible to emotional contagion but is best 
characterized by the automatic emotion-sharing that results from the contagion process. 
There are two main causes of the emotion-sharing provided by empathy. One, as 
just described, is observing another’s emotional expressions. Emotions can be expressed 
through a variety of behaviors, but characteristically empathy results from observations 
                                                
48 The features of empathy I identify here do not pretend to fully capture any one person’s views 
but rather draw from many prominent accounts of the basic processes involved in empathy. 
More comprehensive summaries of empathy can be found in Preston and deWaal (2002) and 
Preston and Hofelich (2012). A detailed definition of empathy from one of the field’s leaders can 
be found in Batson (2009), in which he identifies eight prominent, but different, uses of the term 
empathy in the literature: 1. Knowing another person’s internal states, including his or her 
thoughts and feelings. 2. Adopting the posture or matching the neural responses of an observed 
other. 3. Coming to feel as another person feels. 4. Intuiting or projecting oneself into another’s 
situation. 5. Imagining how another is thinking and feeling. 6. Imagining how one would think 
and feel in the other’s place. 7. Feeling distress at witnessing another person’s suffering. 8. 
Feeling for another person who is suffering.  
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of the face. The second is observing another’s external conditions.49 This includes 
another’s immediate surroundings as well as their presumed life circumstances. For 
instance, I can empathize with a homeless man by observing where he sleeps or I can 
empathize by considering what his daily activities likely consist of (e.g. where he goes to 
get food).   
Of course, observing another’s emotional expressions or external conditions will 
not always result in emotion-sharing. To see the implications of this, we need to 
distinguish the process of empathy from the results of empathy. Emotion-sharing best 
characterizes the process of empathy. The intentional object of empathy is to share in the 
emotions of another, even if this fails to actually result in emotion-sharing. We can see 
this by looking at cases where people empathize with entities that do not plausibly even 
have emotions, like trees, ecosystems, and mountains (Schultz, 2000). In such cases, 
people show increased concern for the entities in question and claim to feel a change in 
emotion (Tam, 2013).50 There are no success conditions based on the accuracy of the 
results here; it is nonsensical to ask whether people are actually sharing in the emotions 
of these entities. Yet clearly people are engaging in the process of empathy.51  
                                                
49 It is generally acknowledged by empathy theorists that understanding the particulars of 
another’s situation is crucial to empathy (Maibom, 2012). 
50 Another interesting and illustrative case is the practice of using rubber rings to remove tails 
from cows. It turns out that cows do not feel any pain from this practice, according to behavioral 
and physiological measures (Tom, Duncan, Widowski, Bateman, & Leslie, 2002). However, if I 
am empathizing with a tail-docked cow, and have turned my attention to its circumstances, 
presumably I will feel pain, sadness, and other emotions appropriate to tail docking. 
51 If brain images could be compared, for instance, of someone in the process of empathizing 
with a mountain and someone empathizing with another human being, and the images indicated 
identical emotion activation, I don’t see any reason why we wouldn’t call both processes true 
empathy.   
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Rather, the success condition of empathy is simply the elicitation of emotions in 
response to aiming to share the emotions of another. These are the results of empathy.52 
Again, these need not result from conscious activities. Emotional contagion, for instance, 
sometimes elicits emotional activation that is incongruent with the target’s emotions 
(e.g., if I confuse tears of joy with tears of sadness), thus failing to result in true emotion-
sharing. Similarly, if we turn our attention to animals’ living conditions (e.g., a pig’s 
farrowing crate), and our empathy system is engaged, we should experience, 
emotionally, what it would be like to live in those circumstances.53 The emotions we 
experience may bear no resemblance to what the pig is actually feeling, and thus do not 
constitute emotion-sharing, but we are nonetheless empathizing. 
The account of empathy I favor, and have described thus far, is more capacious 
than that offered by many other empathy theorists in that I include a wider variety of 
psychological processes. I see this as a benefit of my account: the more capacious my 
conception of empathy the more interesting my rejection of the centrality thesis 
becomes. A traditional challenge in providing an account of empathy towards animals is 
determining whether we are truly sharing their emotions or instead projecting our 
emotions onto them. Most accounts of empathy in the case of humans address this 
                                                
52 This still allows us to exclude explicit projection of one’s emotions onto another being from 
the definition of empathy, which many empathy theorists agree is necessary in a proper 
definition of empathy (Coplan, 2011; Darwall, 1998; Goldman, 1993). Projection does not 
satisfy the requirements for the process of empathy.  
53 Jesse Prinz’s (2011a) definition of empathy aptly captures the process of empathy, as I 
understand it: “Empathy is…a kind of associative inference from observed or imagined 
expressions of emotion or external conditions that are known from experience to bring emotions 
about” (p. 215).  
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problem by limiting legitimate empathy to accurate sharing of emotions, where this 
excludes self-projection. However, because it is difficult to provide success conditions 
for this process, empathizing with animals appears to be a deficient form of the real 
thing—certainly not something capable of providing moral insights.  
My more capacious account, by contrast, takes into account a wide variety of 
emotional understandings that arise out of observing animal expressions and living 
conditions. I see empathy towards animals as legitimate empathy, worthy of the attention 
of ethicists, and want to include all evidence that might speak in favor of its centrality in 
producing moral concern. This makes my task more difficult, but if I am successful the 
implications are also thereby more significant. 
 
5.1.2 Cognitive Empathy 
 Most studies of empathy do not test emotion sharing as such. Rather, they study 
what is called cognitive empathy, or empathy that comes about from actively imagining 
what another person is feeling. For example, the empathy prompt in much of Daniel 
Batson’s classic work on empathy (which will be discussed in more detail below) is 
phrased, “try to imagine how [the target of empathy] feels about what has happened and 
how it has affected [the target’s] life.” This encompasses my definition of empathy but 
also requires a great deal of cognitive effort to successively achieve emotion sharing. 
Some empathy theorists claim that cognitive empathy is the only true form of 
empathy. Many separate cognitive empathy from more basic emotion-sharing processes, 
like emotional contagion, because it is only with cognitive effort that we are able to 
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overcome various limitations in empathizing with others (e.g., in overcoming our self-
focused bias; Coplan, 2011). What many philosophers have focused on is not the sharing 
of emotions, as I have emphasized, but rather the process of thinking about a person’s 
situation, as well as what that person is like (including their psychological makeup), with 
the goal of recreating what that person likely is feeling.54 Lori Gruen (2009), among 
animal ethicists, requires similar features for the process of empathy, “To accurately 
empathize, one must focus on and take account the specific context of the other, their 
idiosyncratic desires, and the processes that shaped those desires, their developmental 
and, in the case of non-sentient beings, their ecological and evolutionary histories, and 
their distinctive telos” (p. 33).55  
While the cognitive aspect of empathy is important, I think it has been 
overstated. Effortful empathizing enhances emotion-sharing, and can correct for certain 
biases, but it does not constitute the empathic process. It is not required that we engage 
in correction of what we think others are feeling in order to empathize. Rather, empathy 
only requires that we direct our attention to others’ emotional expressions and living 
conditions, and feel new emotions as a result. I do not have to actively imagine the 
emotions of a pig in a farrowing crate. I just have to direct my attention to the pig being 
                                                
54 Stueber (2006) calls this process “reenactive empathy,” Goldman (2011) calls it 
“reconstructive empathy,” and Gruen (2009), discussing animals specifically, variously calls it 
“entangled” or “engaged” empathy. Ickes (1997) expresses this idea from a psychologist’s point 
of view. 
55 Donovan (2006) makes a similar suggestion: “the originary emotional empathetic response 
must be supplemented with an ethical and political perspective (acquired through training and 
education) that enables the human to analyze the situation critically so as to determine who is 
responsible for the animal suffering and how that suffering may best be alleviated” (p. 323). 
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in a farrowing crate.56 Empathy is capable of providing us with an understanding of 
another’s emotions without further cognitive effort.  
I see cognitive empathy as mostly a failsafe—a way of enhancing the salience of 
others’ emotions when normal empathy processes have failed. With respect to animals, 
cognitive empathy is important if people fail to consider the plight of animals 
spontaneously.57 For instance, if the automatic processes of emotional contagion fail to 
produce moral concern for animals in pain or in blighted conditions, people can actively 
imagine themselves into those conditions in order to elicit empathy.58 At its foundations, 
empathy leads us to associate certain living conditions with the way it would feel to live 
under those circumstances, and to associate certain emotional expressions with the way 
it would feel to express those emotions. Perhaps we use cognitive effort if these 
activities fail to elicit emotion-sharing, but this is extraneous to the core processes of 
                                                
56 Though I won’t address this in detail, my position on cognitive empathy helps avoid an 
objection raised by Holton and Langton (1999) against Peter Singer’s use of empathy: “We 
suggest that if you want to discover the preferences of a bat or a platypus, the last thing you 
should do is to try to imagine yourself into their place. Is it cruel to screech loudly at a bat? Is it 
cruel to pass a 12 volt shock through the water near a platypus? We don’t know, and imagining 
ourselves in their place won’t help. Imagination ‘yields a perfect blank’ (p. 225). Empathy is not 
as problematic as they make it seem, because it is not the function of empathy to accurately 
discover the preferences of animals. It is merely to produce emotions in us by turning our 
attention to animals’ behavioral expressions and living circumstances. 
57 As Hare (1963, p. 224) states in a provocative passage, “Those who indulged in bear-baiting 
did not reason: ‘If we were bears we should suffer horribly if treated thus; therefore we cannot 
say that it is all right to treat bears thus.’.... The bear-baiter does not really imagine what it is like 
to be a bear. If he did, he would think and act differently.” 
58 To see other popular definitions of empathy used by those writing about animals see Signal 
and Taylor (2007, p. 126) and Eisenberg (1988). I take these other definitions to be broadly 
consistent with my own definition. 
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empathy. 59 Importantly, there’s good evidence that even high-level empathizing, as used 
in cognitive empathy, makes use of the same neural substrate as low-level empathizing, 
like that observed in emotional contagion (Iacoboni, 2011; Preston & Hofelich, 2012).  
Another problem with emphasizing only the cognitive aspects of empathy is that 
doing so makes it difficult to separate empathy from sympathy. A common way to 
distinguish empathy and sympathy is to say that concern for another is constitutive of 
sympathy while it is not for empathy (de Vignement & Singer, 2006). The problem this 
raises is that while cognitive empathy does not require concern as such, it does require 
motivation and cognitive effort, which must come from somewhere. Unlike emotional 
contagion, cognitive empathy seems to require one to take enough interest in another’s 
emotions to reconstruct what they are feeling. Following a point made by Prinz (2011a), 
if our inquiry is directed at whether empathy is necessary for expressing concern for 
animals, concern can’t also be included in the definition of empathy, prior to the 
investigation. By making cognitive empathy the focus, we lose out on some of the 
benefits of emotional contagion while blurring the line between empathy and sympathy.  
 
5.1.3 Resulting Emotions and Alternatives 
 The emotions produced by empathy are of particular importance for my 
investigation. Some of these are related to moral concern, and might seem to support the 
                                                
59 Elisa Aaltola (2012), among animal ethicists, similarly argues that emotion-sharing need not 
be accurate, but, unlike me, thinks empathy is primarily cognitive. As she says, “we can feel 
empathy towards non-human suffering if we use imagination to perceive what that suffering 
might be like, and if we feel care towards that suffering; yet we need not actually share the 
animals’ experiences” (p. 166).  
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centrality thesis. Sympathy, for instance, can result from the emotion-sharing of 
empathy, which might help explain why empathy would be central to moral concern (if 
it is). Other emotions that result from empathy are problematic, however, and illustrate 
limitations for empathy’s role in producing moral concern.  
For instance, empathy often elicits emotions that decrease moral motivation. 
Take a simple example: you observe your neighbor beating his dog. If you empathize 
with the dog, the emotion-sharing component of empathy predicts that you will feel a 
twinge of pain. Likewise, if the dog is cowering in fear, it is predicted that you will share 
in the feeling of fear.  
These responses are problematic because, as discussed in the previous section, 
these emotions would be categorized as avoidance emotions—emotions that generally 
motivate us to move away from a target or goal. If the goal of empathy is to produce 
helping behavior, then feeling emotions of pain or fear (or perhaps defenselessness) are 
not going to be very effective. Fear, for example, functions to remove ourselves from a 
threat; perceiving others in pain elicits an avoidance response, at least partly because 
pain signals that a threat exists in the immediate environment (Yamada & Decety, 2009); 
and sadness, another emotion we might feel in response to animal harm, similarly 
functions to reduce moral motivation (Carver, 2001). Feeling any of these emotions as a 
result of empathizing with animals in pain might produce morally commendable 
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behaviors in certain situations, but it is not likely to motivate us to intervene in cases of 
abuse.60  
 There are other emotional responses that can be elicited simply by observing a 
situation. These emotions can include empathy, and sometimes result from empathy, but 
also arise directly from the observed circumstances. These raise problems for the 
centrality thesis because they are more effective than empathy, as such, in producing 
moral motivation.  
Consider the case of moral anger. There is evidence that anger can arise out of 
empathy (Batson et al., 2007), but it also operates independently. When people perceive 
a threat of personal harm, they often respond with anger (Rozin, Lowery, Imada, & 
Haidt, 1999). For instance, a beating doesn’t just produce pain and suffering, it also 
produces a response to stop the beating—namely, defensive anger. This is true even 
when observing as a third party. For example, observing one’s friends receive threats of 
violence can elicit just as much, if not more, anger than if the threat is made to oneself. 
This might be because we empathize with the situation, but it is likely also due to the 
perceived transgression. The mere fact that someone wishes to inflict pain on another 
can be enough to elicit anger, especially if this is done unjustly. Anger is the converse of 
emotions like pain and fear in that it is categorized as an approach emotion (Carver & 
                                                
60 An argument someone might make against me here is as follows: In cases of emotion-sharing, 
our understanding of self and other allows the empathizer to realize that his or her emotions are 
different in important ways from the emotions of the target of empathy, and thus we are not 
susceptible to or can avoid the negative consequences I mention. However, many studies have 
shown that the emotion-sharing of empathy is quite literal—we feel others’ emotions as if we 
were in their place (e.g., Singer, Seymour, O’Doherty, Stephan, Dolan, & Frith, 2004). Even 
when we acknowledge a strong self-other distinction, empathy often leads to congruence in 
emotion—including motivational direction—between the target and the empathizer. 
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Harmon-Jones, 2009; Harmon-Jones, 2003; Harmon-Jones, Gable, & Peterson, 2010). 
Anger is motivating and helps us to achieve goals, especially in cases of personal harm. 
This provides ethicists a reason to privilege moral anger, and not empathy.  
Moral anger, and other emotions, will be returned to throughout this section. 
These emotions will be used to make a firmer case against the centrality of empathy in 
producing moral concern. I turn now to the various claims made by the centrality thesis.  
 
5.2 Empirical Claims of the Centrality Thesis 
The six claims I will explore are meant to capture the most perspicuous empirical 
hypotheses about how empathy is related to expressing moral concern to animals. I will 
reject the idea that empathy is central to morality, but the argument will not come easily. 
There are indeed some convincing experimental demonstrations of the role of empathy 
in moral judgment. My main argument is that in many of these experiments we can 
identify other non-empathic processes that better explain the relevant phenomena. I will 
further draw from the point just made that other emotions appear to be more central to 
our moral response to animals (such as anger at transgressions against animals). 
 
5.2.1 Empathy Predicts Moral Concern Toward Animals  
 If empathy is central to expressing moral concern towards animals, then at the 
very least we should find a positive statistical correlation between empathy and moral 
concern for animals. This should be the case either for dispositional empathy (as an 
enduring trait) or occurrent empathy (as elicited by experimental factors). Dispositional 
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empathy, for instance, does indeed predict helping behaviors towards other human 
beings (Davis et al., 1999), so perhaps a similar relationship exists with animals. I think 
that such a relationship does exist, but it is not strong enough to support the centrality 
thesis. 
 Consider first an experiment by Sevillano, Aragonés, and Schultz (2007), whose 
findings are characteristic of other research on empathy and attitudes to animals (which 
will be discussed throughout this section). They measured both dispositional and 
occurrent empathy. Like much of the classic research on empathy (e.g., that of Daniel 
Batson), participants received one of two prompts to complete their task. They were 
asked either to remain neutral and objective or to take the target’s perspective and to 
think about how the target feels. The latter prompt is the most widely used method of 
testing the effects of empathy, and will come up again. 
Participants were shown ten photos of animals, five of which depicted animals 
being harmed (e.g., a seal caught in a fishing net) and five just of animals in nature (e.g., 
a rhinoceros on a savannah). Participants’ level of concern for the environment was also 
measured.61 Results showed that neither dispositional empathy nor the empathy prompt, 
taken on their own, correlated with concern for the environment. However, when those 
who received the empathy prompt also saw the photos of animals being harmed, they did 
                                                
61 Concern for the environment was measured using Schultz’s (2000) Environmental Motives 
Scale. The prompt for this scale states, “People around the world are generally concerned about 
environmental problems because of the consequences that result from harming nature. However, 
people differ in the consequences that concern them the most. Please rate the following items 
from 1 (not important) to 7 (supreme importance) in response to the question: I am concerned 
about environmental problems because of the consequences for [blank].” Participants then 
choose among a range of entities that might be affected by environmental problems. 
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express increased concern for the environment (which is also consistent with previous 
studies using similar stimuli and only induced empathy; Schultz, 2000). There were no 
effects observed for dispositional empathy. This suggests there is a relationship between 
perceiving animal harm, being induced to feel empathy, and expressing concern for the 
environment.  
There is one caveat to this experiment, however, one which pops up repeatedly in 
empathy experiments. Those who did not receive the empathy inducing instructions, but 
who were instead told to remain objective when viewing the pictures, also scored 
relatively high (to statistical significance) on concern for the environment after viewing 
animals being harmed.62 These participants still scored lower than those who received 
the empathy prompt, but this indicates that empathy is not necessary for moral concern, 
just that it is slightly more effective than being told to remain objective. 
 Of course, Sevillano et al.’s (2007) study measured environmental concern, not 
concern for animals as such. But other research more directly on empathy and animals 
has provided a similarly complicated and ambiguous picture. For instance, consider one 
of the most widely cited pieces of evidence for the importance of empathy, from an 
experiment conducted by Shelton and Rogers (1981). They showed people films of 
whaling activities, some of which were higher in intensity (e.g., more gore) than others. 
Participants in one condition were given no special instructions while watching the films 
(low empathy), while those in another condition (high empathy) were told to try to feel 
                                                
62 For those interested in the details, the empathy condition was only slightly higher (b = .541, 
t(181) = 2.496, p = .02) than the objective condition (b = .631, t (181) = 2.006, p = . 05).  
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what the whales were feeling, and to sympathize and empathize with the whales (that 
sympathy was included in the prompt is problematic methodologically, but that will not 
matter for the rest of the discussion). After the films had been played, participants filled 
out an emotion scale, designed to measure the effect of the film on their emotional state, 
and were also asked if they would be willing to provide assistance to whales in the 
future. 
The results showed that levels of empathy increased after viewing the high-
intensity films, regardless of whether people received the empathy prompt (that is, for 
participants in both the low and high empathy conditions). But only those who received 
the empathy prompt showed increased empathy after either high- or low-intensity 
scenes. So intense harm elicited empathic responses not elicited by low-intensity harm, 
but both types of harm elicited additional empathic responses when combined with the 
empathy prompt. Those in the high-empathy condition were also more likely to declare 
an intention to help whales. Overall, this evidence suggests that something about the 
empathy induction led to greater moral concern for whales.  
 This study is important because of the fact that low-intensity harm produced a 
significantly lower empathic response as well as a decreased intention to help in people 
who had not received the empathy prompt. This appears to illustrate that empathy plays 
an important role in responding to harm. The whales in the low-intensity film were 
clearly being harmed, but because the harm was not made salient, people were not 
induced to provide assistance. Besides indicating the importance of empathy generally, 
the results might also be taken to indicate that cognitive empathy and perspective taking 
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are important safeguards in our moral thinking, capable of correcting us when our 
natural sensitivity to animal pain fails to elicit helping behavior. 
 However, it’s not clear from the experiment whether those who did not receive 
the empathy prompt were truly without moral concern. Those in the low empathy 
condition—where, remember, they received no instructions at all—still scored relatively 
high on their willingness to help. The overall means, on a ten-point scale for willingness 
to help, was 7.8 for those who received the prompt and 6.8 for those who received no 
instructions. When viewing the low intensity films specifically, those who received no 
instructions had a mean of 5.5. Remember that levels of reported empathy before and 
after the films did not change for participants in this condition. While 5.5 is a fair 
distance from the average score of 8.3 for those in the high intensity, high empathy 
condition, it’s certainly not zero. So it’s not the case that those in the low empathy 
condition were blind to the harm caused by whaling, just that they would be much more 
willing to help if they had received the empathy prompt.  
 I take a measured conclusion from the two experiments just described. Empathy 
amplifies our moral concern for nonhumans, but it is not central to this moral concern, 
and certainly is not necessary. Participants in both experiments expressed relatively high 
levels of concern for nonhumans prior to any empathy induction. In Sevillano et al., this 
preexisting concern had no relationship to dispositional empathy, and in Shelton and 
Rogers, one group of participants expressed a significant degree of concern without any 
measurable change in empathy. 
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Shelton and Rogers’ experiment also highlights the role of other, non-empathic, 
processes, in producing moral concern. Consider how moral anger likely plays a role in 
people’s responses to the whale videos. An alternative explanation for their results is that 
asking participants to empathize with the whales caused anger, which then motivated 
people’s willingness to help whales. This is consistent with the fact that anger is an 
approach-related emotion, and is also consistent with other studies on the approach-
motivation of anger. Harmon-Jones et al. (2003), for example, found that college 
students who were angry about increased tuition costs showed increased activation in 
approach-motivational areas of the brain when told they would have an opportunity to 
sign a petition to prevent future increases in tuition. That is, having the opportunity to 
perform some action directly related to one’s anger actually increased approach-
motivation. Relatedly, Tagar, Federico, & Halperin (2011) found that people who were 
more angry about a political conflict were more likely to propose solutions when asked 
how they would ameliorate the conflict (also see Batson et al., 2007).  
These studies illustrate the motivational strength of anger. Harmon-Jones et al.’s 
experiment in particular illustrates that approach-motivation produces carryover 
effects—the sort that could explain the willingness to help in Shelton and Rogers’ 
experiment. As explained above, the intensity of the whale films actually had a greater 
effect on the declared intention to help whales than did the empathy induction. This is 
unsurprising when we consider that harm, especially unjustified harm as it was depicted 
in the film, normally elicits outrage among Westerners. Though empathy might play a 
role in this, the more central moral emotion would be anger. 
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 The study showing the strongest positive correlation between empathy and 
concern for animals is Henry (2006). Using the Attitudes Toward the Treatment of 
Animals Scale and the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (common assessments of attitudes 
towards animals and dispositional empathy), Henry found a 0.43 correlation between 
dispositional empathy and caregiving attitudes toward animals. These results certainly 
are promising and can be taken as evidence that empathy is positively related to moral 
concern for animals.  
However, again there are caveats. Numerous other studies have found much 
lower correlations. For instance, Taylor and Signal (2005) found a 0.33 correlation 
between empathic concern and positive attitudes toward animals among Australians, and 
Erlanger and Tsytsarev (2012) found a 0.32 relationship between dispositional empathy 
and discomfort toward animal cruelty (for similar data on Norwegians see Ellingsen, 
Zanella, Bjerkås, and Indrebø, 2010). These lower correlations are significant for a 
couple of reasons. One is that a common heuristic used by personality psychologists is to 
treat as unreliable any correlations lower than 0.30 between traits and behaviors. Such a 
low correlation cannot be relied upon for accurate prediction. At this level, any 
correlation observed between a trait and a behavior in one instance does not reliably 
predict that correlation in any other instance. All of these correlations are above the 0.30 
threshold, but just barely. This is particularly important in light of a second 
consideration, which is that these studies rarely test multiple variables, and when they 
do, they tend to find multiple significant positive relationships. To take one example, 
Erlanger and Tsytsarev also found that perspective taking and personal distress, 
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considered separately from empathy, were significantly correlated with discomfort 
toward animal cruelty. The correlation with these factors was relatively small (0.15 and 
0.16 respectively), but the weak correlation with empathy makes it difficult to say it was 
primarily empathy, and not a collection of related variables, that was responsible for the 
observed discomfort.  
The weak relationship found in the majority of these studies should make one 
skeptical of the centrality of empathy. The only strong conclusion that can be taken from 
these studies is that there is a slight positive correlation between empathy and concern 
for animals. There is also good reason to suspect that other emotions, like anger, are 
more central.  
 
5.2.2 Those Who Express the Most Concern for Animals Do So Out of Empathy  
 The experiments just described could be interpreted as suggesting that, at the 
very least, possessing a great capacity for empathy is a good thing—animals will be 
treated better by those who are more empathic. This can be phrased as an explanation for 
the phenomenon of animal loving and animal protectionism: high levels of empathy 
cause increased concern for the welfare of animals. If this is true, then ethicists have a 
good reason to promote empathy.  
 Researchers have indeed found some support for a positive relationship between 
empathy and abnormally high concern for animals. Signal and Taylor (2007), for 
instance, found evidence for this relationship among self-identified animal protectionists 
(e.g., people who work at animal shelters). One interesting feature of Signal and Taylor’s 
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results is that empathy, but not perspective taking, was correlated with positive attitudes 
toward animals. As explained above, it is important to distinguish between empathy as 
automatically sharing emotions with another (like emotional contagion) and empathy as 
perspective taking. Animal protectionists generally scored high on both empathy and 
positive attitudes toward animals, but this was apparently not something that was related 
to actively taking the perspective of animals. This is interesting because it suggests that 
empathizing with animals is an automatic attitude among this group of people, and not 
something that has been taught or is under their direct control. 
  There are other complications with interpreting this data, however. First, while 
there is good evidence that being for or against animal experimentation correlates with 
differences in empathy (Broida, Tingley, Kimball, & Miele, 1993; Furnham, McManus, 
& Scott, 2003), it’s not clear what causal role empathy plays. For instance, Furnham et 
al. found that opposition to animal experimentation also correlated with the personality 
traits of openness, agreeableness, and introversion, which may serve as more 
fundamental explanations of pro-animal attitudes.  
 Other evidence on this relationship is ambiguous and somewhat inconsistent with 
Signal and Taylor’s results. Plous (1993) found that when viewing pictures of animals in 
pain, self-described animal activists ascribed more pain to the animals than did non-
activists. However, in a separate measure of skin conductance, which measures 
physiological response, there were no significant differences between activists and non-
activists. If differences in pain ascription led to greater discomfort among activists, or 
were caused by shared emotions (i.e., through empathy), there should have been 
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corresponding differences in the skin conductance measure. The automaticity of 
empathy, as suggested by Signal and Taylor’s (2007) evidence, would predict that skin 
conductance would bear this out.  
 Some have suggested that vegetarianism is due to enhanced empathy (Gruen, 
2004; Rachels, 2011), which could be construed as an argument that increased empathy 
causes vegetarians to care more about animals. While some studies have found no 
differences in empathy between vegetarians and non-vegetarians (Preylo & Arikawa, 
2008), others have found evidence to suggest the contrary. I will briefly describe an 
experiment by Filippi et al. (2010), which some have claimed shows a connection 
between empathy and vegetarianism.  
Filippi et al.’s experiment showed scenes depicting torture of humans and 
animals to self-described vegetarians, vegans, and omnivores. Results showed more 
activation in areas of the brain that process emotion in vegetarians and vegans than in 
omnivores when torture scenes were viewed. This seems to suggest that eating practices 
reflect a difference in emotional processing, which one could argue is due to differences 
in empathy.  
I again think there are other more plausible, non-empathic, explanations for these 
results. One is that these differences in emotion processing might be a result of 
differential responses to moral transgressions. Vegetarians and vegans are likely to have 
strong moral convictions. These would likely be activated by torture (particularly of 
animals), thus producing greater emotional responses. Thinking that torture is wrong is 
sufficient to produce a strong emotional response when presented with graphic evidence 
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of torture. Another possible explanation is that vegetarians and omnivores responded 
differently to specific features of the torture scenes. For instance, some of the pictures 
showed mutilated bodies, which tend to elicit disgust and fear, with no further evidence 
to suggest torture specifically. Some studies have found that disgust sensitivity in 
particular is known to predict vegetarianism (Rozin, Markwith, & Stoess, 1997). So 
perhaps the role of disgusting stimuli explains the difference in emotion processing. 
Omnivores still expressed moral activation in response to scenes of torture, indicating 
that they responded emotionally, just not in the same way as vegetarians and vegans.  
 From these studies, I conclude that the evidence is, at best, ambiguous as to 
whether high rates of empathy produce greater moral concern for animals. One final 
complication I’ll mention is that greater empathy towards animals appears to come at a 
cost. Knight, Bard, Vrij, and Brandon (2010) found that animal welfarists showed more 
empathy towards animals and less empathy towards human beings. Animal welfarists’ 
enhanced empathy towards animals, that is, was associated with a corresponding 
decrease in empathy towards humans. Among other groups, like scientists, empathy 
toward animals was positively correlated with empathy toward human beings, but the 
overall level of empathy to either group was much lower than that expressed toward 
animals by animal welfarists. This research did not establish a causal relationship, but it 
does suggest a troubling possibility: our capacity for empathy is limited, and high 
degrees of empathy only result from narrow focus on a single moral object. Empathy 
might assist and support moral concern for animals, but only in instances of single-
minded devotedness to their causes, to the exclusion of others (a finding that would be 
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consistent with some research on human empathy as well; Batson, Klein, Highberger, & 
Shaw, 1995). 
 
5.2.3 Empathy Towards Animals Increases Empathy Towards Humans 
 The “sentinel hypothesis” (Patterson-Kane & Piper, 2009), or what is often 
referred to as “The Link” (Linzey, 2009), claims that cruelty to animals indicates a 
corresponding propensity for cruelty towards humans. Kant and Aquinas both famously 
advocated this position. An apparent corollary of this is that acting kindly towards 
animals indicates a kindness towards humans. We can hypothesize that the relationship 
runs in the opposite direction as well: cruelty and kindness toward humans indicates a 
similar propensity toward animals.63  
This family of relationships is important for empathy because it indicates that the 
capacity for empathizing, or sharing emotions with entities other than oneself, is 
generalizable. We can call this the generalization hypothesis: kindness (or cruelty) to 
one category of beings (humans or nonhumans) will increase kindness (or cruelty) to the 
other. This section will investigate this hypothesis by specifically examining the role of 
empathy.64  
                                                
63 Some of the first research on how attitudes towards one group cross over to the other can be 
found in Levinson (1978). 
64 One example of people advocating something like the generalization hypothesis comes from 
Munro (2005, p. 66). She reports that self-described animal protectionists often ask people to 
apply the empathy they show towards their pets and other human beings to a wider variety of 
animals.  
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 The Knight et al. (2010) study just discussed identifies two potential implications 
for the generalization hypothesis. On the one hand, self-described animal welfarists seem 
to refute the generalization hypothesis: their empathy is attuned more to animals than to 
human beings. But scientists, on the other hand, showed the exact relationship predicted 
by the generalization hypothesis (as did other groups). One main difference between 
these groups of people, we might think, is their experiences with animals. Usually The 
Link is discussed in terms of how early childhood experiences with animal abuse teaches 
children about abuse more generally. The generalization hypothesis can be taken to 
make a similar claim, such that empathizing with animals teaches people about empathy 
more generally.   
 In interventionist situations, where animals are introduced explicitly in order to 
change attitudes towards human beings, it has been found that children’s empathy 
towards humans does indeed increase as a result of interacting with and learning more 
about animals (Ascione, 1992; Thompson & Gullone, 2003). However, in these studies 
children learn about much more besides empathy. In Ascione (1992), for instance, 
children were also taught about justice and pain and how these concepts applied to 
animals. This makes it difficult to conclude that empathy is responsible for the observed 
increase in empathy towards humans. 
 This raises a question for the generalization hypothesis: what type of animal 
experience is necessary for the cultivation of empathy? Mere exposure is insufficient, 
but more extensive training will cultivate much else besides empathy. One plausible 
proposal is that what is needed is providing care for animals—ensuring that their basic 
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needs are met. This would plausibly also teach people how to provide care for other 
human beings, and the mechanism responsible would be empathy. 
One piece of evidence against this care feature is that self-described animal 
protectionists generally score high on empathy while farmers generally score low (Hills, 
1993). Farmers, arguably, spend a lot of time providing care for animals, so they should 
possess more empathy. Of course, someone could argue that this is unsurprising because 
farmers exploit animals and use them for human ends. Perhaps, someone might say, 
cultivating empathy requires the right kind of care, the kind farmers generally do not 
engage in. But it seems unlikely that farmers do not possess the right experiences. It is 
often pointed out that farmers are quite sensitive to the welfare of their animals, as, at the 
very least, they must be in order to gain a profit and meet contemporary agricultural 
standards. Thus, farmers should show great empathy if caring for animals possesses a 
strong relationship to empathy. 
 Other empirical research can help sort out these issues. Evidence that runs 
contrary to the predictions of the generalization hypothesis can be gathered from Paul 
(2000). Paul found that, among Scottish participants, the correlation between empathy 
towards humans and empathy towards animals was significant but still below the .30 
cutoff discussed above (.26). More problematically, the results showed that owning a pet 
correlated with animal empathy but not human empathy. So the connection observed 
between empathy towards animals and empathy towards humans, slight as it was, did not 
come about because of interactions with animals (or at least not with pets).  
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 Paul’s (2000) results point to a common phenomenon observed with empathy: 
we tend to be partial, and empathize with those who have special relationships with us. 
Pet owners, for instance, show more empathy towards their pets than towards human 
beings. This will be discussed in more detail in later sections, but its role here is 
important because it functions as a counter to the generalization hypothesis. Rather than 
generalize our empathy from animals to humans, it is instead the case that we empathize 
with those we are close to, and this often involves both animals and humans.  
To further illustrate this, consider a set of experiments conducted by Angantyr, 
Eklund, and Hansen (2011). They gave people in Sweden a story describing a situation 
in which a man, woman, cat, or dog had been found lying on a street with broken ribs 
and a punctured lung. Participants were then asked to rate 16 emotions they were feeling 
towards the target, including empathy. In other conditions, the same situation was 
described but for a human child, human infant, and a puppy. Interestingly, they found 
that parents showed more empathy for infants and pet-owners showed more empathy for 
puppies. This difference did not show up for the adult pets or for the human child. The 
researchers did find that empathy to animals (either dog or cat) correlated positively with 
empathy to humans (either male or female), but experience with puppies and infants 
created additional, localized empathy, particular just to those groups. The generalization 
hypothesis would predict the opposite, that any localized empathy would generalize to 
others.65  
                                                
65 A study from Batson, Lishner, Cook, and Sawyer (2005) might be cited in favor of the 
generalization hypothesis. They attempted to elicit biased (or partial) empathy by asking college 
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I interpret these results as speaking against the generalization thesis insofar as 
there is no discernable causal connection between empathy towards animals and 
empathy towards human beings. Rather, we have enough positive relationships with both 
animals and humans that we naturally respond to either group with empathy. In the 
studies just discussed, neither empathy towards puppies nor empathy towards infants 
showed any generalized effects. Pet owning also failed to transfer to empathy towards 
humans. More direct tests are needed, however. For instance, if someone low in 
dispositional empathy were to be introduced to animals, and subsequently increased their 
empathy towards both humans and animals, that would provide stronger evidence for the 
causal role of empathy.  
  
5.2.4 Cruelty to Animals is Caused by a Lack of Empathy 
 The idea that empathy is necessary for moral concern entails the further claim 
that without empathy we cannot and will not express moral concern. Some take this 
further and say that a lack of empathy causes cruelty (Ascione, 1999; Baron-Cohen, 
2011). We should of course promote empathy if doing so will avoid the creation of 
cruelty and evil.66 
                                                                                                                                           
students to read about another college student who had broken her leg and was struggling 
through rehabilitation. Instead, they showed equal empathy to the student, a 5-year-old pet dog, a 
3-year-old human, and a 4-month-old puppy. However, I find it unlikely that college students 
would be partial to other college students, and thus this study does not provide results relevant to 
the generalization hypothesis. 
66 Here I understand “cruelty” to encompass both active (e.g. intentional abuse) and passive (e.g. 
neglect) forms of mistreatment. This is generally how the term is used in clinical (Ascione, 
2008) and legal (Favre, 2011) contexts.  
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 One way of being cruel to animals is by abusing them. Some have claimed that 
only by urging people to empathize can animal abuse be avoided (e.g., Aaltola, 2012, p. 
160; Fox & McLean, 2008). However, evidence linking abuse of animals to lack of 
empathy is mixed. Henry (2006), for instance, surveyed people on their past experiences 
with animals, including past caregiving as well as past abuse, in addition to measuring 
participants’ empathy. Results showed that empathy was a strong predictor of caregiving 
attitudes toward animals regardless of past experiences with animals. Importantly, those 
who reported participating in animal abuse were no different than others on the empathy 
measure. Whatever caused people to participate in animal abuse, it was not a failure of 
dispositional empathy. In fact, the only predictor of animal abuse was having been 
sexually abused as a child.67  
 A frequently cited counterexample to the cruelty-empathy link is the widespread 
love of animals in the Third Reich. The Nazis notoriously proposed and passed 
ambitious animal protectionist laws, advocating for anti-vivisection, humane hunting, 
pain reduction in livestock animals, and species preservation, as well as promoting 
vegetarianism as a moral ideal (Arluke & Sanders, 1996; Sax, 2000). Moreover, they 
often justified these ambitious laws by appealing to the non-instrumental value of 
animals—they did not exist just to be used by Germans or anyone else (Arluke & Sax, 
1992). They also frequently cited various emotions related to empathy in justifying their 
                                                
67 Evidence for empathy deficiency as a cause of bad behavior in general is also mixed. On 
violence, sexual abuse, and bullying see Maibom (2012) for a review. See Dadds (2008) for 
further discussion of predictors of animal abuse in childhood. See McPhedran (2009) for a 
critique of the relationship between empathy and cruelty similar in spirit to my own. 
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actions. For instance, one of their stated aims in promoting animal protection laws was 
to “awaken and strengthen compassion as one of the highest moral values of the German 
people” (Arluke & Sax, 1992, p. 8). Nazis are typically considered the archetype for 
cruelty and insensitivity, so it would seem that their cruel traits must either be caused by 
something unrelated to empathy or by a very specific form of empathy failure.  
 Another potential counterexample comes from work derived from Stanley 
Milgram’s famous shock experiments. In these experiments, participants were instructed 
to deliver increasingly painful shocks to someone who was ostensibly just another 
participant. Across a wide variety of different experimental conditions, people readily 
delivered the shocks, even when the target (who was actually a confederate enlisted by 
Milgram) explicitly asked not to continue and in some cases showed signs of harm, even 
apparent death. Sheridan and King (1972) conducted a variation on this experiment in 
which they replaced the human confederate with a puppy.  However, for this experiment, 
the puppy received actual shocks. Sheridan and King found that 77% of participants 
were willing to deliver shocks to the puppy. Though the shocks were deemed to be 
harmless, they were jolting enough to occasionally elicit howls from the puppy. 
Apparently, this was not enough to motivate people to desist from following the 
instructions to shock. 
 One might affirm in response to these disturbing results that these participants 
were indeed failing to empathize with the puppy. A common explanation for Milgram’s 
results is that people readily conform to authority. In the case of the puppy, it could be 
said, people similarly conformed to authority and thus failed to consider the situation 
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from the puppy’s perspective. The circumstances were so abnormal, and the external 
pressure so strong, that participants’ empathy either wasn’t engaged properly or was 
easily overwhelmed. Either way, it still indicates an empathy failure. As Miller (2009) 
argues, one can make a case for the importance of empathy by simply saying that if the 
right triggers are available for eliciting empathy, then people will act kindly and provide 
assistance. In the Milgram experiments the right triggers were not available, so people 
could not respond empathically, leading to cruel behaviors.  
 This interpretation seems hopeless, however, if empathy is supposed to be central 
to moral concern. Empathy with animals must be able to operate outside of situations in 
which it is relatively easy to empathize. Many industries in which animals are said to be 
treated cruelly, including in laboratories and on farms, possess precisely the sort of 
authoritative structure used in Milgram’s experiments. If the failure to treat animals well 
in intensive animal agriculture, for instance, is a result of an empathy failure, then it 
would seem that empathy is too weak to rely on for many of our moral aims. Presumably 
cruelty caused by empathy failures would be pervasive throughout society.  
 
5.2.5 Empathy Expands our Moral Concern to Outgroups 
 One task commonly attributed to empathy is expanding concern to those for 
whom we normally have difficulty showing concern. Members of outgroups, typically 
those from countries or ethnicities that are not our own, receive less attention and moral 
concern than people in our ingroup. Empathy is responsible for expanding our “moral 
circle” in a way that our normal treatment of outgroups cannot accomplish. For example, 
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research has found that empathy can induce positive attitudes towards normally 
stigmatized people—those who are considered low in warmth and competence (Batson, 
Chang, Orr, & Rowland, 2002; Batson et al., 1997). This includes people with AIDS, 
homeless people, drug addicts, and convicted murderers. 
 We might predict that empathy plays a similar function with respect to animals. 
Many animals live in our homes as members of our family, and are at the very least 
considered honorary members of our ingroup, but many others are clearly treated as 
outgroup members. Perhaps empathy can induce positive attitudes towards even 
outgroup animals, and potentially motivate increased moral concern. This possibility is 
nicely characterized by Robert Solomon, in describing our expanding moral sense:  
[W]hat allows the circle to expand is not reason…but rather knowledge and 
understanding in the sense of coming to appreciate the situations and the 
circumstances in which other people and creatures find themselves. This requires 
what many theorists now call "empathy" or "feeling with”…. We learn to 
empathize with others…. We learn to perceive chickens, cows, and warthogs as 
sentient beings with real emotions, and we learn to conceive of our uses of 
animals as a moral choice, not, first of all, because of any rational principles but 
because of our cultivated and expanded emotional awareness. (1999, p. 75-76). 
 
Here Solomon emphasizes that acquiring empathy and moral sensitivity to others is a 
learning process. This is conceding, to a certain extent, that we are not naturally sensitive 
to the emotions of outgroup members. But this still allows for the use of empathy to 
extend our concern to outgroups (indeed it provides a reason to encourage explicit 
teaching of empathy). 
 While this is a noble goal, it faces significant obstacles in being realized in 
human psychology. We might be able to bypass issues concerning our natural empathic 
abilities by advocating explicit use of empathy (where this includes prompts and 
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reminders), but this does not mean that people will be capable of setting aside other 
psychological limitations they possess in empathizing with outgroups. Notwithstanding 
some of Batson’s work, research on human-oriented empathy has generally found that 
empathy does not motivate help for outgroups. When people do help outgroups, they 
usually do so because of some sense of similarity to themselves (Stürmer, Snyder, 
Kropp, & Siem, 2006). When people are given the option to empathize with both 
ingroups and outgroups, they generally focus only on their ingroup (Brown, Bradley, and 
Lang, 2006). This is true even if other typical elicitors are manipulated. For example, 
Stürmer, Snyder, and Omoto (2005) found ingroup biases even if outgroup members 
were physically attractive and even if outgroup members had a serious illness in need of 
treatment. An explanation for this phenomenon offered by recent brain imaging 
experiments is that our empathic neural substrates are attuned only to ingroups (Gutsell 
& Inzlicht, 2010; Gutsell & Inzlicht, 2012; Xu, Zuo, Wang, & Han, 2009). 
 A related phenomenon in empathizing with animals, as discussed in section 3, is 
the effect of physical similarity to humans. A common finding in various surveys (Batt, 
2009; Eddy, Gallup, & Povinelli, 1993) is that people attribute mental states to animals 
based roughly on phylogenetic proximity and physical similarity to humans. A similar 
finding has been found with empathy and moral concern. For instance, Plous (1993) 
showed participants pictures of a monkey, raccoon, pheasant, and bullfrog, and told 
them that each animal had been abused in certain ways. Skin conductance measurements 
showed increased activity in response to the animals’ similarity to humans (see also 
Opotow, 1993). Westbury and Neumann (2008) similarly found that empathic emotional 
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responses to animals in abusive situations increased according to phylogenetic similarity 
(as measured by survey as well as skin conductance responses).  
 This bias for similarity to humans can also be seen in people’s allocation of 
punishment for animal abuse. In one experiment (Allen et al., 2002), people read about 
abuse of a goose, monkey, possum, or goanna. They were then asked how much 
punishment they would give the transgressor. Those who scored highest in empathy gave 
out harsher punishments, and this was mediated by similarity to humans. So those high 
in empathy did indeed rush to protect some animals, but this was limited to species 
nearest to us, most notably the primates. Moreover, people were willing to allocate harsh 
punishments for abusing these animals. It’s not clear from this experiment whether 
people were too harsh, but this is nonetheless worrisome in that it replicates the 
favoritism shown generally to human ingroups.  
 As Jesse Prinz (2011a) says about the limitations of empathy, “We can no more 
overcome its limits than we can ride a bicycle across the ocean; it is designed for local 
travel” (p. 229). The evidence cited here suggests that many animals are not considered 
part of any ingroup for humans. The only way in which empathy can assist animals is if 
they possess physical, functional, or phylogenetic similarity to humans, or if they are 
made honorary ingroup members through domestic companionship. This makes empathy 
useful in terms of prompting moral concern for some animals, but its scope is too limited 
to expand generalized moral concern to all animals. 
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5.2.6 Empathy Motivates Us to Act on our Moral Duties 
A common idea is that empathy is helpful for motivating moral action. For 
instance, we might in fact view animals positively, and recognize that they are owed 
improved treatment, but fail to act appropriately because we are not sufficiently 
motivated. Consider factory farming: few would deny that factory farming is morally 
problematic, yet few take action to improve or abolish such practices. What is needed, 
one might say, is more empathy, to transform our moral judgments into appropriate 
action. Empathy assists us in meeting the moral ends we have set for ourselves. I reject 
this claim: empathy is a weak motivator, and when it does motivate, the results often run 
contrary to our moral aims.    
In response to the arguments of the previous section, it could be maintained that 
empathy is a strong motivator of moral concern, so long as it is directed at ingroup 
members. For instance, someone could point out that dogs in the U.S. are generally 
considered ingroup members, yet dog abuse and abandonment is still quite high. 
Promoting empathy could increase moral concern expressed towards these animals and 
others like them. Farm animals may also be potential targets of ingroup empathy. 
Domestic companions and livestock, assuming they are sufficiently close to human 
ingroups, demand moral attention best served by empathy.  
 A good deal of the evidence in support of the motivational powers of empathy in 
humans comes from the work of Daniel Batson. One application of Batson’s methods to 
animals comes from Berenguer (2007), who also found strong evidence for the 
motivational powers of empathy. Berenguer showed people one of two pictures, either a 
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row of trees that had been cut down or a bird covered in oil. People were then asked to 
either judge the pictures objectively or to imagine the feelings of the entity affected and 
how the event affected that entity’s feelings. Participants’ opinions were then solicited 
on how a global funding agency should spend its money. Results showed that those who 
were asked to imagine the feelings of the target (the empathy condition) wanted more 
money to be donated to environmental causes (for both targets). This provides pretty 
straightforward evidence that empathy can motivate prosocial behaviors toward animals. 
It’s also important to note that the intention to help was generalized. The assistance 
participants were willing to provide went beyond the targets and was aimed at 
environmental causes in general. This indicates that empathy is capable of producing 
general prosocial behaviors (which is consistent with other research on the effects of 
empathy towards humans; Eisenberg, Fabes, & Spinrad, 2006; Eisenberg & Miller, 
1987). 
 I discussed above how this sort of phenomenon could also be accounted for by 
moral anger (which could also explain the effects of participants’ responses to something 
like a bird covered in oil). Here I’ll pursue a different objection, directed at the strength 
of motivation provided by empathy. A common criticism of Batson’s research is that 
empathy produces only superficial helping (Neuberg et al., 1997). While the forms of 
helping uncovered by Bereunger are important (such as donating money to help 
animals), the centrality thesis sets a high bar for what empathy should accomplish.   
One illuminating study indicating that empathy is a relatively weak motivator 
comes from Krueger et al. (2013). They injected participants with oxytocin, a hormone 
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known to increase empathy, after which participants read about different transgressions 
involving one person causing serious physical harm to another person (e.g., a robber 
punching a gas station attendant). The results showed that oxytocin injections increased 
participants’ perception of harm but did not have any effect on how much punishment 
they thought the transgressors deserved. Though this might be cited as evidence that 
empathy produces moral concern (perceiving greater harm), it also perfectly illustrates 
empathy’s inability to motivate moral behavior, even when clearly influencing people’s 
moral judgments. Participants could have acted on the greater harm they perceived by 
delivering greater punishment, but they did not. 
 By contrast, the experiments discussed earlier indicate that anger is highly 
motivating, especially in responding to perceived transgressions. Of the six empirical 
theses I have examined, the centrality of moral anger—not empathy—is perhaps clearest 
on the issue of motivation. When attempting to rectify injustices, responding to personal 
threats, or simply trying to achieve some highly desired moral goal, anger seems to be 
the best candidate for providing motivational power  (Carver & Harmon-Jones, 2009).  
This is important when considering that in much of the empathy literature 
(including Berenguer, 2007), participants are prompted to empathize. Participants could 
also be prompted with other, potentially more motivating, emotions, like anger. It’s also 
possible that, because empathy functions to elicit other emotions, the process of empathy 
is motivational only insofar as it elicits other, more motivating, emotions (again, like 
anger; Batson et al., 2007). If other emotions are more motivational, either through direct 
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prompting or indirectly through empathy, then those should be the focus for ethicists 
looking to motivate moral behavior.   
   
5.3 Ethical Implications of Empathy 
 In this section, I have evaluated six prominent empirical claims made about 
empathy and found all of them to be, to different degrees, problematic. These claims are 
often taken to illustrate the centrality of empathy in producing moral concern for 
animals—they offer reasons to think empathy is psychologically essential to showing 
moral concern for animals. In rejecting these claims, I have also proposed that other, 
non-empathic, emotions are more capable of producing moral concern for animals. I 
have focused in particular on moral anger. Moral anger is highly motivating and can be 
used to respond to transgressions against animals. 
However, many animal ethicists may feel as if something has gone wrong. 
Empathy is the quintessential moral emotion, so my argument must be mistaken. 
Perhaps I have identified the wrong empirical claims, or perhaps I have failed to identify 
the conception of empathy favored by specific ethical theories, or perhaps I need to 
account for the possibility that future evidence would contradict the studies I have 
reviewed here. Rather than address a wide range of potential criticisms, I will return 
again to cognitive empathy, and our ability to learn to be more attuned to animals’ 
emotions. This is where I suspect the most significant disagreements will arise. After 
addressing cognitive empathy, I will conclude with brief suggestions for animal ethicists 
in turning to non-empathic emotions. 
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5.3.1 Controlling Empathy 
Consider the definition Lori Gruen (2009) provides for what she variously calls 
“entangled” or “engaged” empathy: 
Engaged empathy is a process whereby individuals who are empathizing with the 
well-being of others first respond to the other’s condition (most likely, but not 
exclusively, by way of a pre-cognitive empathetic reaction), and then reflectively 
imagine themselves in the position of the other, and then make a judgment about 
how the conditions that the other finds herself in may contribute to her state of 
mind or impact upon her interests. These judgments will involve assessing the 
salient features of the situation and require that the empathizer seek to determine 
what information is pertinent to effectively empathize with the being in question. 
(pp. 29-30) 
 
Gruen’s position accommodates emotional contagion but primarily requires a great deal 
of cognition. Reflective imagination, I suggested above, is used infrequently, and mostly 
as a failsafe. Consideration of interests, while certainly important for expressing moral 
concern for animals, is not part of empathy, as I understand it. But someone might object 
that engaged, or cognitive, empathy is what animal ethicists should focus on. Ethicists 
cannot rely on our automatic processes to be sufficient.  
Two features of empathy that make this proposal particularly problematic are 
empathy’s ingroup bias and its weak motivational powers (the fifth and sixth hypotheses 
examined above). These are inherent in empathy and extremely difficult to modify. If we 
want to produce moral concern for outgroups—like animals—we need a different 
emotion.  
Suppose for the sake of argument, however, that my rejection of the fifth and 
sixth hypotheses was mistaken. I will highlight a third feature that makes cognitive 
empathy ineffective and unhelpful: what is known as Just World Bias or Just World 
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Theory. Lerner and colleagues’ seminal research (Lerner, 1980; Lerner & Miller, 1978; 
Lerner & Simmons, 1966) found that victims who people were otherwise inclined to 
help were blamed for their situation if their suffering could not be alleviated. The 
explanation offered by psychologists is that this phenomenon is the result of a bias 
towards thinking that the world is fundamentally just, commonly expressed in the 
psychological literature as “people get what they deserve and deserve what they get.” 
For instance, when people are asked to imagine how it would feel to be homeless—a 
group of people who experience persistent suffering—people tend to reduce their 
expressed concern for the homeless (Kozak, Marsh, & Wegner, 2006). The explanation 
for this is that people assume that such persistent suffering would not occur in a just 
world. Since the world is just, they reason, anyone who lives in poor conditions, such as 
the homeless, deserve their plight. 
This is relevant to animals because empathy requires people to look at animals’ 
external conditions. Gruen’s definition includes this feature, as does Elisa Aaltola’s 
(2012, chapter 6), among animal ethicists. I do not know of any research directly testing 
the relationship between just world beliefs and animals, but we can predict that people’s 
responses will vary according to the plight of the animal in question. For instance, a pig 
living in wretched conditions might be considered appropriate for the pig. Imagining 
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pigs’ external conditions is likely to make people content with their plight and think they 
deserve nothing better.68  
In short, the just world bias predicts that people will search for a reason to blame 
someone for their condition, rather than respond to injustice or real harms. Positive 
empathic responses will thus be limited by the extent to which our just world beliefs lead 
us to blame animals for their situation. Importantly, it is unlikely that this can be 
overcome with cognitive control. The Just World Bias is a general psychological process 
predicted to be employed even when we attempt to control our initial responses. Thus, 
we are likely to judge animals to be responsible for their poor conditions, even when we 
step back to fully imagine what it would be like to be in their situation.69  
 
5.3.2 Concluding Thoughts 
 Given my analysis of the centrality thesis, we must conclude that empathy is not 
central to producing moral concern for animals. And given what I have just said about 
just world beliefs, we must also be skeptical of the ability of cognitive processes to make 
empathy more central. Cognitive perspective taking can indeed function as a failsafe 
under certain conditions, but this is not sufficient to justify giving empathy a privileged 
role in our moral theories. 
                                                
68 Asking someone to empathize with domestic pets, by contrast, is likely to produce greater 
concern, as pets in the West often live comfortable lives among people who already care for 
them.  
69 There is also some evidence that anger, or “moral outrage,” is absent in cases of “system 
justification” (Wakslak, Jost, Tyler, & Chen, 2007). This again illustrates the importance of 
moral anger, though there is not enough empirical evidence to compellingly argue that anger is 
capable of overcoming the Just World Bias.  
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 Instead, ethicists should turn to the plethora of other moral emotions we possess 
towards animals. In doing this, one aspect of empathy that should be retained is the focus 
on animas’ external conditions. Seeing how animals live evokes emotional responses 
and drives us to consider whether we are treating them rightly or wrongly. This includes 
not just moral anger, but all the other emotions we normally feel in response to moral 
transgressions—guilt, shame, disgust, and contempt, among others. Ethicists have been 
right to focus on our emotional responses to animal abuses, but it is these other 
emotions—not empathy—that have the potential to actually produce moral concern for 
animals. 
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6. CONCLUSION: TOWARDS PSYCHOLOGICAL PLAUSIBILITY 
To this point my conclusions have been largely negative—identifying what 
animal ethicists should avoid. Here I will make more positive suggestions and sketch 
some strategies for constructing psychologically plausible theories in animal ethics. 
First, however, I will review the main claims I have made thus far. Then I will return to 
issues raised about psychological plausibility and propose strategies for pursuing social 
and political change.  
 
6.1 Summary of Main Claims 
 Section 2 aimed to identify basic psychological constraints on ethical theories. I 
argued against Owen Flanagan’s account of the psychological plausibility of ethical 
theories on the grounds that it fails to actually rule out any ethical theories, and then 
proposed five of my own criteria for assessing an ethical theory’s psychological 
plausibility. These criteria demand that ethicists 1) look to psychological science to 
support their theories, 2) ensure that their theories’ demands can ultimately be met by 
human beings, 3) promote ideas that can have an impact on currently existing human 
beings, 4) have a plan for modifying human psychology if current psychological profiles 
are inadequate, and 5) make moral psychological claims that are broadly consistent with 
their theories’ main goals. I also discussed ways in which psychological constraints 
impact ethical prescriptions for theories that meet these basic criteria. My argument, in 
short, was that when individuals possess limited resources, such that moral obligations 
cannot be met, then individuals do not have the relevant moral obligations. 
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The aim of sections 3, 4, and 5 was to identify the most significant psychological 
limitations relevant to animal ethics. I focused on attributing mental states to animals, 
the role of animals as disgust elicitors, and the role of empathy in producing moral 
concern for animals. To evaluate the normative implications of these issues, I primarily 
drew from the Impact, Achievability, and Transition criteria outlined in section 2. That 
is, I examined whether theories in animal ethics could have an impact on current 
psychological profiles, given these psychological factors, or if they could not, whether 
there was a plausible transition plan for people to be able to meet these demands at some 
point in the future. 
 First I examined mentalizing, and argued that the empirical evidence supports 
the phenomenal account of mentalizing, which holds that animals are deemed morally 
considerable only if they are attributed phenomenal mental states. Agential states, by 
contrast, do not factor into moral considerability judgments. I also provided evidence 
that phenomenal mental states are attributed mainly to animals that look and act like 
human beings, thereby limiting the range of animals deemed morally considerable. This 
poses a challenge to ethicists, I argued, since the range of animals thought to be capable 
of experiencing phenomenal states is far beyond those that look and act like us. This 
additionally places limits on animals’ moral significance, insofar as moral 
considerability is a prerequisite for moral significance. My ultimate conclusion in 
section 3 was that pure agential views—those that deny the relationship between 
phenomenal states and moral considerability—fail to satisfy the Impact, Achievability, 
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and Transition criteria, while theories that attribute sentience to a wide range of animals 
satisfy these criteria but still face significant psychological difficulties.  
In section 4, I surveyed research indicating that animals cause disgust through 
two different mechanisms: core disgust and animal reminder disgust (or mortality 
salience). In short, animals activate systems designed to protect us from contaminants, 
which leads us to show aversion towards animals. The aversive reactions caused by 
animals, I argued, raise two further challenges: 1) for psychologists, explaining how we 
cope with animals, despite their disgust-evoking powers; 2) for ethicists, accounting for 
this aversion when arguing that animals deserve improved moral treatment. I dealt with 
the psychological problem by drawing from research on dehumanization, and proposed 
that we cope with animals, and our disgust responses to them, by attributing mental 
states that include positive evaluations but simultaneously “mark” animals as inferior 
beings. That is, animals are evaluated positively but in a way that indicates they are sub-
human. In order to address the ethical issue, I turned again to the criteria of Impact, 
Achievability, and Transition. I granted to “disgust skeptics” that our disgust responses 
could be managed by changing laws and policies, thus satisfying my minimal conditions 
for psychological plausibility. However, I argued that these changes do not necessarily 
entail moral psychological change for individuals, and thus individuals who still lack the 
resources to overcome their disgust responses cannot be expected to meet various moral 
obligations to animals. 
 Section 5 focused on empathy towards animals. I examined six empirical claims 
commonly made in support of the idea that empathy is central to showing moral concern 
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for animals—what I called the centrality thesis. I found each of these claims to be 
problematic, and thus rejected the centrality thesis. I also reviewed evidence indicating 
that other moral emotions, particularly anger, are more central to showing moral concern 
for animals. Since I acknowledged that empathy could produce moral concern for 
animals, I did not measure empathy-based theories using my minimal criteria for 
psychological plausibility. Instead, I provided reasons to think that attempts to improve 
or enhance empathy in order to thereby produce moral concern would ultimately fail. 
My suggestion for ethicists looking to improve moral concern for animals was to turn to 
other moral emotional responses to animals. 
 Overall, I found that most theories in animal ethics either fail to meet my 
minimal criteria for psychological plausibility or face significant psychological obstacles 
(despite meeting the minimal criteria). The latter category of theories—those that are 
minimally plausible but face significant challenges from human psychology—will be the 
focus of the rest of the section. The main question for theories that are minimally 
plausible is whether the ideals they promote can be realized through social and political 
change. In short, these theories need to pursue a transition plan, along the lines of my 
discussion in section 2.  
 
6.2 Managing Psychological Limitations  
 One of the chief issues raised in section 2 was the implication of limited 
resources for individuals’ moral obligations. I argued that when individual resources are 
in fact limited, such that moral obligations cannot be met, then individuals do not have 
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the relevant moral obligations. The solution usually offered for limitations in 
individuals’ resources, which I sketched briefly in section 2 and described in more detail 
in section 4 on the topic of disgust, is to pursue social and political change so that 
individuals have greater resources to work with. That is, the best way to overcome 
psychological constraints is through incremental change at the level of laws and policies. 
In this section, I set aside the issue of individuals’ moral obligations and focus instead on 
societies’ obligations to change laws and policies.  
 One interesting theme of the psychological processes I have focused on is the 
role of animal bodies. Animal bodies determine (and limit) phenomenal mentalizing, 
elicit disgust in human beings, and identify animals as outgroup members, thus making 
animals unlikely targets for human empathy. My suggestions will thus focus on 
changing our perceptions of animal bodies. I will propose strategies for handling 
problems raised by animal bodies, specifically those influenced by our Just World Bias 
and disgust toward animals. These suggestions are largely speculative, since the relevant 
research has yet to be conducted. My aim is to make these suggestions amenable to 
further empirical study and practical applications. 
 Two preliminary issues must be addressed before proceeding. There are 
generally two types of proposals for managing psychological limitations. A society 
could protect against potential harmful impacts of psychological processes, or it could 
attempt to change psychological processes so they no longer have the potential to cause 
harm. I will be discussing the latter, and essentially taking for granted that it could be 
achieved through ordinary democratic processes. However, there has been much debate 
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over the extent to which liberal societies (like the U.S.) can engage in either of these 
projects, specifically with respect to animals (Donaldson & Kymlicka, 2011; Garner, 
2005; Smith, 2012). The reason usually cited for why liberal societies cannot pursue 
these strategies is that liberal societies embrace the doctrine of “exclusion of ideals” 
(Raz, 1986, pp. 134-136). That is, they do not explicitly endorse any particular moral 
ideal in constructing laws and policies. This is problematic with respect to animals 
because not everyone values animals in the same way, and in many cases people’s 
values conflict. Though providing basic protections for animals is now widely 
considered permissible (Donaldson & Kymlicka, 2011), endorsing laws and policies that 
aim to change people’s moral psychological responses to animals is not.  
However, I will not address the reasons usually given against the latter project in 
any detail, nor will I provide a thorough defense of its legitimacy. Changing moral 
psychologies through laws and policies is the primary aim of many ethicists and political 
philosophers, even if the strategies for doing so are not straightforwardly permissible in 
normal democratic processes. Insofar as change is inevitable, and laws and policies will 
nudge changes relevant to animals in one direction or another, we must assume that 
governments and institutions will have some sort of influence on these outcomes, and 
can be evaluated accordingly. I intend for my suggestions to be useful for changing laws 
and policies, but I leave it to other ethicists and political philosophers—those whose 
theories require moral psychological change—to determine how my suggestions might 
be incorporated into normal democratic processes. 
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The second preliminary issue that must be addressed is how the motivation and 
societal resources for moral psychological change are supposed to come about if the 
population at large does not yet support the change (because they do not have the right 
moral psychological profile). Though I think this is a difficult problem that ethicists 
would need to address in order to enact certain policies, my suggestions will be aimed at 
cases in which moral psychological change is being instituted by individuals acting 
independently of the population as a whole (e.g., these policies would not be put through 
a voting procedure). The cases I have in mind are akin to what Thaler and Sunstein 
(2009) call “nudges,” where people’s decision frameworks are modified in order to steer 
their choices in particular directions. As Sunstein (2013) discusses, there are in fact 
offices of the U.S. government (like the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs) 
that possess the authority and the resources to initiate nudges, particularly through policy 
change. These nudges are open to public inspection, but they do not require public 
support in order to be enacted, thus avoiding the problem of obtaining public support 
prior to pursuing moral psychological change. 
Based on the research discussed in previous sections, two highly problematic 
features of current psychological profiles are our tendency to defend injustices toward 
nonhumans (the just world bias) and to be disgusted by nonhumans (core disgust/ 
mortality salience). These influence many other processes (including our bias towards 
things that look and act like us), thus fundamentally impacting our relationships with 
animals. Any attempts to change moral psychology will likely need some general plan 
for managing these processes. 
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6.2.1 Disgust and Animal Bodies 
With respect to disgust and mortality salience, the main challenge is managing 
our perceptions of animal bodies. The role of bodies in eliciting disgust in particular is 
what prompted Martha Nussbaum to urge solutions focused on “the body itself, and our 
anxieties about it” (2003, p. 424). But as I discussed in section 4, focusing on the body 
will likely be unhelpful because it will enhance disgust towards animals. Similarly, I do 
not think increased focus on the body will assist in overcoming any psychological biases 
with respect to mentalizing or empathy. Instead, what is needed are proposals for 
changing how we perceive animal bodies. 
One possible source for proposals on perceiving gross physical features is the 
literature on managing racism. For instance, Kelly, Faucher, and Machery (2010) review 
evidence for what they call “the dissemination hypothesis” as well as the well-known 
“contact hypothesis” (Gaertner, Rust, Dovidio, Bachman, & Anastasio, 1994). These 
ask, roughly, if either increased knowledge of other races or increased contact with other 
races will reduce harmful racist biases. We can ask the same questions of our 
relationships with animals. For instance, in a recent book review, Jessica Pierce (2013) 
proposes a combination of both strategies: 
  I challenge any skeptic to spend a few weeks immersed in the now extensive 
literature on animal cognition, emotion, and prosocial behavior—and then spend 
a couple of weeks in the company of animals—and still come away with a sense 
that they are less sensitive, less intelligent, less socially attuned than humans. Our 
skeptic will certainly come away thinking that animals can't do everything we 
do…. But she will also come away with a new appreciation of our own limited 
capacities and a new respect for other forms of life—including, I would think, a 
sense that our wanton cruelty and disregard for others' lives and feelings is just 
plain wrong. 
 
  177 
Applying this to policy change, perhaps certain national organizations could be induced 
to provide the necessary resources for people to learn more about animals and to come 
into greater contact with them. Zoos and other scientific organizations engage in some of 
this already, but Pierce is clearly suggesting something more involved.  
In Kelly, Faucher, and Machery’s review, they argue that the dissemination 
hypothesis is unsupported by the evidence (knowing more about other races has no 
effect on racism) but that the contact hypothesis has some support. The evidence, they 
argue, suggests that coming into contact with other races does indeed reduce racism, 
albeit only slightly and only in specific circumstances. I will not provide a thorough 
review of the literature, but the evidence on the dissemination hypothesis for animals 
suggests the same negative conclusion (Hazel, Signal, & Taylor, 2011; Heleski & 
Zanella, 2006; Jamieson et al., 2012). I will thus focus on the contact hypothesis as it 
applies to animals. 
What is needed is a better understanding of the types of contact with animals that 
can modify our aversive responses. Unfortunately research on contact with animals has 
not addressed this issue in much detail. Typically researchers study the effects of 
introducing animals that are already viewed positively, like dogs and rabbits (Daly & 
Suggs, 2010). “Disgusting” animals in these studies are usually somewhat familiar to the 
participants, like fish and frogs. Moreover, researchers usually investigate what people 
learn about animals from handling them, rather than how aversive responses might be 
managed. Thus, we do not have a very good idea of how to avoid aversive and avoidant 
reactions to animals.  
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One exception to these trends is a study by Randler, Hummel, and Prokop 
(2012). They were able to reduce 11-13 year old children’s disgust towards a wood 
louse, a snail, and a mouse by exposing the children to each animal, combined with basic 
instruction about proper handling in order to avoid causing harm. Another study of 11-
12 year-old children found that disgust and fear towards toads, frogs, and salamander 
were greatly influenced by direct experience with each type of animal, indicating that 
more experience led to more favorable attitudes (Tomažič, 2011). Though only 
suggestive, these studies indicate what sorts of interventions, if pursued on a larger scale, 
might be able to reduce people’s aversive responses to animals.  
To optimize the chances of success, future interventions would need to utilize a 
wide variety of animals (e.g., mammals that are likely to elicit disgust), which might 
prove difficult to implement on a larger scale, and thus require a larger amount of 
resources. Researchers and policy makers would also have to take into account the 
possibility that the way people respond to handling animals in controlled settings (like a 
classroom) does not generalize to other situations. For instance, perhaps aversion is 
reduced by bringing disgusting animals into clean, controlled environments but returns 
to baseline when the animals are encountered in their normal environment. Future 
research should look into whether the contact hypothesis is more effective for some 
types of animal exposures than others.  
Increased contact with animals might also have trickle-down effects. For 
instance, Morris, Knight, and Lesley (2012) found that familiarity with animals, 
including rodents, increased attributions of mental states, particularly emotions. Given 
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my discussion of the phenomenal account in section 3, we can expect that increased 
contact with an animal increases the probability of that animal being deemed morally 
considerable. Depending on the strength of this relationship, increased contact might 
also help in overcoming our bias towards animals that look and act like human beings. 
For instance, perhaps people are naturally inclined to deny phenomenal mental states to 
rats, thereby also denying them moral considerability, but this can be at least partially 
reversed with certain types of exposure and handling. 
 
6.2.2 Justifying Animals’ Living Conditions 
While contact with animals has some promise for reducing core disgust 
responses, it is arguably less suited for reducing mortality salience or just world 
responses. Just world responses are typically elicited by living conditions human beings 
perceive as unjust, while mortality salience is caused by symbolic threats to human 
existence. It is unlikely that increased exposure to animals would alleviate either of these 
responses. Instead, I will focus on changing animals’ living conditions.  
The main problem raised by the just world response is that we are likely to justify 
poor living conditions as being appropriate for animals, and on those grounds deny them 
improved treatment. The simplest way of avoiding this is to change animals’ living 
conditions. Just World Theory predicts that the just world response is elicited when 
animals’ conditions are indicative of misery and suffering. Misery and suffering cannot 
exist in a just world, so their existence must be explained some other way—as 
appropriate for animals. Rather than attempt to modify the just world response, so that 
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people see misery and suffering as bad in themselves, I suggest that a more effective 
solution would be to circumvent the just world response entirely. This might be achieved 
by changing animals’ conditions so they are not indicative of misery and suffering. For 
instance, small, dirty enclosures isolated from other members of an animal’s species will 
likely elicit the just world response in ordinary human agents; these are the sorts of 
conditions human beings would find uncomfortable and seek to justify. This could be 
avoided, however, by providing enclosures and living conditions that people would 
associate with improved treatment. This would not necessarily lead people to think that 
animals deserve a higher standard of treatment, but it would prevent the elicitation of 
just world responses. 
This might also have the side effect of diminishing animals’ mortality salience. 
Haslam’s research, discussed in section 4, seems to indicate that we feel more 
comfortable with animals’ presence when we can anthropomorphize them in certain 
ways. Exaggerating their perceptual adeptness, for example, clearly demarcates them as 
separate from us. Animals’ living conditions can influence this exaggerated 
anthropomorphism. As I understand the process of dehumanization as it relates to 
mortality salience, human beings are likely to be threatened by either dirty living 
conditions or excessively lavish living conditions. Both processes reduce the gap 
between humans and nonhumans: the former by bringing humans down and reminding 
them of their animal natures, the latter by bringing nonhumans up and threatening 
human uniqueness. What are needed are living conditions that avoid both of these 
possible outcomes. We should work to create living conditions that are indicative neither 
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of misery and suffering nor similarity to human beings. This might involve somewhat 
superficial changes in living conditions—more directly informed by human biases than 
animal welfare—but animals would, as a result, be evaluated without the taint of 
mortality salience. 
 
6.3 Conclusion: Towards Psychological Plausibility in Animal Ethics 
 As I explained in section 2, ethicists and political philosophers have been 
untroubled by psychological limitations because they think any pertinent limitations can 
be overcome through incremental changes. Societies, like individuals, possess resource 
constraints, but those can be overcome incrementally (e.g., through decades of economic 
growth). In this section, I have described some general strategies for managing human 
psychology in order to meet moral goals and pursuing incremental change in animal 
ethics. The main psychological obstacles I identified are people’s perception of animal 
bodies and living conditions. Future proposals will likely need to develop roughly along 
the lines I have outlined, though much more research is needed in order to develop more 
specific strategies for moral psychological change. 
 A key factor in improving the psychological plausibility of ethical theories is 
providing individuals with greater resources. Bringing people into certain types of 
contact with animals, for instance, gives them greater resources for overcoming aversion 
they might have towards animals. Though this may seem like a simple idea, I hope to 
have shown throughout the various ways in which ethical theories fail to recognize that 
significant psychological constraints on individuals' reactions to animals exist that 
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cannot be effectively addressed, even incrementally, without significant commitments of 
societal resources. Solving this problem, and providing individuals with the resources to 
meet their moral obligations (as described by the main theories in animal ethics), 
requires greater attention to empirical research into moral psychology.  
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